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THREE IF BY EQUITY: MAREVA ORDERS &
THE NEW BRITISH INVASION
JEFFREY L. WILSON*
If you live in New York City for any decent amount of time, you
are bound to hear stories about things being stolen. Watches,
purses, cars, wallets, cargo trucks, you name it. Chances are, if
it has value, someone in this town has thought about stealing it.
That's no slight, mind you, on New York City's Finest. It's just a
fact of life produced by the confluence of eight million people in a
single place. Frankly, these stories tend to go in one ear and out
the other unless you happen to be the unfortunate one from
whom the item is stolen. Another product of big city living.
Even against that backdrop, one would think that making off
with a $40 million hotel might make the newspapers. After all,
just exactly how does one steal a hotel? Does insurance cover
that? Wouldn't there be a lot of witnesses? All of these are
reasonable questions. It happened in the summer of 2003, to the
Gorham Hotel on 55th Street and Sixth Avenue, just north of
Times Square in Manhattan. Not a word of it made the
mainstream press. For those of us with a subscription to the
NEW YORK STATE LAW DIGEST, however, the larcenous behavior
did not go unnoticed.1
The perpetrators did not use a gun. They did not have to.
They had access to a weapon of a different kind: a Mareva order.
Called a "nuclear weapon of the law," 2 the Mareva order has a
" J.D. Candidate, St. John's University School of Law, June 2005; B.B.A Finance &
Business Economics, cum laude, University of Notre Dame, May 1994. The author would
like to extend sincere and profound thanks to Professor Ettie Ward for her invaluable
guidance and assistance with this Note. Of course, nothing worth doing is worth doing
without thanking my family and friends.
1 Court of Appeals Reviews Circumstances in Which New York Will Recognize Foreign
Country Judgment Not Based on Jurisdictional Principles Identical to New York's Own,
N.Y. ST. L. DIG., No. 523 (New York State Bar Association 2003).
2 See Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 308, 332 (1999)
(stating court does not have authority to supersede law by creating "nuclear weapon of the
law"); Kern Alexander, The Mareva Injunction and Anton Piller Order: The Nuclear
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short but turbulent history, little-known but lethal and catching
on fast.3 Developed in 19754 by an English judge with a career
as celebrated and criticized as any in the twentieth century,5 the
Mareva order (also called a Mareva "injunction") will come to be
viewed by defendants unlucky enough to be subjected to one with
all of the regard with which civil libertarians greeted the USA
PATRIOT Act6 or organized crime dons welcomed the RICO Act.7
Weapons of English Commercial Litigation, 11 FLA. J. INT'L L. 487, 488 (1997) (describing
Mareva injunction as one of two nuclear weapons of law); see also Carlos Fabano,
Maximizing Plaintiff Protection in the World of Asset Freezing and Bypassing the Due
Process Requirement of Notice: The Mareva Injunction as an Alternative to the American
Legal Remedies, 9 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 131, 137 (2002) (defining Mareva injunction
as creditor's nuclear weapon).
3 See Grupo, 527 U.S. at 332 (recognizing the atomic appellation); see also Tim Taylor,
Worldwide Marevas in the Real Wide World, 86 L. Soc'Y GAZETrE 22 (1989) (describing
Mareva injunction, with Anton Piller order, as "one of the law's two 'nuclear' weapons").
But see Richard Aird, The Scottish Arrestment and the English Freezing Order, INT'L AND
CoMP. LAw QUART., 51.1(155) (2002) (citing Lord Denning's own appraisal of device as
"the greatest piece of judicial law reform in my time").
4 See Nippon Yusen Kaisha v. Karageorgis, [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1093, 1093 (Eng. C.A.)
(creating Mareva injunction); Mareva Compania Naviera v. Int'l Bulkcarriers S.A. (The
Mareva), [1980] 1 All E.R. 213, 213 (Eng. C.A.) (holding in 1975: "if it appears that the
debt is due and there is a danger that the debtor may dispose of his assets so as to defeat
it before judgment, the Court has jurisdiction in proper case to grant interlocutory
judgment so as to prevent him disposing of those assets); see also Rhonda Wasserman,
Equity Renewed: Preliminary Injunctions to Secure Potential Money Judgments, 67 WASH.
L. REV. 257, 338 (1992) (stating that in 1975 the Court of Appeal revolutionized English
practice).
5 See In Every Sense a People's Judge - Obituary: Lord Denning, FIN. TIMES (London),
Mar. 6, 1999, at 7 (citing Denning's efforts to improve equality of women in press,
individual freedoms, and consumer protection); Simon Tegel, Maverick "People's Judge"
Lord Denning is Mourned, BIRMINGHAM POST Mar. 6, 1999, at 6 (describing Denning as
"one of the most courteous and controversial judges of the century, [inspiring] public
affection for being more interested in justice than in the legal niceties"); John Torode,
Denning, Defender of Justice and Liberty; Former Master of the Rolls Dies at 100, DAILY
MAIL (London) March 6, 1999, at 39 (citing one of Denning's favorite quotes: "be you never
so high, you are not above the law.").
6 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272. The ACLU, clearly not a proponent of the legislation, states on its webpage:
Just 45 days after the September 11 attacks, with virtually no debate, Congress
passed the USA PATRIOT Act. Many parts of this sweeping legislation take away
checks on law enforcement and threaten the very rights and freedoms that we are
struggling to protect. For example, without a warrant and without probable cause,
the FBI now has the power to access your most private medical records, your library
records, and your student records... and can prevent anyone from telling you it was
done.
American Civil Liberties Union, "USA PATRIOT Act," available at http://www.aclu.org!
SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm? ID=12126&c=207 (last visited Mar. 19, 2005). Whether
the ACLU's assessment of threat posed by the USA PATRIOT Act is accurate is, of course,
a matter of conjecture and much debate.
7 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1969 (2000)
(enacted by Congress to create new avenues of prosecution for organized criminal
activity).
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A Mareva "injunction" is, technically, an interlocutory
judgment8 which freezes the assets of a defendant to ensure that
a plaintiffs final judgment will not go unsatisfied.9 Though
founded in equity,10 the procedure for obtaining a Mareva
injunction is now based in statute, and is, under the statute,
called a "freezing injunction."ll In the usual case, a creditor-
8 See Mareva Compania Naviera, [1980] 1 All E.R. at 213. Lord Denning stated:
In my opinion [the power to protect a party's legal or equitable right] applies to a
creditor who has a right to be paid the debt owing to him, even before he has
established his right by getting judgment for it. If it appears that the debt is due and
owing - and there is a danger that the debtor may dispose of his assets so as to defeat
it before judgment - the Court has jurisdiction in a proper case to grant an
interlocutory judgment so as to prevent him disposing of those assets.
Id. at 213 (emphasis added). There is considerable confusion, even in countries that have
adopted the procedure, as to exactly how to classify it. It is not technically an "injunction"
in the classical sense, as its recent genesis attests. The High Court of Australia has
recognized that the Mareva should not be considered part of the law of injunctions, calling
them instead "asset preservation orders." Cardile v. LED Builders Pty Ltd. [1999] 198
C.L.R. 380, 393 (Austl.). The leading professor of remedies law in Australia, however,
differs with the High Court's classification, stating, "Not only is [the Mareva's] historical
development associated with the law of injunctions, but they are an essential (and
controversial) part of the armour of prejudgment enforcement of remedies, a topic which
is itself entwined, in a very practical way, with the law of secondary rights." Michael
Tilbury, Remedy Discussion Forum: Teaching Remedies in Australia, 39 BRANDEIS L.J.
587, 590 (2001). Another prominent professor of remedies in Australia agrees. Bruce
Kercher, Remedy Discussion Forum: Legal History and the Study of Remedies, 39
BRANDEIS L.J. 619, 627 (2001). For the purposes of this Note, the term Mareva "order" is
preferred, though there may inevitably be reference to Mareva "injunctions," as well -
where so noted, the references should be considered synonymous.
9 See Mareva Compania Naviera, [1980] 1 All E.R. at 213 (holding that Court has
jurisdiction in proper case to grant interlocutory judgment so as to prevent debtor
disposing of his assets); Third Chandris Shipping Corp. v. Unimarine SA (The Pythia)
[1979] 3 W.L.R. 122, 122 (Eng. C.A.) (stating that plaintiff should give some grounds for
believing that there is risk of assets being removed before judgment is awarded); see also
Jet W. Ltd. v. Haddican [1992] 1 W.L.R. 545, 545 (Eng. C.A.) (suggesting that Mareva
injunction is means for preventing dissipation of assets in one way or another).
10 See HAROLD GREVILLE HANBURY & RONALD HARLING MAUDSLEY, MODERN EQUITY
784 (Jill E. Martin ed., 12th ed. 1985) (stating that Mareva injunction is founded in
equity); Jeffrey T. Kirshner & Ronald J. Silverman, Mareva Orders: Fact or Fiction in the
United States, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Nov. 2002, at 24 (citing well-established general
principle that judgment establishing debt was necessary before court of equity would
interfere with debtor's use of his property); Alan Seveg, Investment: When Countries Go
Bust: Proposals for Debtor and Creditor Resolution, 3 ASPER REV. INTL Bus. & TRADE L.
25, 57 (2003) (stating Mareva injunction is equitable remedy for attaching assets before
obtaining final judgment).
11 Though the Supreme Court Act of 1981, §37 (Eng.), codified the procedure into
English statutory law and renamed the device the "freezing injunction," American and
English courts still refer to it by its common law name. The name "Mareva" has also stuck
despite the fact that Mareva Compania Naviera was the second case in which this
procedure was implemented. The first case, occurring just one month before Mareva
Compania Naviera, issued an identical remedy. See Nippon Yusen Kaisha v. Karageorgis,
[1975] 1 W.L.R. 1093, 1093 (Eng. C.A.). The term "Mareva" is also still used to refer to
these injunctions in the United States. See, e.g., Grupo Mexicano De Desarrollo v. Alliance
Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 308, 342 (1999); Guinness PLC v. Ward, 955 F,2d 875, 878 (4th Cir.
1992).
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plaintiff who fears that a debtor-defendant might default on his
debt - and secret away his assets to frustrate any future
judgment - applies ex parte to an English court for this
provisional remedy.12 The plaintiff must demonstrate a "good
arguable case"13 and a real risk of default,14 all supported by a
full and frank disclosure of material facts, usually in the form of
an affidavit by his attorney.15 All of this takes place quickly and
secretly, so as not to tip off the defendant.16 If the judge agrees,
12 In any legal system - and some would argue in the English system particularly -
there necessarily will be delays between the commencement of an action and final
adjudication of the merits. Between those points, there exist dangers such as destruction
of evidence or dissipation of assets, both of which could potentially frustrate or eliminate
any satisfaction of plaintiffs claim following judgment. Courts have developed provisional
remedies which are designed to ensure, as much as possible, that the rights of the parties
are not irreparably harmed in the intervening span of time. JONATHAN HILL, THE LAW
RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL DISPUTES 559 (1994). Common examples
include interlocutory injunctions, disclosure orders, attachment, and appointments of
receivers. Id. at 559-60. The purpose of an interlocutory injunction is to preserve the
status quo and to protect the respective rights of the parties pending a determination on
the merits. Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc. 835 F.2d 859, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1987). A Mareva
injunction does not assist a right in the same way as an interlocutory injunction as a
Mareva order is a preliminary judgment rather than merely an initial manifestation of a
right which may later be established at trial. Tilbury, supra note 8, at 589.
13 See Rasu Martima S.A. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi
Negara (Pertamina) [1978] Q.B. 644, 644 (C.A.), aff'd, Polly Peck Int'l v. Nadir (No. 2)
[1992] All E.R. 769 (Eng. C.A.) (granting Mareva injunction based on showing of good
cause); see also Etablissement Esefka Int'l Anstalt v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, [1979] 1
Lloyd's Rep. 445, 448 (Eng. C.A.); Ninemia Mar. Corp. v. Trave Schiffahrtsgesellschaft
M.B.H.& Co. K.G., (The 'Niedersachsen'), [1983] 1 W.L.R. 1412, 1412 (Eng. C.A.) (stating
that risks must be proven by solid evidence).
14 See Ninemia Mar. Corp., [1983] 1 W.L.R. at 1412 (explaining proof necessary to
grant such injunctions); Establissement Ese/ka Int'l Anstalt, [1979] 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 445
(stating that Mareva injunction cannot be obtained unless there is some evidence that
defendant will default); see also Jeremy Ostrander, Note, The Last Bastion of Sovereign
Immunity: A Comparative Look at Immunity from Execution for Judgments, 22 BERKELEY
J. INT'L L. 541, 555 (2004) (stating that there is genuine risk of disappearance of assets for
sole purpose of avoiding judgment).
15 See Arena Corp. v. Schroeder [2003] E.W.H.C. 1089, 1089 (Eng. Ch.); Re Indus.
Servs. Group (No.1) [2003] B.P.I.R. 392, 392 (Eng. Ch.) (stating that attorney's affidavit
was sufficient to support injunction); Mary J. Davis, Summary Adjudication Methods in
United States Civil Procedure, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 229, 242 (1998) (stating that affidavit is
necessary to show that there is risk of immediate harm).
16 See HILL, supra note 12, at 587 (discussing need for secrecy); Mary A. Nation,
Comment, Granting a Preliminary Injunction Freezing Assets Not Part of the Pending
Litigation: Abuse of Discretion or an Important Advance in Creditors' Rights?, 7 TUL. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 367, 400 (1999) (explaining that order itself would be rendered
ineffective if defendant had knowledge of it and disposed or transferred assets prior to
granting of injunction); see also David Zicherman, Note, The Use of Pre-Judgment
Attachments and Temporary Injunctions in International Commercial Arbitration
Proceedings: A Comparative Analysis of The British and American Approaches, 50 U.
PITT. L. REV. 667, 676 (1989) (stating that because of need for secrecy, application for
Mareva injunction is "invariably made ex parte"). See generally David Perkins & Garry
Mills, Patent Infringement and Forum Shopping in the European Union, 20 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 549, 562 (1996) (explaining that putting defendant on notice of Mareva
injunctions would give him time to hide assets and frustrate their purpose).
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he can then freeze the known assets of the defendant and
impress into service the defendant's bankers17 (who are, of
course, sworn to secrecy)' 8 to assist the plaintiff in "tracing" any
other assets the defendant may have, usually up to the point of
the plaintiffs claim, though sometimes beyond.19 Only later,
sometimes months later,20 is the defendant told anything about
the order, creating a situation whereby a defendant literally
wakes up one morning and finds that everything he owns has
been "frozen" by an English court, his confidential fiduciaries
have made public his private finances, and he has been placed on
an allowance - not unlike that of a child - to pay for his living,
business, and legal expenses. 21
17 See Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Comm'rs of Customs & Excise, [1974] A.C. 133, 133
(Eng.) (discussing principle for disclosure against person who is not party to action);
Zicherman, supra note 16, at 675 (stating that Mareva injunction does not regulate only
actions of defendant; it also controls behavior of third parties and prevents them from
dissipating defendant's enjoined assets); see also Nation, supra note 16 at 399 (explaining
that banks would not be permitted to transfer funds or make other payments that would
be in violation of order).
18 See generally DAVID BARNARD & MARK HOUGHTON, THE NEW CIVIL COURT IN
ACTION, 247 (1993); Alexander, supra note 2, at 490 (explaining that to maintain element
of surprise, speed and secrecy are required); Fabano, supra note 2, at 140 (stating that
every person who has knowledge of injunction is obliged to do whatever he reasonably can
to preserve assets affected by its terms).
19 See, e.g., Gidrxslme Shipping Co. v. Tantomar-Transportes Maritimos Lda, [1995]
1 W.L.R. 299, 299 (Q.B.), where plaintiffs obtained a Mareva order restraining defendants
from: ".... removing [their] assets from the jurisdiction or disposing of, assigning their
rights to, charging, mortgaging, encumbering or otherwise howsoever dealing with any of
their assets within the jurisdiction until the Final Award was satisfied, save in so far as
the unencumbered value of the assets exceeded US$720,000." See also Cretanor Mar. Co.
v. Irish Mar. Mgmt. Ltd., [1978] 1 W.L.R. 966, 966 (Eng. C.A.), where the court issued a
Mareva injunction prohibiting defendant from removing assets up to a stated amount out
of the jurisdiction. A Co. Ltd. v. Republic of X, [1990] 2 Lloyd's Rep 520, 524 (Q.B.), is a
case which issued a Mareva injunction restraining the defendant from removing any of
his assets out of the jurisdiction or disposing of, assigning, or otherwise dealing with any
of his assets that exceed the judgment.
20 See CIBC Mellon Trust Co. v. Mora Hotel Corp., 100 N.Y.2d 215 (2003) (holding
that English procedures, although not indistinguishable from those used in New York, are
not incompatible with due process); see also Adler v. Fenton, 65 U.S. 407, 411 (1861)
(stating that laws accurately determine time and manner in which property becomes the
possession of creditors). See generally Perkins & Mills, supra note 16, at 676 (explaining
that putting defendant on notice of Mareva injunctions would give him time to hide assets
and frustrate their purpose).
21 Courts recognize that the Mareva order can be punitive as applied and expend not
a few paragraphs on reassuring those involved that defendants will be allowed to
maintain their lifestyle in the manner to which they are accustomed. But note the case of
PCW Ltd v. Dixon, [1983] 2 All E.R. 158, 158 (Q.B.), where a wealthy man with five
children in private education was granted an "allowance" of £100 per week for ordinary
living expenses, despite the fact that there was no evidence to suggest he was dissipating
his assets or living in a manner any different than he had before the case was filed. This
case demonstrates the powerful effect this type of procedure can have on a defendant to
consider settling the case against him, regardless of his culpability. See Iraqi Ministry of
Def. v. Arcepey Shipping Co. SA (The Angel Bell), [1980] 2 W.L.R. 488, 488 (Q.B.), which
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To add insult to pecuniary injury and privacy invasion, the
defendant can expect to disclose the rest of his assets 22 not
disclosed by his banks anywhere in the world and, in all
likelihood, to go out of business in a matter of weeks. 23
Sometimes, he can expect a knock on his door by the plaintiffs
solicitors, accompanied by local law enforcement, with another
court order allowing his adversary to seize papers, records, and
any potential evidence that might be required at the future
trial.24 There is no requirement that the defendant own assets in
England, conduct business in England, or, for that matter, ever
set foot in England. 25 His compliance with this oppressive order
is enforced on threat of contempt of court with sanctions ranging
from fines, to debarment from defending the merits of the suit, to
imprisonment.2 6
states that defendant's legal expenses, living expenses, and ordinary business expenses
will be considered. See also Wasserman, supra note 4, at 348 n.377, in which the author
cites multiple cases, all stating that the court will ensure that a defendant will remain
able to pay his routine expenses after the implementation of a Mareva injunction against
him, though this assumption is questionable in practice.
22 Derby & Co., Ltd. v. Weldon (No. 1), [1989] 2 W.L.R. 276, 276 (Eng. C.A.) (holding
that reach of Mareva orders extends to cover defendant's worldwide assets); George A.
Bermann, Provisional Relief in Transnational Litigation, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
553, 589 (1997) (recognizing Mareva injunctions over worldwide assets of defendants); see
Zero Knowledge Systems Inc., An Analysis of International Initiatives on High-Tech
Crime: A Review of Implications for the Canadian Policy Environment (2001), available at
http://www.lexinformatica.org/cybercrime/pub/perrin.pdf (listing Derby & Co. among other
British cases officially recognizing worldwide reach of Mareva orders).
23 Tony Willoughby, The Mareva Injunction: A Cruel Tyranny, EUR. INTELL. PROP. R..
1997, 19(8), at 480 (stating that, in his experience, few businesses can survive imposition
of a Mareva order for more than a week or two). Contrast Nation, supra note 16, at 403
(citing European courts' view that, as general principle, injunction should not interfere
with defendants' ordinary course of business). See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The
Bitter with the Sweet: Tradition, History, and Limitations in Federal Judicial Power - A
Case Study, 75 NOTRE DAMtE L. REV. 1291, 1321 n.166 (2000) (noting that Mareva
injunctions put defendants at serious disadvantage).
24 See Anton-Piller KG v. Manufacturing Processes Ltd., [1976] Ch. 55, 55 (Eng. C.A.)
(granting order without notice allowing plaintiff to search defendant's premises and
allowing him to remove documents belonging to plaintiff); see also HILL, supra note 12, at
560 (explaining generally British view of procedural aspects of international commercial
transactions); John Hull & Anton Piller Abuses, EURO. INTEL. PROP. REV., 1989, 11(10), at
389 (discussing particular abuses of this invasive procedure).
25 See Michael Bundock, The Onward March of the Mareva, 139 NEW L.J. 496 (1989)
(noting progression of English cases toward world-wide application of Mareva); Taylor,
supra note 3, at 2 (discussing how Mareva operates as procedural "back door" to English
court jurisdiction). See generally TERENCE INGMAN, THE ENGLISH LEGAL PROCESS 481-82
(9th ed. 2002) (describing how previous limits on Mareva to assets within English
territory "can no longer be regarded as good law").
26 The U.K. Practice Directions, Part 25, Appendix A provide a sample template
Mareva order (or "freezing injunction" as it is now called) to be filled in by plaintiffs and
presented ex parte to the court. On its face, it reads, "[If you] disobey this order you may
be held in contempt of court and may be imprisoned, fined or have your assets seized."
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Judges, to be sure, are cognizant of the dangers such
"remedies" can inflict on defendants.27 No small amount of ink is
expended in English decisions cautioning against the
unrestrained expansion of this procedure. 28  Yet, the
demonstrated trend of expansion yields a contrary conclusion.
What began as an exception to the general rule that a person's
property was his to do with as he saw fit until a legal judgment
held otherwise29 has taken on a life of its own, swallowing the
rule, moving beyond the borders of the jurisdiction that created
One sanction specifically discussed in Mareva cases is debarment of the defendant from
defending the case entirely. Lord Donaldson, in Derby & Co. Ltd v. Weldon (Nos. 3 & 4),
[1990] 1 Ch. 65, 81-82 (Eng. C.A.), stated (or, perhaps, understated):
In the context of the grant of the Mareva injunction, I think that a sufficient sanction
exists in the fact that, in the event of disobedience, the court could bar the
defendant's right to defend. This is not a consequence which it could contemplate
lightly as it would become a fugitive from a final judgment given against it without
its explanations having been heard and which might well be enforced against it by
other courts.
Id.
Another judge, in Coop. Ins. Soc. v. Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd, [1998] A.C. 1 (Eng.),
discussed the punitive nature of contempt as an enforcement mechanism, noting:
[The] only means available to the court to enforce its order is the quasi-criminal
procedure of punishment for contempt. This is a powerful weapon; so powerful in fact
as often to be unsuitable as an instrument for adjudicating upon the disputes which
may arise over whether a business is being run in accordance with the court's order.
The heavy-handed nature of the enforcement mechanism is a consideration which
may go to the exercise of the court's discretion in other cases as well, but its use to
compel the running of a business is perhaps the paradigm case of its disadvantages.
Id.
27 See, e.g., Grupo Torras SA v. Al-Sabah (No. 1), [1995] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 374, 385 (Q.B.)
(explaining that reaction to remedy has been mixed in England, as some see it as
unnecessary intervention); see also Kercher, supra note 8, at 628 (noting that potential
dangers of Mareva orders to debtors was part of reason Supreme Court refused to allow
them in past cases); 'Taylor, supra note 3, at 22, stating:
The conundrum that defeats the fulfillment of that principle in practice is that where
a plaintiff obtains and holds a Mareva injunction the overwhelming probability is
that no judgment will follow and the existence of the plaintiffs right will never be put
to the definitive test of a trial. Instead, the plaintiff can advance his case in affidavit
evidence and where the defendant contradicts that evidence the court does not seek to
resolve that conflict and will by and large assume that the facts are as described by
the plaintiffs affidavits even though they may be denied by the defendant. In the
result, it is all too easy for the defendant's rights to suffer in the interests of
protecting a right of the plaintiff which in the ultimate analysis may be illusory.
Id.
28 Taylor, supra note 3, at 22; see also Ninemia Mar. Corp. v. Trave
Schiffahrtsgesellschaft M.B.H. & Co. K.G., (The 'Niedersachsen'), [1983] 1 W.L.R. 1412,
1412 (Eng. C.A.) (cautioning against "rapid and sustained increase in the number of
applications [for Mareva orders]").
29 See, e.g., Lister v. Stubbs, [1890] All E.R. 797, 797 (Eng. C.A.) (stating the long-
standing principle); Short v. Berry, [1828] N.S.W.S. Ct. Cas. 38, 38 (Austl.) (describing
such "remedies" as "violation of all principle"). See also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 138 (noting right to dispose of one's property as one saw fit, prior to a
court judgment, as an "absolute" in English law)..
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it, and becoming a recurring insult to nations around the world
and a violation of, if not of the letter, certainly the spirit of
international law.
If that's not enough, for American defendants, the nightmare
has only just begun. As of now, four Justices of the Supreme
Court of the United States would allow federal courts to adopt
the preliminary injunction in aid of money claims by general
creditors. 30 Though five agree that it is beyond the traditional
power of federal courts to issue such injunctions, 31 the federal
Circuit Courts of Appeal have already found relatively simple
avenues around their approach. 32 Those New York defendants
who might become subject to the English procedure, likewise,
will find little solace in their home courts, who have considered
the Mareva injunction no obstacle to enforcing the judgments of
English courts. 33 Even if that means sanctioning a $330 million
contempt of court judgment for violating the terms of a Mareva
order,34 the largest in the history of American law.3 5 Even if that
30 Grupo Mexicano De Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 308, 342 (1999)
(implying that right now, Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Souter, and Stevens would favor
adoption of Mareva-style remedy in American federal courts).
31 Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. 308 (holding that Mareva-style injunctions lay beyond
statutory and equitable authority of federal courts); see Fabano, supra note 2, at 135
(summarizing majority opinion in Grupo Mexicano); John H. Bae, Cross Boarder
Transactions; Evaporation of the Mareva Injunction and The Need to Protect Debtors and
Creditors, BANKR. STRATEGIST, October 2000, at 1 (commenting that American plaintiffs
were permitted to use Mareva injunctions until Grupo Mexicano was decided in 1999).
32 See Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 290 (1940) (allowing for
temporary injunctions for equitable relief prior to trial, reversible only for abuse of trial
court's discretion); Rahman v. Oncology Assocs., 198 F. 3d 489, 492 (4th Cir. 1999)
(finding Deckert to be leading authority in situations where both money damages and
equitable relief were sought). See generally DeBeers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. U.S., 325 U.S.
212, 220 (1945) (stating circumstances in which preliminary injunctions are appropriate).
33 See CIBC Mellon Trust Co. v. Mora Hotel Corp., 100 N.Y. 2d 215, 222 (2003)
(enforcing English contempt judgment based on Mareva); Decision of Interest; United
States District Court, Southern New York; Three Foreign Judgments in Garnishment
Proceeding are Entitled to Recognition, 57 N.Y. L.J. 21 (2004) (discussing enforcement of
English decisions in American courts).
34 See CIBC Mellon Trust Co, 100 N.Y. 2d at 220.
35 See id. at 220 (discussing the $330 million judgment entered against Mora in
England); Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 69, CIBC Mellon Trust Co. v. Mora Hotel
Corp., N.V., 100 N.Y. 2d 215 (2003) (No. 47) (stating research indicated next largest
contempt sanction in U.S. was $18 million in Meissner v. Wal-Mart, Case No. A159,432
(Tex. Dist. Ct. Jefferson Co.)); see also Ellen Freedman & Masib Avrigian Sr., Managing
the Mountain of Paper: Good Reasons to Protect Yourself and Your Clients With a Formal
Records-Management Policy, 26 PA. LAW. 16, 16 (2004) (noting Wal-Mart's $18 million in
sanctions for withholding and destroying documents).
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means "stealing" a $40 million New York hotel to satisfy that
judgment.36
Whether one considers the Mareva device to be an
indispensable tool to combat rampant international fraud37 or an
extortionate tool to force settlement by foreign defendants, 38 no
one can deny the effectiveness of the procedure. But at what cost
to existing balance between the rights of the parties involved
does such effectiveness come? At what cost to the sovereignty of
nations? These questions and others are addressed below.
PART I of this Note discusses the development of the Mareva
procedure, including its later expansion and use on an ever-
widening class of defendants. Some technical aspects of the
device, including how to apply for application and discharge of a
Mareva order, are addressed in PART II. The approach taken by
American courts with regard to Mareva-style remedies is the
subject of PART III. PART IV considers the extraterritorial,
adversarial, due process, and other legal implications of the
Mareva order. And, finally, PART V posits some potential
solutions to the problems raised by the Mareva procedure.
36 See CIBC Mellon Trust Co., 100 N.Y.2d at 220 (stating that New York Supreme
Court confirmed attachment of hotel); Paul H. Aloe, 2002-2003 Survey of New York Law:
Civil Practice, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 825, 848 (2004) (noting that English judgment
allowed Mora's hotel to be sold under circumstances that would not have occurred if
action had commenced in New York); Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the
American Courts in 2003: Seventeenth Annual Survey, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 9, 70 (2004)
(explaining Mareva judgment creditors looked to enforce it by attaching debtor's hotel).
37 See, e.g., Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson, Territorial Jurisdiction and the New
Technologies, 25 ISRAEL L. REV. 145, 152-53 (1991) (outlining necessity of tools to combat
international fraud). See also Paul Friedman, Trusts and Mareva Injunctions, available at
Trusts & Trustees Electronic Library, http://www.trusts-and-trustees.comilibrary/v6no4
.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2005) (explaining that Mareva injunctions are often requested
form of relief in litigation involving international fraud);
38 See Z Ltd. v. A-Z and AA-LL, [1982] Q.B. 558, 586 (1982) (Kerr, UJ) (warning "the
great value of this jurisdiction must not be debased by allowing it to become something
which is invoked simply to obtain security for a judgment in advance, and still less as a
means of pressuring defendants into settlements."); Alexander, supra note 2, at 490
(suggesting that Mareva injunctions are successful tool used to convince defendants to
settle their cases); Willoughby, supra note 23, at 480 (noting that most businesses quickly
fail after imposition of Mareva injunction).
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I. DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN ENGLISH PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
A. Avoiding "An Entirely New and Wrong Principle"
This Note addresses only a select set of the modern provisional
remedies 39 that are utilized with increasing frequency by English
courts in the arena of international litigation. These remedies,
founded in equity, represent only recent evolution in a vastly
larger body of English judicial thought and consideration.40
Because these evolutions remain static only briefly, it is
important to point out what appear to be wrong turns so that the
system's continued vitality and progress can be preserved. It is
one well-intentioned, but flawed turn that this Note addresses:
the Mareva injunction. 41
Though now placed on statutory footing, the Mareva injunction
can only be understood in light of broader principles underlying
English equity practice. As has confounded first year law
students for centuries, the power of a court to pursue justice
between the parties does not simply reside in its legal authority.
Rather, a court also has an equitable authority which, in some
cases, extends further than its legal mandate. 42 A modern
39 See HILL, supra note 12, at 559-60 (describing applicable English law for conflict
resolution); John T. Cross, The Erie Doctrine in Equity, 60 LA. L. REV. 173, 208 (1999)
(explaining flexible structure of English courts in regards to equity); Ellen E. Sward,
Special Issue on the History of the Trial: A History of the Civil Trial in the United States,
51 KAN. L. REV. 347, 359-60 (outlining background of English equitable trial procedures).
40 It is clearly beyond the scope of this Note to attempt - let alone succeed - in an
exhaustive review of English equitable procedures. Both interesting and multi-textured,
this development has been the subject of countless volumes of commentary and review by
far more skillful scholars in England and the United States and resort to their eminent
authority has been made by this author and is encouraged for anyone interested in a
depth of discussion not possible in this Note. See, e.g., BARNARD & HOUGHTON, supra note
18; HANBURY & MAUDSLEY, supra note 10; INGMAN, supra note 25; F.W. MAITLAND,
EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW - TWO COURSES OF LECTURES (A.H.
Chayter & W.J. Whittaker eds., 1909); SNELL'S PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY (P.V. Baker & T.
St. J. Langan eds., 28th ed. 1982); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE (F.V. Balch ed., l1th ed. 1873).
41 See Mareva Compania Naviera, [1980] 1 All E.R. at 213 (holding that Court has
jurisdiction in proper case to grant interlocutory judgment so as to prevent debtor
disposing of his assets); Nippon Yusen Kaisha v. Karageorgis, [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1093, 1093
(Eng. C.A.) (creating "Mareva" injunction); Supreme Court Act, 1981, c. 54, §37 (Eng.)
(renaming Mareva to "freezing injunction")..
42 See generally SNELL'S PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY, supra note 40, at 8-9 (detailing
court's role in policy and decision making); Cross, supra note 39, at 209 (explaining that
English courts of equity could develop substantive -rights); James R. Theuer, Pre-
Judgment Restraint of Assets for Claims of Damages: Should the United States Follow
England's Lead?, 25 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 419, 421-22 (2000) (noting that English
courts have power to grant injunctions, with few limitations).
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English court wields both powers - legal and equitable - though
this was not always the case. Only since mid-1870's, with the
passage of the Judicature Acts of 187343 and 1875,44 has an
English plaintiff been able to secure an equitable remedy -
common examples include injunctions, declaratory judgments,
and specific performance45 - without making a separate claim to
a court of equity jurisdiction. Prior to this change, equitable
jurisdiction rested almost exclusively in the English Court of
Chancery. 46
Today, English courts of equity and law have been merged into
the High Court of Justice, which is divided into three divisions:
the Queen's Bench Division, the Chancery Division, and the
Family Division. 47 Cases are allocated to the divisions generally
based on subject matter, though each is capable of handling any
case presented to it.48 The High Court of Justice has both
original and appellate jurisdiction over County Courts in all civil
43 See Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66 (Eng.).
44 See Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1875, 38 & 9 Vict., c. 77 (Eng.).
45 See generally HANBURY & MAUDSLEY, supra note 10 (discussing development and
current status of English equitable law); Lars E. Johansson, The Mareva Injunction: A
Remedy in the Pursuit of the Errant Defendant, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1091, 1095 (stating
plaintiffs ability to obtain injunctions against defendants); Theuer, supra note 42, at 422
(noting old divisions between law and equity are abolished).
46 By the mid-nineteenth century, some blending of powers was evident. HANBURY &
MAUDSLEY, supra note 10. For example, the Common Law Procedure Act of 1854 gave
common law courts a certain power to prescribe equitable remedies, Common Law
Procedure Act, 1854, 17 & 18 Vict., c. 125 (Eng.). Similarly, the Chancery Amendment Act
of 1858, commonly called Lord Cairns' Act, gave the Court of Chancery the power to
award damages, a legal remedy, in addition to or in substitution of equitable remedies,
such as injunctions or specific performance, Chancery Amendment Act, 1858, 21 & 22
Vict., c. 27 (Eng.). One of the most vociferous critics of the Chancery Court was Charles
Dickens, whose character said in BLEAK HOUSE to "keep out of Chancery, whatever they
did. 'For,' says he, 'it's being ground to bits in a slow mill; it's being roasted at a slow fire;
it's being stung to death by single bees; it's being drowned by drops; it's going mad by
grains." CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE, available at Project Gutenberg, http://www.
gutenberg.org/dirs/etext97/blkhsl2h.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2005).
47 See SNELL'S PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY, supra note 40, at 18 (detailing structure of
English court system); Alexander, supra note 2, at 494 (explaining that Mareva
injunctions can be brought in any of three divisions); Taylor, supra note 3 (suggesting
there may be some measure of strategy in choosing between Queen's Bench Division and
Chancery Division when applying for Mareva order).
48 See generally SNELL'S PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY, supra note 40, at 18 (stating that
admiralty cases are assigned to Queen's Bench Division, though previously had been
assigned to Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division); Alexander, supra note 2, at 494
(explaining that Mareva injunctions can be handled by any of three divisions, despite
subject matter restrictions); Diane P. Wood, Generalist Judges in a Specialized World, 50
SMU L. REV. 1755, 1762 (1997) (noting how three divisions are divided based on subject
matter).
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and some criminal matters.49 Appeals from the High Court are
heard by the Court of Appeal, which is divided into Civil and
Criminal Divisions.50 Ultimate civil appeal is heard in the House
of Lords (for the time being5 1) for cases of general public
importance.52
Beside the separate structural development, one important
distinction continues to distinguish law and equity: the discretion
of the presiding judge.53 In wielding his equitable powers, a judge
maintains virtually unfettered, individual discretion. 54 An oft-
quoted commentary of Judge Joseph Story55 persuasively
49 See generally SNELL'S PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY, supra note 40, at 19 (noting levels of
jurisdiction of High Court); Wood, supra note 48, at 1762 (discussing discretionary
jurisdiction that High Court has over appeals in civil cases).
50 See generally SNELL'S PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY, supra note 40, at 17-18 (explaining
structure of Court of Appeal); Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Architecture:
Modifying the Regional Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 610
(1989) (explaining that English Court of Appeal judges will hear appeals of High Court
cases based on subject matter distinctions); Wood, supra note 48, at 1762 (stating that
civil High Court appeals go to civil division of Court of Appeal).
51 Prime Minister Tony Blair has proposed a change in the English legal system
which would vest ultimate appeal in a newly formed Supreme Court, rather than in the
House of Lords. As of this writing, discussions were on-going about the implementation of
that proposed reform, though Blair's proposed reform, and perhaps his hold on the PM
seat, seems far from certain. See, e.g., Colin B. Picker, "A Light Unto the Nations" - The
New British Federalism, the Scottish Parliament, and Constitutional Lessons for
Multiethnic States, 77 TUL. L. REV. 1, 11 (2002); Gwyn Prins, British Political Leadership
from Churchill to Blair: A Class Act, 28 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 39, 51 (2004); Philip
Webster, et al., This Cheerful Chappie Wants to Change the Way Our Legal System Runs,
Lord Woolf and His Learned Friends Will Do All They Can to Stop Him, THE TIMES
(London), Mar. 5, 2004, at 13.
52 See generally SNELL'S PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY, supra note 40, at 526 (explaining
appeals process in House of Lords); Sofie Geeroms, Comparative Law and Legal
Translation: Why the Terms Cassation, Revision, and Appeal Should Not Be Translated,
50 AM. J. COMP. L. 201, 221 (2002) (describing that appeals to House of Lords can be done,
but are unusual); Lisa Griffin, The Correction of Wrongful Convictions: A Comparative
Perspective, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1241, 1268 (2001) (noting that there is no absolute
right to appeal to House of Lords).
53 See Grupo Mexicano de Desarollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 308, 331 (1999)
(discussing power English judges have when granting Mareva injunctions); Cross, supra
note 39, at 209 (explaining that flexibility of equity judges' allowed them to grant awards
not available at common law); Theuer, supra note 42, at 425 (noting that English judges
have expanded power of Mareva so it can be used in worldwide cases).
54 See generally Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 331 (explaining power English judges
have to craft such remedies as Mareva orders); SNELL'S PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY, supra
note 40, at 8 (noting great extent of judges' powers on equity matters); Cross, supra note
39, at 209 (describing equity judges' power to strengthen or weaken a party's legal
position).
55 Joseph Story, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States (1811-
45), was an eminent legal scholar and commentator in the early and mid-nineteenth
century. In addition to serving as the youngest ever justice on the Court (serving with
Chief Justice John Marshall), Justice Story also held positions as a state legislator, U.S.
Congressman, and law professor at Harvard College. He wrote comprehensive summaries
of (mostly British) case law in addition to commentaries on such topics as the U.S.
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summarizes the equitable power of an English judge sitting in
equity:
If, indeed, a Court of Equity in England did possess the
unbounded jurisdiction, which has been thus generally
ascribed to it, of correcting, controlling, moderating, and
even superceding the law, and of enforcing all the rights, as
well as charities, arising from natural law and justice, and of
freeing itself from all regard to former rules and precedents,
it would be the most gigantic in its sway, and the most
formidable instrument of arbitrary power, that could well be
devised. It would literally place the whole rights and
property of the community under the arbitrary will of the
Judge, acting, if you please, arbitrio boni judicis, and it may
be, ex aequo et bono, according to his own notions and
conscience; but still acting with a despotic and sovereign
authority. A Court of Chancery might then well deserve the
spirited rebuke of Seldon; "For law we have a measure, and
know what to trust to Equity is according to the conscience of
him, that is Chancellor; and as that is larger, or narrower, so
is Equity. Tis all one, as if they should make the standard for
the measure the Chancellor's foot. What an uncertain
measure would this be? One Chancellor has a long foot;
another a short foot; a third an indifferent foot. It is the
same thing with the Chancellor's conscience." 56
From such commentary emerges a generally accepted chain of
inferences in English and American courts regarding equity.
First, the strict and rigid nature of laws can create hardships on
parties incompatible with traditional notions of justice, especially
as society advances while the law does not.57 Second, judges can
use their equitable power to mitigate both the harshness and
severity of the rules of law.58 Third, equity is rooted in
Constitution, bailments, conflict of laws, agency, partnership, equity pleading, and
promissory notes. His most famous - and enduring - commentaries are those on equity
jurisprudence, still cited today in opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States. See,
e.g., Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 321-22; Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424, 435-36
(1911); H. Jefferson Powell, Joseph Story's Commentaries on the Constitution. A Belated
Review, 94 YALE L.J. 1285, 1285-94 (1985) (book review).
56 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §19, at 21 (14th ed.
1918).
57 See generally Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 321 (stating that reforms of present law
because of changes in society are better left to Congress, not courts); SNELL'S PRINCIPLES
OF EQUITY, supra note 40, at 10 (noting problems that rigid rules can create in regards to
seeking justice).
58 See STORY, supra note 56, § 16, at 17 (noting that court at equity boldly
undertakes "to correct or mitigate the rigor, and what in a proper sense may be termed
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discretion.5 9 Fourth, discretion can be abused, creating its own
injustice, severity, and rigidity.60 And, finally, such power must
be therefore exercised cautiously for fear it will undermine the
very rule of law it is supposed to complement. 61
It is hardly an overstatement to suppose that since the
beginning of any system of commerce, there have been debtors
who have tried to avoid, for whatever reason, the paying of their
debts. Concomitantly, there have been creditors who have
rightly demanded repayment. Though one can imagine an
infinite variety of methods which have been employed to that
end,62 for our purposes, resort to the courts is one natural
approach. 63 It is in this breach that law and equity collide.
the injustice of the common law.") (citations omitted); see also Redding v. Gibbs, 203 Neb.
727, 739 (1979) (stating that "in deciding whether or not equitable relief should be
granted ... it is clear the gravity of the fault must be weighed against the gravity of the
hardship."). See generally SNELL'S PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY, supra note 40, at 11
(commenting that judges can lessen severity of some rules of law).
59 See Honorable H. Brent McKnight, How Shall We Then Reason? The Historical
Setting of Equity, 45 MERCER L. REV. 919, 939 (1994) (stating that "equity...considers
itself competent to intervene deeply in political disputes and to sweep local governments
aside if the court finds them inefficient, corrupt, or unjust."); see also Grupo Mexicano, 527
U.S. at 331 (discussing power English judges have while granting Mareva injunctions).
See generally SNELL'S PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY, supra note 40, at 8 (noting extent of
discretion of judges in equity matters).
60 See Noland v. Noland, No. 88-CA-000020, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 3346, *3 (Ct. App.
1989) (noting that "the term 'abuse of discretion' connotes more than an error of law or
judgment; it implies the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.")
(citations omitted); see also Kercher, supra note 8, at 626 (observing that "[e]quity has
rigidified over the last century or so."); cf. McKnight, supra note 59, at 944 (concluding
that "the framers designed a constitution with a serious view to separating the powers of
the legislature.. .the executive.. .and the judiciary... [and] [t]he judges were to have little
discretionary power and be the least dangerous branch.").
61 One American commentator has stated that "it would be hard to argue that equity
dispensed by the federal courts is not now a significant force in reducing the importance
of state courts and state and local governments." McKnight, supra note 59, at 940. While
across the globe, one Australian commentator has discussed the controversy associated
with what has been called "discretionary remedialism." Tilbury, supra note 8, at 593-94.
Proponents of Mareva.type equitable remedies suggest that they only bolster underlying
primary rights. Opponents, on the other hand, suggest that courts too often divorce the
remedies from a party's primary rights and impose whatever remedial measure they see
fit to apply. Id. Key to both sides' positions, then, is the definition of "discretion."
Discretion should be exercised very carefully otherwise it could weaken the laws that are
already in place. See generally SNELL'S PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY, supra note 40, at 10.
62 One can surmise, likewise, an infinite variety of excuses for non-payment of those
debts. The common law in England and Australia, until well into the nineteenth century,
allowed - as a matter of right to plaintiffs - the arrest of the debtor (not merely his
assets) so as to prevent his physical escape from the jurisdiction, called "arrest on the
mesne process." Kercher, supra note 8, at 627. The 'mesne process' is when "the sheriff
was.. required to begin the lengthy process of securing the defendant's appearance."
David Millon, Positivism in the Historiography of the Common Law, 1989 WIS. L. REV.
669, 675 (1989). The mesne process more generally has been defined and explained in
many articles. See e.g., Bradford E. Biegan, Presidential Immunity in Civil Actions: An
Analysis Based Upon Text, History and Blackstone's Commentaries, 82 VA. L. REV. 677,
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Prior to the development of the Mareva injunction in 1975, a
number of general propositions could be asserted with regard to
creditor-debtor law in England. One legal thread ran the length
of it: that creditors, no matter the merits of their claim, generally
possessed no legal rights over the property of their debtors prior
to the securing of a legal judgment. 64 Once accomplished, legal
and equitable remedies such as damages, attachment, and liens
could be brought to bear on the debtor's property. 65 A parallel,
practical thread also existed, especially in the mind of the
creditor: that defendant-debtors could frustrate potential claims
of creditors by simply selling off or dissipating or destroying any
assets they maintained prior to judgment. 66 Creditors, then,
invoked the equitable powers of the Court of Chancery,
679 (1996). The Mareva remedy, then, can be seen as the latest development in the
gradual (if not painfully slow) shift from arrest of the debtor to "arrest" of the debtor's
assets. Kercher, supra note 8, at 627. One could plausibly argue that this development
has achieved fully circular status with the Mareva order: moving from an "in personam"
arrest of the debtor to an "in rem" focus on property (discussed in further detail below) to
an "in personam" Mareva remedy over the debtor's property.
63 See Kercher, supra note 8, at 628 (commenting that law schools in Australia do not
even teach debt recovery law, that it is somehow "beneath the dignity" of Australian
lawyers and more the province of accountants and debt recovery specialists); see also In re
Lenz Oil Service, Inc., 65 B.R. 292, 296 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986) (stating that "the proper
approach for a court to determine whether an injunction is an equitable remedy, or in its
application a money judgment, is to focus on the nature of the injuries which the
challenged remedy is intended to redress."); In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 63
B.R. 641, 644 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986) (stating that "a money judgment is an order entered
by the court or by the clerk, after a verdict has been rendered for plaintiff, which adjudges
that the defendant shall pay a sum of money to the plaintiff.").
64 It has long been established in commentary and case law that "the absolute rights
of every Englishman are said... to consist of three principal or primary articles: the right
of personal security, personal liberty, and private property." See Hutchinson v.
Schimmelfeder, 40 Pa. 396, 398 (1861) (citations omitted). Indeed, Sir William
Blackstone, perhaps the most famous commentator on English law, stated in 1765, "The
third absolute right, inherent in every Englishman, is that of property: which consists in
the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or
diminution, save only by the laws of the land." 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
138. This right is said to be of the utmost importance because "the man, who is forbidden
to acquire and enjoy properly in the same manner in which the rest of the community is
permitted to acquire and enjoy it, is deprived of liberty in particulars of primary
importance to his pursuit of happiness." See e.g., Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, 105 (1895).
65 See In re Macgillivray, 285 B.R. 55, 56 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2002) (noting that one
particular type of lien is "a judicial lien [which is a] 'lien obtained by judgment, levy,
sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding."'). See generally SNELL'S
PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY, supra note 40, at 43 (discussing power over property within and
without court jurisdiction).
66 See Bethany Kohl Hipp, Defending Expanded Presidential Authority to Regulate
Foreign Assets and Transactions, 17 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1311, 1345 (2003)
(recognizing the impetus for such things as "freezing orders"); see also INGMAN, supra
note 25, 477-78 (9th ed. 2002) (describing justifications for freezing orders); cf. Emilio J.
Cardenas, The United Nations Security Council's Quest for Effectiveness, 25 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 1341 (2004) (discussing freezing orders in aftermath of September 11, 2001).
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requesting pre-judgment injunctions against potential defendant-
debtors to prevent them from making themselves, in effect,
"judgment proof."67 For centuries, that court responded to the
requests of creditors with in the resounding negative. 68
Echoing the traditional view, Lord Cotton refused such an
invitation to use the Court's equitable powers and stated in 1890
in Lister v. Stubbs69:
I know of no case where, because it was highly probable that
if the action were brought to a hearing the plaintiff could
establish that the debt was due from the defendant, the
defendant has been ordered to give security until that [debt]
has been established by the judgement or decree. 70
He concluded, "[Such an order] would be introducing an
entirely new and wrong principle, even though we might think
that, having regard to the circumstances of the case, it would be
highly just to make the order."71
Lord Lindley's opinion in the same case addresses what he
believed to be the inevitable consequences of granting such a pre-
judgment injunction 72 - consequences which he regarded as
startling. 73 First, he stated that such a possessory right over
defendant's property would alter the existing balance between
67 See INGMAN, supra note 25, at 477-78 (describing recent development of freezing
orders in English law); see also Zicherman, supra note 16, at 673 (commenting that "the
injunction [would put] the plaintiffs in the same position as they would have been in had
the defendants been local residents with permanent assets inside the jurisdiction"); cf.
Ostrander, supra note 14, at 546 (observing that pre-judgment attachment remains a
controversial issue).
68 See, e.g., Lister v. Stubbs, [1890] All E.R. 797, 797 (Eng. C.A.), for a case
announcing that the court would not respond to such a request of the creditor. Courts in
another common law country, Australia, likewise echoed their disdain for a Mareva-type
remedy. In Short v. Berry, 11828] N.S.W.S. Ct. Cas. 38, 38 (Austl.), an Australian judge
stated that such an application "could not be granted for it went to restrain merchants
from carrying on trade without any suggestion that they were unable to meet their
demands. It was a motion of the first impression; and in violation of all principle." One
commentator noted that "courts could not grant an interlocutory order enjoining a
defendant from disposting of his assets or removing them from the jurisdiction before
judgment was rendered" under the authority of Lister. Zicherman, supra note 16, at 669.
69 [1890] 45 Ch.D. 1 (C.A.)
70 Id. at 13.
71 Id. at 14.
72 Id. at 15..
73 Lister v. Stubbs, [1890] 45 Ch.D. 15 (C.A.) (stating that holding as plaintiffs
request "would involve consequences which, I confess, startle me.").
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competing creditors should the defendant go bankrupt. 74 By
giving the plaintiff a pre-judgment property right, the court
would in effect be removing substantial assets from the reach of
other potential creditors in bankruptcy proceedings, giving the
first creditor to apply for such an injunction preferential access to
the debtor's assets.75 Second, any profits made prior to the
judgment with the funds sought to be frozen by injunction would
theoretically belong to the plaintiff-creditor as a matter of
right. 76 In essence, this type of injunction transferred ownership
- and its profit potential - to the plaintiff prior to legal
judgment.77 Lord Lindley concluded that "confounding ownership
with obligation" in such a manner was unsound. 78
B. Embracing "An Entirely New and Wrong Principle"
A testament to the truth of Justice Story's observations, 79
hundreds of years of legal precedent and judicial restraint were
radically altered in 1975 with the stroke of an English judge's
pen. That summer, one of the most controversial80  - and
74 Id. (finding that "if Stubbs were to become bankrupt, this property acquired by him
with the money paid to him by Messrs. Varley would be withdrawn from the mass of his
creditors and be handed over bodily to Lister & Co.").
75 Id. (noting that it is necessary to again look at premises to see if they are sound,
because result would be unfair).
76 Id. (noting that if these results remained, then court would "be doing what [Lord
Lindley] conceives to be very great mischief').
77 Id. (discussing absurd consequences that would follow from such prejudgment
injunction); see Kirshner & Silverman, supra note 10, at 24 (stating that U.S. courts view
prejudgment injunctions with disfavor); see also Craig Rotherham, Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment: Restitution and Property Rites: Reason and Ritual in the Law of Proprietary
Remedies, 1 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 205, 210 (2000) (describing that prejudgment injunction
confounds "ownership with obligation").
78 Lister v. Stubbs, [1890] 45 Ch.D. 15 (C.A.) (characterizing legal remedy that creates
ownership prior to judgment as illogical).
79 See 1 STORY, supra note 56, § 19, at 21 (noting the "uncertainty" of conscience in
minds of courts of equity); see also Alexander, supra note 2, at 491 (stating that, before
1975, English courts did not issue injunctions "where an order was sought to restrain a
defendant from disposing of its property on the grounds of a likely recovery by a plaintiff
in a civil action"). See generally Peter S. O'Driscoll, Performance Bonds, Bankers'
Guarantees and the Mareva Injunction, 7 Nw. J. INT'L. L. & BUS. 380, 398 (1985)
(discussing history of Mareva injunction).
80 Lord Denning, for example, believed - though later was forced to capitulate - that
neither the prior decisions of the House of Lords nor his own Court of Appeals had any
precedential value to a judge presiding over a case. Regardless of the thoughtful
approach of judges faced with similar situations in the past, Lord Denning felt he should
be subject to no constraint in his efforts to do what he perceived to be justice for the
parties before him. Needless to say, the House of Lords and other Court of Appeal judges
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popular8l - judges in the English Court of Appeal's twentieth
century history, Lord Denning, charged headlong twice down the
did not share his disdain for stare decisis. In Conway v. Rimmer, [1968] AC 910, [1968] 1
All ER 874, HL, Lord Denning wrote,
[M]y brethren today feel that we are still bound by the observations of
the House of Lords in Duncan v Cammell, Laird & Co. Ltd .... I do
not agree. The recent statement of Lord Gardiner LC has transformed
the doctrine of precedent. This is the very case in which to throw off
the fetters.
Lord Halisham, writing for The House of Lords, responded,
[I]t is not open to the Court of Appeal to give gratuitous advice to
judges of first instance to ignore decisions of the House of Lords in this
way and, if it were open to the Court of Appeal to do so, it would be
highly undesirable. ... The fact is, and I hope it will never be necessary
to say so again, that, in the hierarchical system of courts which exists
in this country, it is necessary for each lower tier, including the Court
of Appeal, to accept loyally the decisions of the higher tiers.
After the Lords' rebuke, Lord Denning later applied his theory to the precedents of the
Court of Appeal when he stated in Gallie v. Lee, [1969] 1 All ER 1062, CA,
I do not think we are bound by prior decisions of our own, or at any
rate, not absolutely bound. We are not fettered as it was once thought.
It was a self-imposed limitation: and we who imposed it can also
remove it. The House of Lords have done it. So why should not we do
likewise?
After a number of similar pronouncements by Lord Denning, the House of Lords (this
time by Lord Diplock) again castigated Denning by saying in Davis v. Johnson [1979] AC
264, [1978] 1 All ER 1132,
[T]he rule as it had been laid down in the Bristol Aeroplane case had
never been questioned thereafter until, following upon the
announcement by Lord Gardiner LC in 1966 that the House of Lords
would feel free in exceptional cases to depart from a previous decision
of its own, Lord Denning MR conducted what may be described, I hope
without offence, as a one-man crusade with the object of freeing the
Court of Appeal from the shackles which the doctrine of stare decisis
imposed upon its liberty of decision ... In my opinion, this House
should take this occasion to reaffirm expressly, unequivocally and
unanimously that the rule laid down in the Bristol Aeroplane case as
to stare decisis is still binding on the Court of Appeal.
For the purposes of this Note, it is worthwhile to emphasize that this rebuff came after
the Nippon Yusen Kaisha and Mareva Compania Naviera cases.
81 See In Every Sense a People's Judge, supra note 5 (citing Denning's efforts to
improve equality of women in press, individual freedoms, and consumer protection); see
Tegel, supra note 5, at 6 (describing Denning as "one of the most courteous and
controversial judges of the century, [inspiring] public affection for being more interested
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path Lords Cotton and Lindley were unwilling to tread in 1890:
first, in Nippon Yusen Kaisha v. Karageorgis82 and then one
month later in Mareva Compania Naviera S.A. v. International
Bulkcarriers S.A.83
In Nippon Yusen Kaisha, defendants, John and George
Karageorgis, chartered three ships from large Japanese ship-
owner, Nippon Yusen Kaisha, but failed to pay for the charters
and subsequently disappeared.8 4 Plaintiff believed defendants to
have funds in English banks which it feared would be transferred
out of the jurisdiction.8 5 It applied ex parte to the High Court for
an injunction restraining defendants from removing their assets
from the jurisdiction.8 6 Mr. Justice Donaldson refused the
application in the High Court.8 7 Plaintiff appealed, also ex parte,
to the Court of Appeal.88 In granting the request, Lord Denning
stated,
We are told that an injunction of this kind has never been
done before. It has never been the practice of the English
Courts to seize assets of a defendant in advance of judgment,
or to restrain the disposal of them... It seems to me that the
time has come when we should revise our practice.8 9
Lord Denning cited no case authority for his ruling and failed
to even consider the precedent of Lister v. Stubbs, if only to
distinguish it.90 Instead, he held the freezing injunction to be
warranted by § 45 of the Judicature Act of 192591 allowing the
High Court to grant a mandamus or injunction or appoint a
in justice than in the legal niceties"); see also Torode, supra note 5, at 39 (citing one of
Denning's favorite quotes: "be you never so high, you are not above the law").
82 [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1093 (Eng. C.A).
83 [1980] 1 All E.R. 213 (Eng. C.A.).
84 See Nippon Yusen Kaisha v. Karageorgis, [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1093, 1093 (Eng. C.A.)
(stating that Mr. George Karageorgis and Mr. John Karageorgis did not make payments
required of them).
85 See id. (describing plaintiffs' fear that money defendants had in English banks
would be transferred out of jurisdiction).
86 See id. (detailing legal actions taken by plaintiffs).
87 See id. (stating that Mr. Justice Donaldson refused relief requested by plaintiffs).
88 See id. (noting that plaintiffs appealed to Court of Appeal).
89 Id.
90 See Mareva Compania Naviera v. Int'l Bulkcarriers S.A. (The Mareva), [1980] 1 All
E.R. 213, 213 (Eng. C.A.) (indicating that Lister was not brought to attention of
Karageorgis court).
91 Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 49 (Eng.).
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receiver by an interlocutory order in "all cases where it appears
to the Court to be just or convenient to do so."92
In Mareva Compania Naviera S.A. v. International
Bulkcarriers S.A,93 defendants, International Bulkcarriers S.A.,
chartered the vessel Mareva from the plaintiff ship-owners,
Mareva Compania Naviera S.A., on a time-charter basis. 94 The
ship was delivered to the defendants who thereafter sub-
chartered the Mareva to the President of India to deliver a cargo
of fertilizer to India. 95 The Indian High Commission paid, in
accordance with the sub-charter contract, £174,000 to a London
bank account of International Bulkcarriers. 96 Defendants paid
two of three installments to plaintiff.97 While the ship was en
route to India, the defendants exchanged telexes with plaintiff,
informing them that they would be unable to pay the third
installment, amounting to roughly $30,800.98 Plaintiff considered
this a repudiation of the original charter agreement and filed a
writ for the unpaid amount and damages.99 Additionally, in light
of Nippon Yusen Kaisha, they applied ex parte to the High Court
for an injunction to restrain the removal of the money in the
London bank.100 Mr. Justice Donaldson felt he was bound by the
precedent of Lister v. Stubbs and had no power to grant the
requested injunction, but in deference to the Court of Appeal's
recent decision, he issued a temporary injunction for the Court of
Appeal to reconsider their previous ruling in light of Lister v.
Stubbs.101 When Mr. Justice Donaldson refused to extend the
temporary injunction, plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeal
for a continuance. 102
Lord Denning, in his decision, again ignored Lister v. Stubbs,
opting instead to expand - or justify - his rationale grounded in §
92 Nippon Yusen Kaisha, [1975] 1 W.L.R. at 1093.
93 [1980] 1 All E.R. 213 (Eng. C.A.)
94 See id. (stating that "[Mareva Compania Naviera S.A.] let [the vessel Mareva]
to ... International Bulkcarriers S.A. on a time charter").
95 See id. (noting that defendants subchartered Mareva to President of India).
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Mareva Compania Naviera v. Int'l Bulkcarriers S.A. (The Mareva), [1980] 1 All
E.R. 213, 213 (Eng. C.A.).
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
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45 of the Judicature Act of 1925.103 § 45 of the 1925 Judicature
Act repeats § 25(8) of the Judicature Act of 1875 which states, "A
mandamus or an injunction may be granted or a receiver
appointed by an interlocutory order of the court in all cases in
which it shall appear to the court to be just or convenient." O4 In
construing the 1875 Act, English courts had broadly interpreted
§ 25(8), giving a wide, general power to judges.l05 Lord Denning
cited with approval Beddow v. Beddow,106 in which Sir George
Jessel stated, "I have unlimited power to grant an injunction in
any case where it would be right or just to do sO."107 This
unlimited, arbitrary power has but one qualification: an
injunction will not be granted to protect a person who has no
legal or equitable right whatever. 108 As such, Lord Denning held:
In my opinion [the power to protect a party's legal or
equitable right by injunction] applies to a creditor who has a
right to be paid the debt owing to him, even before he has
established his right by getting judgment for it. If it appears
that the debt is due and owing - and there is a danger that
the debtor may dispose of his assets so as to defeat it before
judgment - the Court has jurisdiction in a proper case to
grant an interlocutory judgment so as to prevent him
disposing of those assets. 109
The "Mareva injunction" was born in those words.
Both decisions alluded to the right of defendants - upon notice
of the injunction - to apply for discharge of the injunction but
failed to elaborate on what grounds such a discharge would be
granted - and whether or not such a defendant could even
103 Mareva Compania Naviera v. Int7 Bulkcarriers S.A. (The Mareva), [1980] 1 All
E.R. 213, 213 (Eng. C.A.).
104 Id.
105 Id. See generally Des Salles d'Epinoix v. Des Salles d'Epinoix, [1967] 1 W.L.R. 553
(Eng. C.A.) (referring to section 25(8) and stating that words of rule should be construed
to apply to any injunction that defendant deems himself entitled to); Robinson v.
Robinson, [1964] 3 W.L.R. 935 (Eng. P.) (stating that section's terms are very wide, and
widest possible construction should be attributed to that section).
106 [1878] 9 Ch.D. 89 (Eng.).
107 Id. (emphasis added).
108 See North London Ry. Co. v. Great Northern Ry. Co., [1883] 11 Q.B. 30. But see
Channel Tunnel Group v. Balfour, [1993] 1 All E.R. 664 (Eng. H.L.) (calling into question
even this requirement). See generally Dep't of Soc. Sec. v. Butler, [1995] 4 All E.R. 193
(Eng. C.A.) (stating that court has power to grant injunctions "in all cases in which it
appears to the court to be just and convenient to do so").
109 Mareva Compania Naviera S.A. v. International Bulkcarriers S.A., [1975] 2
Lloyd's Rep. 509, 510 (Eng. C.A.).
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receive a "just" review of his request, considering to grant a
discharge is tantamount to the issuing judge admitting his
interlocutory judgment was erroneous.110
Irrespective of the correctness of the decisions,"' they raised
three important considerations that affect later courts and the
use of these injunctions today. First, the decisions failed to
adequately appreciate the controversial nature of the right
asserted, i.e., that a defendant is completely constrained from
dealing with his assets where a putative plaintiff asserts a claim
for legal damages112 under English jurisdiction. Lord Roskill, in
Mareva Compania Naviera, indicated some understanding of the
controversy but, beyond simply recognizing it, failed to address it
further.113 Second, between two conflicting lines of precedent,
Lord Denning opted for the one conferring "unlimited power"
over the one conferring no power on the reviewing judge.114 The
eminent standing in which Lord Denning was held at the time,115
110 The issuance of the "preliminary judgment" itself indicates that the granting
judge has - with the evidentiary support of one side only - determined it was necessary to
restrain the defendants from hiding their assets. Any future variation on that order would
necessarily mean his initial judgment was incorrect, unfair, or at the very least, ill-
founded. To think that judges in these cases are not making "judgments" is erroneous. For
example, in Derby & Co. v. Weldon, [1989] 1 All E.R. 469 (Eng. C.A.), Judge Parker
commented that, "the defendants are clearly sophisticated operators who have amply
demonstrated their ability to render assets untraceable or delay execution of the
judgment." Whether true or not, such pronouncements should be reserved, if only in the
interest of fairness, to the post-evidentiary period of a trial, after both sides have given
testimony.
111 Whether or not an English judge has correctly or incorrectly expanded his
authority in light of or in spite of English precedent is not the focus of this Note. How
these injunctions affect American defendants remains the issue, one which does not
require any commentary on the propriety of England's course of action with regard to its
own legal system.
112 This is the particular feature of the Mareva injunction that was revolutionary.
There was never hesitation to freeze assets that were the subject of an equitable action -
e.g., specific performance. Indeed, it was not uncommon to do so before trial to ensure that
the res remained available to satisfy the judgment. Using equity to secure claims seeking
only money damages may seem like a natural extension of the doctrine, but in fact it
fundamentally erodes the distinction between law and equity and wreaks havoc on the
existing balance between creditors, debtors, and financial institutions going forward.
113 See Mareva Compania Naviera S.A. v. Int'l Bulkcarriers S.A., [1975] 2 Lloyd's
Rep. 509, 511-12 (Eng. C.A.).
114 One can only imagine the eloquent disdain with which Charles Dickens would
have received Lord Denning's Mareva decision, given his loathing for English courts of
equity.
115 At the time of this decision, Lord Denning had gained a fair measure of popularity
and reverence within and without the legal community (see, e.g., Lord Denning's widely
published report regarding the Profumo affair, a national scandal which implicated high
officers in the British government). Patrick Fitzgerald, A Very Public Stripping Off;
Investigation into British Arms Sales to Iraq, NEW STATESMAN & SOCIETY, Feb. 2, 1996, at
20. Further, at the time of these decisions, Lord Denning held the post of Master of the
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coupled with his forceful pronouncements in these cases,
emboldened later judges to extend the Mareva methodology
beyond the boundaries of England.116 Finally, because of the ex
parte nature of the procedure, the Nippon Yusen Kaisha and
Mareva Compania Naviera decisions dramatically altered the
adversarial balance of power between plaintiffs and
defendants,11 7 the effects of which are discussed in PART IV.
C. Grounding "An Entirely New and Wrong Principle" in Statute
Three years later, in 1978, the Court of Appeal heard
argument from a defendant when considering the propriety of the
Mareva procedure.118 It reaffirmed its earlier decisions and the
procedure itself.119 In 1981, Parliament passed the Supreme
Court Act of 1981, § 37(1)120 of which stated in broad language,
"The High Court may by order (whether interlocutory or final)
grant an injunction or appoint a receiver in all cases in which it
appears to the court to be just and convenient to do so."121 This
statutory foundation arguably takes the procedure out of the
equitable arena and places it squarely in the legal one. One
would be hard-pressed, however, to claim that later expansions of
this procedure have their true justification in statutory
interpretation rather than the procedure's historical equitable
and discretionary underpinnings.
Rolls, the most senior civil judge in the English court system. See also Cecil Lyon, In the
Trenches: Evolution or Devolution of the Law, LAW. WKLY., Nov. 22, 2002, at 1; Denning
Myths Debunked, LAW. WKLY., Jun. 15, 2001, at 1.
116 See, e.g., Babanaft Int'l Co. S.A. v. Bassatne, (1989] 2 W.L.R. 232 (extending
Mareva procedure to defendants outside of English jurisdiction); Republic of Haiti v.
Duvalier, [19891 2 W.L.R. 261 (Eng. C.A.) (broadening reach of Mareva injunctions to
third parties, instead of merely defendants); Derby & Co., Ltd. v. Weldon (No. 1), [1989] 2
W.L.R. 278 (Eng. C.A.) (applying Mareva injunctions to assets not within English
jurisdiction).
117 See Helen Pines Richman, Mareva Injunction: Important Tactical Tool, N.Y. L.J.,
Jul. 7, 1994, at 2 (stating that Mareva injunction "enables the seizure of assets so as to
preserve them for the benefit of the creditor but not to give a charge in favour of any
particular creditor"); Michael Brandon, Recent Developments in English Law Affecting
International Transactions, 15 INrVL LAW. 629, 629 (1981) (noting that Mareva injunctions
are orders for pre-judgment attachment of assets to prevent removal by defendants of
assets from jurisdiction); Lawrence W. Newman, International Judgment Enforcement -
Thinking Outside the Box, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 29, 2001, at 3 (noting that Mareva injunctions
restrain defendant from removing assets from jurisdiction or otherwise restrain him from
dealing with his assets).
118 See Rasu Martima SA v. Pertamina, [1978] 3 All E.R. 324 (Eng. C.A.).
119 Id.
120 Supreme Court Act of 1981, § 37(1) (Eng.)
121 Supreme Court Act of 1981, § 37(1) (Eng.) (emphasis added)
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More importantly, the Supreme Court Act of 1981 laid the
groundwork for the modern provisional measures, 122 including
interlocutory injunctions which preserve the status quo prior to
trial,12 3 security measures such as in rem attachment12 4 and
"modern" Mareva interlocutory judgments,125 and investigative
orders which serve to aid plaintiffs in securing pre-trial
disclosure of defendants' assets. 126 These investigative devices
are discussed in further detail in PART I-E.
D. Expanding "An Entirely New and Wrong Principle"
On the facts of Nippon Yusen Kaisha and Mareva Compania
Naviera, there was considerable debate in the cases that followed
whether it was a requirement that the defendant be a foreign
company or a foreign resident before an English court could issue
a Mareva injunction.127 That is, did the Mareva injunction serve
122 See HILL, supra note 12, at 559 (explaining rationale for provisional remedies);
Tung-Pi Chen et al., Order Amid Chaos: Security Devices for Secured Transactions in
China, 24 INT'L LAW. 21, 24 (1990) (noting that provisional measures have been expanded
to secured transactions in countries like China); Daniel G. Murphy, Business
Transactions and Disputes: International Litigation, 35 INT'L LAW. 491, 491 (2001) (noting
that lack of internationally recognized provisional measures has led to litigation in
several jurisdictions).
123 Interlocutory injunctions seek to ensure that justice can be done when the dispute
is ultimately decided, i.e., to maintain the status quo. HILL, supra note 12, at 559-60.
Like all injunctions, they either restrain or mandate that a party do a particular thing. Id.
For example, a plaintiff employer may request an injunction to force a defendant
contractor to cease work on a construction project. Id.
124 Security measures are designed to secure the ultimate judgment or award, rather
than to maintain the status quo - though they may have similar effects. HILL, supra note
12, at 560. They prevent, for example, a defendant from selling off his assets prior to the
final judgment. Id. The simplest form of a security measure is attachment - literally a
seizing of the underlying asset, such as a ship - in admiralty proceedings. Id.
125 The Mareva order is a type of security measure. Because it is technically an
interlocutory "judgment," it is not designed to maintain the status quo but rather to
restrain a defendant - by freezing his assets - from frustrating the potential satisfaction
of plaintiffs claim. HILL, supra note 12, at 560. The significant distinction between
interlocutory judgments and interlocutory injunctions is primarily grounded in the
threshold showing required of a plaintiff for a court to issue one. Id. at 560-61. The
requirements of interlocutory injunctions are governed by the principles set out in Am.
Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd., [1975] A.C. 396, 408 (Eng.). HILL, supra note 12, at 560-
61. The granting of Mareva injunctions are governed less clearly by a combination of
statutory and case law interpretations discussed in PART II.A.
126 See HILL, supra note 12, at 560. Anton Piller orders, which permit plaintiffs to
enter the premises of the defendant to secure evidence, and Norwich orders, which compel
third parties, usually banks, to assist plaintiffs in the tracing of defendant assets, are two
relatively common examples of investigative orders. Id.; John Jaffey, Court Dissolves
Mareva Injunction Granted U.S. Trade Commission, LAW. WKLY., Oct. 17, 2003, at 1.
127 See HILL, supra note 12, at 563; Lawrence W. Newman & Michael Burrows,
Lessons from English Mareva Injunctions, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 19, 1998, at 3 (citing Babanaft
Int'l Co. S.A. v. Bassatne [1988] W.L.R. 232, 242 ("in appropriate cases, though these may
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as a limited exception to the general rule of Lister v. Stubbs
solely when a foreign defendant who might remove his assets
from the jurisdiction was involved? Cases decided in 1980
answered that question in the negative, applying Mareva
injunctions for the first time to English residents.128
The expansion of the procedure occurred most dramatically in
1989.129 In Babanaft International Co. S.A. v. Bassatne,130 the
Mareva procedure was extended extraterritorially to defendants
who maintained assets within English territorial jurisdiction.131
It was applied to third parties outside of English jurisdiction in
Republic of Haiti v. Duvalier.132 Whatever limitation, self-
imposed or otherwise, that had existed before by applying the
Mareva injunction only to assets within English jurisdiction was
eliminated in Derby & Co., Ltd. v. Weldon (No. 1).133 Derby
required defendants, on threat of contempt,134 to make full
disclosure of their assets worldwide and applied the Mareva
well be rare, there is nothing to preclude our courts from granting Mareva type
injunctions against defendants which extend to their assets outside the jurisdiction."));
Richman, supra note 117, at 2 (noting that Mareva injunction is allowed over assets of
anybody, foreign or otherwise, where there is risk of dissipation of assets in jurisdiction or
elsewhere).
128 See Chartered Bank v. Daklouche, [19801 1 W.L.R. 107 (Eng. C.A.); Barclay-
Johnson v. Yuill, [19801 1 W.L.R. 1259 (Eng. C.A.); Rahman (Prince Abdul) bin Turki al
Sudairy v. Abu-Taha, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1258 (Eng. C.A.).
129 See Dr. Peter Kaye, Powers of Disclosure of Foreign Assets in English Courts, 139
NEW L.J. 875 (1989) (discussing extraterritorial expansion of Mareva procedure in 1989);
Edward Sibley & Philip M. Smith, Taking a Lesson from English Courts on Restricting the
Movement of Assets, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 16, 1998, at 1 ("[lit was not until a series of cases in
[1989] that England's Court of Appeals sanctioned an expansion of Mareva injunctions to
cover assets beyond jurisdictions of the English courts."). But see Edward Flanders &
David W. Oakland, New York's Highest Court Refuses to Enjoin Defendants' Asset-
Stripping Tactics, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., May, 2000, at 4 (noting that New York
Court of Appeals adopted reasoning that such substantial expansion of equitable power of
courts is inconsistent with traditional American legal development).
130 [1989] 2 W.L.R. 232 (Eng. C.A.).
131 Id.; Brad Daisley, B.C. Justice sets Precedent by Granting Worldwide Mareva
Injunction, LAW. WKLY., Dec. 16, 1994, at 1 (stating that there was nothing precluding
courts "from granting Mareva-type injunctions against defendants which extends to their
assets outside the jurisdiction."); Newman, supra note 117, at 3 (noting that "courts may
grant Mareva injunctions to restrain judgment debtors from dealing with their assets
outside the original jurisdiction. ..")
132 [19891 2 W.L.R. 261 (Eng. C.A.)
133 [1989] 2 W.L.R. 278 (Eng. C.A.)
134 Like all equitable remedies, these injunctions are enforced solely by the court's
contempt power which can subject a contemnor to fine, imprisonment, the drawing of
unfavorable inferences based on existing evidence, discovery sanctions, and ultimately
default judgment (inability to argue on the merits). See Doug Rendleman, Choices of Law
and Remedy: Irreparability Irreparably Damaged. The Death of The Irreparable Injury
Rule, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1642, 1642 (1992), which emphasized that the contempt doctrine is
an important tool of injunction enforcement.
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injunction to those assets, wherever situated, and regardless of
enforcement by courts where such assets were located.135 The
only qualification was that the plaintiff had to consult the issuing
court before seeking enforcement of the Mareva injunction
beyond the jurisdiction of the English courts. 136 By 2003, English
courts were regularly issuing ex parte Mareva injunctions in aid
of foreign proceedings and to assets and defendants with little or
no relationship to England. 137
E. Enforcing 'An Entirely New and Wrong Principle"
Technically, the Mareva order only "freezes" a defendant's
assets so that they cannot be dissipated or destroyed prior to a
legal judgment.138 To effectuate the spirit and letter of the
Mareva order, English courts utilize three ancillary enforcement
orders also punishable by contempt. 139
The first order, a simple disclosure order, requires the
defendant to disclose all of his worldwide assets, which naturally
implies that the defendant has been made aware of the Mareva
135 See Derby & Co., Ltd. v. Weldon (No. 1), [19891 2 W.L.R. 278 (Eng. C.A.) (holding
that Mareva injunction can freeze defendant's assets overseas); see also Alexander, supra
note 2, at 499 (stating that Derby decision applied Mareva injunction to defendant's assets
worldwide); Taylor, supra note 3, at 22 ("Lord Justice Neill (cutting the ribbon on the
floodgates) pronounced 'that the time had come to state unequivocally that in an
appropriate case the court had power to grant an interlocutory injunction on a worldwide
basis against any person who was properly before the court'.").
136 See Derby & Co., Ltd. v. Weldon (No. 1), [1989] 2 W.L.R. 278 (Eng. C.A.) (holding
that plaintiff has to get approval of English court before attempting to enforcing
injunction abroad); see also Alexander, supra note 2, at 500 (1997) (stating that foreign
court will have to declare injunction enforceable before Mareva injunction can have any
extraterritorial effect); George A. Ber, Provisional Relief in Transnational Litigation, 35
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 553, 583 n.84 (1997) (noting that plaintiff had to obtain
permission by English court before enforcing injunction abroad).
137 See, e.g., Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, [2004] W.L.R. 113 (Eng. C.A.); CIBC
Mellon Trust Co. v. Mora Hotel Corp., 743 N.Y.S.2d 408, 411 (App. Div.). In both cases,
plaintiffs resorted to English jurisdiction after being denied the relief they sought in the
United States. See also Andrew Lenon, Mareva Injunctions in Support of Foreign
Proceedings, 147 NEW L.J. 1234 (1997), which noted the increasing popularity of Mareva
injunctions.
138 See generally BARNARD & HOUGHTON, supra note 18, at 249-50 (describing effects
of Mareva injunction); see also Alexander, supra note 2, at 512 (stating that Mareva
injunction is used to freeze assets before trial); Wasserman, supra note 4, at 339 (noting
that Mareva injunction is used to freeze defendant's assets).
139 See Aird, supra note 3; Johansson, supra note 43, at 1098, which describes the
courts' ancillary powers in terms of the Mareva injunction. See generally SNELL'S
PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY, supra note 40, at 647-50. These orders have their own historical
development and may be used individually as the presiding judge sees fit. Custom has
indicated, however, that they are often issued to assist in effectuating Mareva orders.
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order.140 Where it is presumed that the threat of contempt may
not sufficiently motivate a defendant or simply to avoid tipping
off the defendant to the plaintiffs' course of action, the court can
issue what has come to be called a Norwich order,141 based on the
inherent jurisdiction of English courts, requiring third parties,
usually banks, to provide "full information" about the defendant's
assets to plaintiffs.142 These third parties are enlisted to assist
plaintiffs' asset tracing activities prior to notification of the
defendants of the issuance of the Mareva order.143 The final
order, called an Anton Piller order,144 is the most egregious. This
order creates an injunction permitting plaintiffs attorneys to
search the defendant's premises and seize items and documents
140 See Johansson, supra note 43, at 1097 (stating that court has ancillary power to
issue disclosure order); see also Alexander, supra note 2, at 497-98 (noting that discovery
order can be granted to determine defendant's assets); Peter F. Schlosser, Coordinated
Transnational Interaction in Civil Litigation and Arbitration, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 150,
165-71 (1990) (examining ancillary disclosure orders).
141 Named after Norwich Pharmacal v. Comm'rs of Customs & Excise, [1974] A.C.
133 (Eng.); see Paul Magrath, THE INDEPENDENT (London) Aug. 12, 1993 (stating that the
court in Mareva was influenced by Norwich decision); see also Jaffey, supra note 126, at 1
(opining that both Mareva and Norwich orders are extraordinary measures).
142 See, e.g., Ashworth Hosp. Auth. V. MGN Ltd, (2002] 4 All E.R. 193 (Eng. H.L.),
which described the justification for Norwich orders:
In my opinion, accordingly, the respondents, in consequence of the relationship in
which they stand, arising out of their statutory functions, to the goods imported, can
properly be ordered by the court to disclose to the appellants the names of persons
whom the appellants bona fide believe to be infringing these rights, this being their
only practicable source of information as to whom they should sue, subject to any
special right of exception which the respondents may qualify in respect of their
position as a department of state. It has to be conceded that there is no direct
precedent for the granting of such an application in the precise circumstances of this
case, but such an exercise of the power of the court seems to be well within broad
principles authoritatively laid down. That exercise will always be subject to judicial
discretion, and it may well be that the reason for the limitation in practice on what
may be a wider power to order discovery, to any case in which the defendant has been
"mixed up with the transaction", to use Lord Romilly MR's words, or "stands in some
relation" to the goods, within the meaning of the decision in [Post v Toledo,
Cincinnati and St Louis Railroad Co (1887) 11 NE Rep 540], is that that is the way in
which judicial discretion ought to be exercised.
Ashworth Hosp. Auth. V. MGN Ltd, [20021 4 All E.R. 193 (Eng. H.L.).
See also Dr. Mark S.W. Hoyle, The Mareva Injunction and Related Orders, 39 VA. J. INT'L
L. 503, 511 (1999) (describing bank's duty to cooperate with court's order in determination
of defendant's assets); see also Fabano, supra note 2, at 140 (noting that bank which
becomes aware of injunction is not allowed to transfer defendant's assets).
143 See O'Driscoll, supra note 79, at 402 (noting that plaintiff may request bank
conduct search for defendant's assets); Hoyle, supra note 142, at 511 (stating that
disclosure order can require third parties to reveal all of defendant's assets); see also
Fabano, supra note 2, at 140 (stating that notice to defendant should be bypassed).
144 Anton-Piller KG v. Manufacturing Processes Ltd., [1976] 1 Ch. 55 (Eng.). See
generally Alexander, supra note 2, at 488 (describing Anton Piller orders); Hoyle, supra
note 142, at 503, (stating Anton Piller orders allow plaintiff to search defendant's
premises and seize items or documents which might become evidence at trial).
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which might constitute evidence in the plaintiffs action against
the defendant.145
The four orders, especially when used together, have rightly
been called the "nuclear weapons of the law."146 An arsenal,
which is, notably, only at the plaintiffs disposal, the existence of
which may only become known to a defendant after "detonation."
II. TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THE WORLDWIDE MAREVA
PROCEDURE
A. Application for a Mareva Order
As an initial matter, a plaintiff seeking to secure a Mareva
order in support of a legal claim must apply for one - usually in
the form of a standard, fill- in-the-blank proposed order provided
in the U.K. Practice Directions,14 7 the precise wording of which
depends on the scope of assets sought to be covered by the
order.148 Recognizing the draconian nature149 of the procedure
and its potential for abuse, 150 English courts have recognized
some procedural safeguards and requirements for the issuance of
such orders.151 Whether these requirements actually afford any
145 See Hoyle, supra note 142, at 504 (stating that purpose of the Anton Piller order is
to prevent defendant from destroying evidence before trial); see also Alexander, supra
note 2, at 503 (noting that the Anton Piller order is very controversial). See generally
SNELL'S PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY, supra note 40.
146 See Grupo Mexicano de Desorrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 332
(1999) (recognizing atomic appellation); see also Taylor, supra note 3, at 22 (describing
Mareva injunction, with Anton Piller order, as "one of the law's two 'nuclear' weapons.").
147 U.K. CIV, P. R., Practice Directions, Part 25 (Feb. 2002).
148 For the purposes of this Note, only the "worldwide Mareva" will be considered.
Mareva injunctions which apply to assets in England (i.e., a "domestic Mareva") do not
present the same extraterritorial difficulties. A plaintiff seeking to secure a Mareva order
simply chooses the language in the sample Practice Directions template designed to reach
the assets he seeks to freeze - i.e., assets outside of England require a different order
than those within its borders. U.K. CrV. P. R., Practice Directions, Part 25 (Feb. 2002).
149 See Arena Corp. v. Schroeder, [2003] E.W.H.C. 1089, 173 (Eng. Ch.) (calling
Mareva injunction draconian in nature); see also Fabano, supra note 2, at 137 (noting that
due to extreme nature of measure it is often called creditor's "nuclear weapon"); Jaffey,
supra note 126 (characterizing Mareva order as extraordinary measure).
150 See Ninemia Mar. Corp.v. Trave Schiffahrtsgesellschaft M.B.H. & Co., [1983] 2
Lloyd's Rep. 600, 603 (Eng. Q.B.) (stating remedy could be used as "vehicle for
oppression"); see also ; Nation, supra note 16, at 399-400 (describing criticism of Mareva
orders); Theuer, supra note 42, at 466 (noting that Eleventh Circuit's fear of extreme
nature of Mareva order has led to refusal to adopt it and instead seek alternative
remedies).
151 See Fabano, supra note 2, at 141-44 (describing "limits" of Mareua injunction); see
also Hoyle, supra note 142, at 509-13 (analyzing procedural limitations of Mareva
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measure of protection has been the subject of debate.152 The
general application process for a Mareva order is laid out in the
Practice Directions1 53 but it is best appreciated with resort to
case law. 154
Apropos of its discretionary equitable origins, what is required
of an applicant for a Mareva order varies based on who is being
asked to issue it.155 Depending upon the case consulted or the
treatise relied upon,156 one judge's "requirement" is another's
injunction); Johansson, supra note 43, at 1104 (noting that in their decision to grant
Mareva injunctions, courts should balance the need to protect plaintiffs' interests against
"the risk of inflicting legally unjustified harm on defendants").
152 See Willoughby, supra note 23, at 480; see also Johansson, supra note 43, at 1104
(noting that despite procedural limitations courts should use measure sparingly due to
countervailing concerns); Nation, supra note 16, at 371 (addressing issue whether Mareva
injunction is abuse of discretion despite limitations).
153 U.K. CIv. P. R., Part 25.3 - How to Apply for an Interim Remedy (2000) SI
1998/3121 (describing application process for interim remedy); U.K. CIV. P. R., Practice
Directions, Part 25 - Interim Remedies and Security for Costs, Department for
Constitutional Affairs, available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/procrulesfir/contents/
parts/part25.htm (last visited January 15, 2005) (outlining application process). See Civil
Procedure Rules: Updates, Department for Constitutional Affairs, available at
http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/procrules-fin/update.htm (last visited January 15, 2005)
(recording all recent updates to U.K. Civil Procedure Rules).
154 See, e.g., Ninemia Maritime Corp. v. Trave Schiffahrtsgesellschaft M.B.H.& Co.
K.G., (The 'Niedersachsen'), [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 600, 603, 608 (Eng. C.A.) (explaining
necessary requirements for Mareva order); Establissement Esefka Int'l Anstalt v. Cent.
Bank of Nigeria, [1979] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 445, 448 (Eng. C.A.) (articulating and applying
requirements for Mareva order); Rasu v. Perusahaan ('The Pertamina") [1978] 1 Q.B. 644,
657-661 (Eng. C.A.) (discussing historical procedure for seizing property before judgment
and then-present state of law concerning Mareva orders).
155 One commentator stated that given the relatively recent development of the
Mareva order, some judges will have never had any practice experience with defending
them, i.e., before they were judges and, as such, may not consider all of the implications it
has for a defendant. See Taylor, supra note 2, at 22. It is also important to note that once
a judge decides, within his discretion, to issue a Mareva order, "th[e] court would not
ordinarily interfere with [the decision], absent any misdirection." Polly Peck Int'l v. Nadir
(No. 2), [1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 238, 242 (Eng. C.A.).
The issuing of a Mareva order may also depend on which branch of the civil court from
which the plaintiff requests the order. One commentator suggested this is not a miniscule
concern by stating:
In the Chancery Division, in contrast, the plaintiff will only exceptionally enjoy the
luxury of an order granted ex parte until trial and often has to await the generally
automatic inter partes hearing which follows the granting of the ex parte order before
an order requiring the defendant to disclose his assets will be made. Furthermore,
the plaintiff may be treated to the sight (some would say rare in the Queen's Bench
Division) of the judge who hears the ex parte application reading not just the
affidavits but the exhibits as well and having the temerity to interfere with the form
of the order drafted by the plaintiffs advisers.
Taylor, supra note 2, at 22. The procedure to be followed in seeking a Mareva order also
differs based on which branch of the civil court is called upon. See SNELL'S PRINCIPLES OF
EQUITY, supra note 40, at 646-47.
156 Author Jonathan Hill articulates two requirements for a Mareva order, a good
arguable case and a real risk of default. HILL, supra note 12, at 562. In addition, he
indicates that evidence is required but yet he makes no mention of the "full and frank
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mere "consideration."157  Lord Denning best explained this
variation in approach when - fittingly - he said, "when a statute
gives a discretion, the courts must not fetter it by rigid rules from
which a judge is never at liberty to depart."158 A recent case,
Arena Corp. Ltd. v. Schroeder,159 utilized what appears to be the
generally accepted three threshold requirements a successful
applicant will be required to fulfill in order to obtain a Mareva
order. 160
First, an applicant for a Mareva order must present to the
court with a "good arguable case."161 This requirement is
disclosure" of all material facts, including potential defenses. Id. MODERN EQUITY cites
Denning's eight considerations (see below). HANBURY & MAUDSLEY, supra note 10, at 733-
43. SNELL'S PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY lists five prerequisites: disclosure, statement of nature
of case, assets in England, risk of removal, and undertaking in damages. SNELL'S
PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY, supra note 40, at 648. Arena Corp. v. Schroeder gives the main
three. [2003] E.W.H.C 1089, 114 (Eng. Ch.).
157 MODERN EQUITY lists the eight factors to consider, outlined by Lord Denning.
HANBURY & MAUDSLEY, supra note 10, at 733-43. These include: 1) The plaintiff must
have a good arguable case; 2) The injunction is not limited to money, but in the case of
goods, caution is required if the injunction would bring the defendant's business to a
standstill; 3) The court should favor the grant if it would be likely to compel the defendant
to provide security; 4) the plaintiff must make full and frank disclosure of all material
matters; 5) He should give particulars of his claim and its amount, and (in an ex parte
application) he should fairly state the points made against it by the defendant; 6) He
should give grounds for believing that the defendant has assets in the jurisdiction; 7) He
should give grounds for believing that there is a risk of their removal before the claim is
satisfied, and a danger of default if the assets were removed. The mere fact that the
defendant is abroad is not sufficient; and 8) He must undertake in damages, giving
security in suitable cases, in cease he is unsuccessful in the action. Id.
Lord Denning later articulated a different set of requirements to prevent the Mareva
injunction from being "stretched too far": disclosure, a particular statement of the claim,
grounds for believing the defendant has assets, reasons why there is a danger of the
assets being moved before satisfaction of the judgment and an assessment of damages.
See Third Chandris Shipping Corp. v. Unimarine S.A., [1979] Q.B. 645, 668-69 (C.A.).
Sir Robert Megarry discussed the two lines of authority for the Mareva injunction and
identified the two major components as a "good arguable case" and "the risk of the
defendant moving his assets from the jurisdiction. Barclay-Johnson v. Yuill, [19801 1
W.L.R. 1259, 1262 - 1265 (Eng. Ch.).
158 Pertimina, [1978] 1 Q.B. at 660.
159 [2003] E.W.H.C 1089 (Eng. Ch.).
160 Id., at 11 (listing what Arena Corp. must demonstrate to receive Mareva
injunction).
161 See Rasu v. Perusahaan ('The Pertamina") [1978] 1 QB 644, 661 (Eng. C.A.)
(asserting that "an order restraining removal of assets can be made whenever the plaintiff
can show that he has a 'good arguable case"'); see also Polly Peck Int'l v. Nadir (No. 2),
[1992) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 238, 242 (Eng. C.A.) (expressing that "[a] Mareva injunction could
not ever be justified unless at least a fair arguable case for liability could be shown");
Ninemia Maritime Corp., [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 603-04 (quoting Lord Denning's
requirement of "good arguable case"); Barclay-Johnson, [1980] 1 W.L.R. at 1265
(reiterating the need for a "good arguable case"); Establissement Esefka Int'l Anstalt,
[1979] 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 448 (restating that Mareva injunctions "should at least [require]
a good arguable case for the plaintiffs that the money is going to become due to them").
See generally Willoughby, supra note 23, at 480 (suggesting that Pertimina decision of
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intended to prevent the use of the court's authority to aid
vexatious or frivolous claims,162  so applicants need not
demonstrate that their claim could withstand summary
judgment.163 In fact, the standard does not rise anywhere near
that of a preponderance.164 Mr. Justice Lloyd, in Ninemia
Maritime Corporation v. Trave Schiffahrtsgesellschaft M.B.H.und
Co. KG., (The 'Niedersachsen'),165 described the relatively
minimal standard as one where the applicant's claim must be
"more than barely capable of serious argument."166
Second, there must be a "real risk that a judgment or award in
favour of the plaintiffs would remain unsatisfied."167 Cases have
held that the mere fact that the defendant is a foreigner is not
sufficient168 and that risk of removal of assets from the
jurisdiction, by itself, does not satisfy this requirement.169 The
Lord Denning "moved the goal posts" as far as threshold criteria for securing a Mareva
injunction were concerned, since what was conceived originally as a much higher
standard had been made significantly lower).
162 See Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd., [1975] A.C. 396 (Eng.) (laying out
framework for interlocutory injunctions and rationale regarding misuse of court's
authority, which also applies to Mareva orders); see also HANBURY & MAUDSLEY, supra.
note 10, at 731 (maintaining that "the court must be satisfied that the plaintiffs case is
not frivolous or vexations and that there is a serious question to be tried"). See generally
Willoughby, supra note 23, at 483 (arguing that Mareva injunction is "a vital instrument
of justice when properly applied for, properly granted and properly administered," and yet
"[i]n the absence of any of these elements, it is capable of being the cruellest of
tyrannies").
163 See Pertimina [1978] 1 Q.B. at 661 (finding summary judgment to be too high a
standard); see also HANBURY & MAUDSLEY, supra note 10, at 733 (calling standard
required, "a real prospect of success at the trial"); Willoughby, supra note 23, at 480
(noting that in Pertimina, "Lord Denning held that Mareva injunctions should not be
limited to those cases exhibiting the certainty demanded in order to obtain summary
judgment").
164 See Ninemia Maritime Corp., [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 604 (announcing that
plaintiff must "do substantially more than show that the case is merely 'arguable," yet
"need not go so far as to persuade the Judge that he is likely to win"); see also Pertimina,
[1978] 1 Q.B. at 661 (commenting that "[t]he defendant may put in an affidavit putting
forward a specious defence sufficient to get him leave to defend, conditional or
unconditional ... [blut when the case actually comes to the Court for trial, he throws his
hand in"). See generally Willoughby, supra note 23, at 480 (stressing that we need to
revise standard to an "extremely strong prima facie case").
165 [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 600 (Eng. C.A.).
166 Id. at 605.
167 Id. at 617.
168 See id. at 605 (establishing that "[t]he mere fact that a defendant having assets
within the jurisdiction is a foreigner or a foreign corporation cannot,..., by itself justify
the granting of a Mareva injunction"); Third Chandris Shipping Corp. v. Unimarine S.A.,
[1979] Q.B. 645, 669 (Eng. C.A.) (reaffirming that Mareva injunctions cannot
automatically be imposed on foreign companies). See e.g., Z Ltd v. A-Z, [1982] 1 All E.R.
556, 572 (Eng. C.A.) (illustrating application of Mareva injunctions to foreign companies).
169 See Ninemia Maritime Corp., [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 605-06 (emphasizing need
for additional facts beyond mere risk of removal of assets); see also Z Ltd., [1982] 1 All ER
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pertinent question appears to be whether there is a risk of
default, leaving plaintiff without a satisfied judgment, to which
risk both the status as a foreigner and the likelihood of removal
are certainly components. 170 Implicit in this is the notion that the
defendant will seek to avoid judgment, i.e., default, though
evidence of any such 'nefarious intent" has been explicitly
disclaimed as a requirement. 171 Another implicit idea in this
requirement is that the defendant have assets to freeze, 172 but
some commentators insist courts nevertheless require plaintiffs
to demonstrate this in the material supporting their
application.173
556, at 572 (highlighting that "the danger of assets being removed from the jurisdiction is
only one facet of the 'ploy' of a defendant to make himself 'judgment-proof"); INGMAN,
supra note 25, at 480 (acknowledging that plaintiff must show that defendant's assets will
not be available at time of judgment).
170 The necessity of a real risk of removal of assets prior to a judgment being awarded
has been widely recognized. See HILL, supra note 12, at 580. Justice Lloyd noted that
"[tihere must be facts from which the Commercial Court, like a prudent, sensible
commercial man, can properly infer a danger of default if assets are removed from the
jurisdiction." Ninemia Maritime Corp., [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 605-06.
In Derby & Co. Ltd. v. Weldon (Nos. 3 & 4), Lord Donaldson suggested, "[the] existence of
sufficient assets within the jurisdiction is an excellent reason for confining the [Mareva]
jurisdiction to such assets, but other considerations apart, the fewer the assets with the
jurisdiction the greater the necessity for taking protective measures in relation to those
outside of it." Derby & Co. Ltd. v. Weldon (Nos. 3 & 4), [1990] Ch. 65, 79 (Eng.). The clear
implication of this statement is that, while neither status is of itself determinative, a
plaintiff who demonstrates any combination of the two - being foreign and keeping an
insufficient amount of assets in the jurisdiction - will probably provide an issuing court
with sufficient proof to pass on this requirement.
171 See Ninemia Maritime Corp., [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 617. It is clearly established
that a plaintiff does not need to prove "nefarious intent." See id; Willoughby, supra note
23, at 480. However, there still lies the principle that "[clourts will not permit the course
of justice to be frustrated by a defendant taking action, the purpose of which is to render
nugatory or less effective any judgment or order which the plaintiff may thereafter
obtain." Polly Peck Int'l v. Nadir (No. 2), [1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 238, 249 (Eng. C.A.).
Therefore, though there is no requirement that plaintiff demonstrate that the defendant
actually "intends" to place his assets beyond the reach of the plaintiff and the court, it is
certainly permissible to provide anecdotal evidence of the defendant's business practices,
operations, and past transactions in order for the issuing judge to infer such an intent,
thereby satisfying this requirement. Ninemia Maritime Corp., [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at
606.
172 See Third Chandris Shipping Corp., [19791 Q.B. at 668 (suggesting that plaintiff
should state some grounds for belief that defendant have assets within jurisdiction,
though only indications of assets will suffice). See also SNELL'S PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY,
supra note 40, at 648 (noting that plaintiff can state some grounds for belief that
defendant has assets within jurisdiction but does not have to precisely identify assets);
Alexander, supra note 2, at 495 (stating that plaintiff must only evince reasonable belief
that defendant have assets within court's jurisdiction).
173 See, e.g., HANBURY & MAUDSLEY, supra note 10, at 786 (stating that plaintiff
should give court grounds for belief that defendant has assets within jurisdiction);
INGMAN, supra note 25, at 480 (asserting that plaintiff must satisfy court that defendant
has assets within or without jurisdiction); Zicherman, supra note 16, at 673 (suggesting
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Finally, the plaintiffs application must be supported by a "full
and frank disclosure" 174 of all material matters, supported by
affidavits,175 including the particulars of his claim and its
amount.176 The evidence should draw the court's attention to the
factual, legal, and procedural aspects of the plaintiffs case. 177
The applicant is also expected to have undertaken all practicable,
relevant inquiries.178 As this is an ex parte proceeding, plaintiff is
also obligated to "fairly" state the arguments the defendant is
likely to make.179 Material non-disclosures of facts or potential
that plaintiff must provide grounds for belief that defendant have assets within court's
jurisdiction).
174 Arena Corp.. v. Schroeder [2003] E.W.H.C. 1089, 113 (Eng. Ch.).
175 Id. at 115. In Arena v. Schroeder, the court identifies affidavits as part of
plaintiffs application. Id. See Samuel K. Alexander, III, The Mareva Injunction and
Related Orders, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 503, 509 (1999) (book review). The author states that
plaintiff is required to submit affidavits in support upon application for Mareva
injunction. Id. at 509. As has been the practice, affidavits are usually sworn to by
plaintiffs attorneys as affiants. See Alexander, supra note 2, at 495-96. The author notes
that affidavits in support must accompany application and affidavits can be sworn by
individual plaintiff, senior officer of plaintiff corporation, or plaintiffs solicitor. Id. at 495-
96.
176 See, e.g., Gidrxslme Shipping Co.. v. Tantomar-Transportes Maritimos Lda. where
plaintiffs obtained a Mareva order restraining defendants from: ". . . removing [their]
assets from the jurisdiction or disposing of, assigning their rights to, charging,
mortgaging, encumbering or otherwise howsoever dealing with any of their assets within
the jurisdiction until the Final Award was satisfied, save in so far as the unencumbered
value of the assets exceeded US $720,000." [1994] 4 All ER 507 (Eng. Q.B.). The plaintiffs
claim is generally used as the upper limit of defendant's assets over which the order
applies, though this is not necessarily required. See Third Chandris Shipping Corp.
[1979] Q.B. at 668. In Third Chandris, the court noted that plaintiffs disclosure of
amount of claim is merely required for consideration of injunction application. Id. at 668.
177 Arena Corp. v. Schroeder [2003] E.W.H.C. 1089, at 116 (quoting Memory Corp.
PLC v. Sidhu, [2000] 1 WLR 1443, 1459) (stating that plaintiff should "draw the court's
attention to significant factual, legal and procedural aspects of the case"); see Alexander,
supra note 175, at 509-10 (summarizing recommended and required application
material); see also Manuel Juan Dominguez, Using Prejudgment Attachments in the
European Community and the U.S., 5 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 41, 52 (1995) (outlining
information plaintiff should provide upon injunction application).
178 Arena Corp., [2003] E.W.H.C. at 115. In Arena Corp. v. Schroeder the court
states that a plaintiff must investigate the nature of the cause of action asserted. Id. at
115. Where a plaintiff claims that the risk of dissipation is great and thus time is of the
essence, this part of the requirement is greatly relaxed. See Alexander, supra note 175, at
510. The author suggests that plaintiff ensure all undertakings have been completed
when application is submitted. Id. at 510. See also Eric S. Rein, International Fraud:
Freeze, Seize, and Retrieve, 116 BANKING L.J. 144, 147, where the author outlines
responsibilities expected of plaintiff upon application for injunction.
179 Arena Corp., [2003] E.W.H.C. at 114 (stating, "[e]qually, in fairness to the
defendant, the plaintiff ought to disclose, so far as he is able, any defence which the
defendant has indicated in correspondence or elsewhere. It is only if such information is
put fairly before the court that a Mareva injunction can properly be granted."); see Third
Chandris Shipping Corp., [1979] Q.B. at 668 (stating that plaintiff should account for
points made against his claim by defendant in applying for Mareva injunction);
Dominguez, supra note 177, at 52 (noting that plaintiff is required to provide court with
defendant's applicable affirmative defenses).
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defenses do not by themselves defeat an application but instead
are subject to a fact-sensitive balancing test.18 0 Judges, though
cognizant of the implications,S1 are nevertheless free to grant
the Mareva order despite the plaintiffs breach of duty to fully
inform the court.18 2
As a means of ameliorating potential hardship on defendants
and, perhaps, to avoid abuse of the procedure by plaintiffs, some
judges may require the applying party to post a security bond
sufficient to cover defendant's costs of compliance with the
Mareva order's disclosure obligations.183 There is disagreement
as to whether this is to be considered a "requirement" or merely
an optional safeguard. 184
B. Effect on Defendant's Assets
PENAL NOTICE:
180 Arena Corp., [2003] E.W.H.C. at 213 (highlighting guidelines for recommended
balancing test for judges); Alexander, supra note 2, at 496 (suggesting that judges are
more likely to approve applications when plaintiff provides as much information as
possible); Alexander, supra note 175, at 510 (stating that plaintiffs should provide more
information than required to avoid omissions which may result in rejection of
application).
181 Arena Corp., [2003] E.W.H.C. at 193 (noting Court of Appeal's concern about
Mareva injunction issued where plaintiff made material non-disclosures).
182 Arena Corp., [2003] E.W.H.C 215. In Arena Corp. v. Schroeder there were six
material non-disclosures by the plaintiff in his application for the Mareva order, and the
court refused to continue it, but nonetheless left it in place until the court conducted
further hearings[!] Id. at 215. This author wonders if there is a timepiece accurate
enough to measure the speed with which an English court would hold a defendant in
contempt were he to make "six material non-disclosures" to the court when subject to a
Mareva order. See Third Chandris Shipping Corp., [1979] Q.B. at 669. In Third Chandris
the court notes that although plaintiffs submission of more details is preferred, judges
may find submission of few details sufficient for granting injunction. Id. at 669. See also
Rachel Davies, No Mareva for Non-UK Assets, FIN. TIMES (London), June 24, 1988 at 15.
The author states that the court ultimately considers whether approval of application is
fair and just, despite amount of details provided. Id. at 15.
183 See, e.g., HANBURY & MAUDSLEY, supra note 10, at 786 (stating that plaintiff must
post security in case action is unsuccessful); see Fabano, supra note 2, at 142 (positing
that plaintiff is required to post security upon application in case injunction is
erroneously granted); Zicherman, supra note 16, at 673 (noting that plaintiff should post
security to in case claim fails or injunction is unjustified).
184 See, e.g., INGMAN, supra note 25, at 481. The author argues that such a bond is not
a pure "requirement" because the justification for issuing the order is one of justice and
convenience, not the financial condition of the claimant. Id. at 481. Given the 'loser pays"
system in England, one would think it should be a requirement. See Nation, supra note
16, at 399-401. The author suggests that a judge may or may not require plaintiff to post
form of security. Id. at 401. See also Wasserman, supra note 4, at 347-48. The author cites
posting of security as a possible method for reducing risks posed to defendants. Id. at 348.
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IF YOU [Insert Name of Respondent] DISOBEY THIS
ORDER YOU MAY BE HELD TO BE IN CONTEMPT
OF COURT AND MAY BE IMPRISONED, FINED OR
HAVE YOUR ASSETS SEIZED.
ANY OTHER PERSON WHO KNOWS OF THIS ORDER
AND DOES ANYTHING WHICH HELPS OR PERMITS
THE RESONDENT TO BREACH THE TERMS OF THIS
ORDER MAY ALSO BE HELD TO BE IN CONTEMPT
OF COURT AND MAY BE IMPRISONED, FINED OR
HAVE THEIR ASSETS SEIZED. 185
These are the words of admonition a defendant is greeted with
upon receipt of a typical Mareva order. While the bold-typeface,
capitalized text of the standard form cover page seems menacing
enough, the real nightmare for an unsuspecting defendant is in
the pages that follow.' 8 6
After being informed of the application against him, the party
making the application, and the fact that a hearing has already
been held in his absence, the defendant is then informed of the
effect of the order upon his assets.18 7 A defendant must not "in
any way dispose of, deal with or diminish the value of any of his
assets whether they are in or outside England and Wales ... ."188
Paragraph 6 further clarifies the scope of the order:
Paragraph 5 applies to all the Respondent's assets whether
or not they are in his own name and whether they are solely
or jointly owned. For the purpose of this order the
Respondent's assets include any asset which he has the
power, directly or indirectly, to dispose of or deal with as if it
were his own. The Respondent is to be regarded as having
185 U.K. Civ. P. R., Practice Directions, Part 25 - Annex - Sample Freezing
Injunction, cover page [hereinafter "Sample Freezing Injunction"]. Use of the Sample
Freezing Injunction is common practice and, indeed, variation from its language (without
notice to the issuing judge) could potentially provide grounds for rescinding the order in
its entirety or modifying it as appropriate. See BARNARD & HOUGHTON, supra note 18, at
251-52, where the authors note that care should be exercised in drafting the affidavits
and order so as not to provide defendants with grounds to discharge once they are served.
186 For the purposes of this Note, the "worldwide" freezing injunction language will be
utilized. Slight variation in the language is used where the assets subject to the order are
entirely within English jurisdiction. The effects and requirements are identical, however.
See Sample Freezing Injunction, Para. 5. There is only slight variation in language
between a freezing injunction limited to assets in England and Wales and a "worldwide"
injunction. Id.
187 Sample Freezing Injunction, paras. 5-8 (describing what defendant may or may
not do with his assets once order has been served).
188 Sample Freezing Injunction, para. 5.
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such power if a third party holds or controls the assets in
accordance with his direct or indirect instructions. 189
The order can encompass either the totality of the defendant's
assets1 90 or a subset of them corresponding to a specified sum,
often identical to the amount the plaintiff surmises his claim is
worth.191 Some consideration is given by issuing courts to allow
for reasonable living192 and legal expenses of defendants. 193 One
court stated that "[ilt is not the purpose of a Mareva injunction to
prevent a defendant acting as he would have acted in the absence
of a claim against him."194 That assertion is questionable at best,
189 Sample Freezing Injunction, para. 6.
190 Willoughby, supra note 23, at 481 (describing Mareva order which was signed by
judge despite it applying to entirety of defendant's assets, though it followed specimen
order in all other respects); see Fabano, supra note 2, at 140 (acknowledging power of
Mareva injunction to encompass entirety of defendant's assets); Nation, supra note 16, at
400 (suggesting that orders encompassing entirety of defendant's assets are possible, if
rarely justified).
191 See Gidrxslme Shipping Co. v. Tantomar-Transportes Maritimos Lda, [1994] 4 All
E.R. 507 (Eng. Q.B.) (discussing Mareva order which restrained defendants from
"removing [their] assets from the jurisdiction or disposing of, assigning their rights to,
charging, mortgaging, encumbering or otherwise howsoever dealing with any of their
assets within the jurisdiction until the Final Award was satisfied, save in so far as the
unencumbered value of the assets exceeded US$720,000"); see also William Tetley, Arrest,
Attachment, and Related Maritime Law Procedures, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1895, 1955 (1999)
(noting Mareva orders can freeze "any or all" of defendant's assets). See generally Lord
Denning, Forward to the First Edition of STEVEN GEE, MAREVA INJUNCTIONS & ANTON
PILLAR RELIEF, at xix (2d ed. 1990) (explaining Mareva injunctions with unlimited scope
are rarely granted and suggesting limited Mareva orders more closely reflect purported
goal of Mareva orders which is to preserve adequate assets to protect plaintiffs potential
judgment).
192 See Willoughby, supra note 23, at 481-82 (noting courts recognize punitive
potential of Mareva orders and therefore typically assure defendants subject to Mareva
orders - after the fact, obviously - that they can continue to live in manner in which they
are accustomed). But see PCW Ltd. v. Dixon, [1983] 2 All E.R. 158 (Eng. Q.B.)
(demonstrating how Mareva orders persuade defendants to consider settling their cases,
regardless of guilt or innocence, through explanation of case in which wealthy man with
five children was granted £100 per week for ordinary living expenses under Mareva order
despite absence of evidence suggesting he was dissipating assets or living in a manner
any different than he had before case was filed). See generally Iraqi Ministry of Def. v.
Arcepey Shipping Co. SA The Angel Bell, [1981] 1 Q.B. 65 (Eng.).
193 See Willoughby, supra note 23, at 481-82 (noting defendant must get permission
from plaintiffs solicitors when seeking legal representation, suggesting "approved" limits
may burden defendant's choice of legal representatives such permission requirement may
further heighten expenses, and describing, as an example, six-figure case in which
considerable inter-solicitor correspondence resulted from solicitors' refusal to allow
defendant to pay £200 phone bill); see also Bank not Liable for Suspicious Customers,
TIMES (London), July 18, 2000, at Features (describing Mareva order granting defendant
access to sufficient funds for legal expenses). See generally Solicitors Risk Claim of
Constructive Trust, TIMES (London), Dec. 15, 1997, at Features (highlighting that proviso
in Mareva injunction which permitted defendant to use assets otherwise frozen for
reasonable legal expenses was not a breach of order).
194 Polly Peck Int'l Plc. v. Nadir, [1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 238, 249 (Eng. C.A.)
(emphasizing Mareva injunction is meant only to restrain defendant from "indulging in a
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considering the order itself was founded on grounds which were
meant to demonstrate that a defendant would jeopardize a
plaintiffs claim precisely by acting as he had been in the absence
of the claim.195
Courts and commentators take great pains to clarify that, like
an injunction, the Mareva order operates only in personam on the
defendant;196 it is not an in rem attachment of the property
itself.197 Given the broad sweep of the prohibitions outlined in
the order and the debilitating effect the mere imposition of the
order has on conducting business,198 it is doubtful that the
distinction is of any meaningful, practical significance to a
defendant. The importance of the distinction comes into clearer
focus, however, when the Mareva order is applied to assets
located in other sovereign nations, beyond the reach of English
jurisdiction, which will be considered in further detail in PART
IV.
spending spree undertaken with the intention of dissipating or reducing his assets before
the day of judgement").
195 See Ninemia Mar. Corp. v. Trave Schiffahrtsgesellschaft M.B.H.und Co. K.G.,
[19831 2 Lloyd's Rep. 600, 617 (Eng. Q.B.) (explaining plaintiff must prove there exists
substantial risk defendant will not satisfy judgment before obtaining Mareva order and
adding plaintiff may provide anecdotal evidence of defendant's business practices,
operations, and past transactions in order to prove such risk); see also Selva Kumar,
Insurance Pay-Out Allowed to Satisfy Debts Despite Mareva Injunction, Bus. TIMES SING.,
Sept. 10, 2004, at Shipping News (noting Mareva injunctions are generally utilized when
it appears to court that plaintiffs claim would be jeopardized without such injunction).
See generally Invoking Asset-Freezing Jurisdiction, TIMES (London), Apr. 1, 1999, at
Features (emphasizing Mareva orders are ordinarily not utilized unless defendant is
known, on evidence of plaintiff only, to participate in bad faith financial transactions).
196 See Timothy Portwood, Effect of Mareva Injunction on a Debtor, J. OF INT'L
BANKING L., 4(2), N68-69 (1989) (discussing in personam effect of Mareva orders); see also
Babanaft Int'l Co. v Bassatne [1989] 1 All E.R. 433, 438 (Eng. C.A.). See generally
Bermann, supra note 22, at 564 (emphasizing Mareva injunctions are directed against
individuals, not against property, and operate in personam, rather than in rem).
197 See Bermann, supra note 22, at 560 (describing that attachment, most often used
post-judgment, gives plaintiff ownership interest in attached property whereas Mareva
injunction is intended to prohibit defendant from frustrating plaintiffs future ownership
interest); see also Flightline Ltd. v. Edwards, [2002] 1 W.L.R. 2535, 3 (Eng. Ch.) (noting
Mareva injunction is in personam relief which does not effect seizure of any asset, adding
such injunctions merely prohibit owners from doing certain things in relation to assets,
and suggesting that "it is ... not strictly accurate to refer to a Mareva injunction as a
pre-trial attachment.") See generally Alexander, supra note 2, at 501 (reiterating that
Mareva injunctions operate in personam and not in rem).
198 See Ninemia Mar. Corp., [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 603; see also Alexander, supra
note 2, at 498 (highlighting breadth of Mareva order in enveloping bank accounts, motor
vehicles, objects d'art, other valuables, and money held in bank accounts in foreign
currency). See generally R. Doak Bishop et al., Strategic Options Available When
Catastrophe Strikes the Major International Energy Project, 36 TEX. INT'L L.J. 635, 647
(2001) (emphasizing broad scope of Mareva injunctions in reaching tangible assets,
intangible assets, realty, and personal property).
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C. Application for Discharge or Variation of a Mareva Order
Lord Denning's 1975 opinions in Nippon Yusen Kaisha and
Mareva Compania Naviera both indicated that a defendant could
apply to the court for a discharge of the injunction but failed to
elaborate on the grounds for such a discharge.199 The standard
form order is no more informative:
Anyone served with or notified of this order may apply to the
court at any time to vary or discharge this order (or so much
of it as affects that person), but they must first inform the
Applicant's solicitors. If any evidence is to be relied upon in
support of the application, the substance of it must be
communicated in writing to the Applicant's solicitors in
advance. 200
This all presumes, of course, that the defendant has been
"served with or notified" of the Mareva order itself. Like many of
the provisional remedies, one important aspect is the element of
surprise.201 The very fear that underlies the necessity of the
order - that the defendant will secret away his assets - militates
against making him aware of the proceedings. By quickly202
freezing the assets and compelling third parties to disclose
information about the defendant's assets,203  the Mareva
199 See Jane Andrewartha & Michael Swangard, English Maritime Law Update:1999,
31 J. MAR. L. & COM. 471, 500 (2000) (exemplifying uncertainty regarding grounds for
Mareva order discharge by describing case in which judge discharged Mareva order due to
plaintiffs non-disclosure of material facts in connection with Mareva application but
simultaneously emphasized that such material non-disclosure did not necessarily warrant
discharge); see also Bishop et al., supra note 198, at 647 (noting defendants are "rarely
able to discharge a Mareva order"). See generally Alexander, supra note 175, at 506
(emphasizing rarity of Mareva order discharges).
200 Sample Freezing Injunction, para. 13. Note, also, that the discharge, unlike the
order itself, cannot be secured ex parte.
201 See Hill, supra note 12, at 587; see also Alexander, supra note 175, at 506
(suggesting element of surprise in Mareva order is integral). See generally Alexander,
supra note 2, at 490 (adding ex parte order necessary for Mareva injunctions because
element of surprise is crucial).
202 See Hill, supra note 12, at 587; see also Alexander, supra note 2, at 490
(suggesting speed and secrecy in freezing defendant's assets are necessary for successful
Mareva injunction). See generally Alexander, supra note 175, at 506 (emphasizing
importance of quickness in maintaining Mareva order's element of surprise).
203 See Ashworth Hosp. Auth. v. MGN Ltd., [2002] U.K.H.L. 29 (Eng.) (describing
judicially issued Norwich orders which require third parties, usually banks, to provide full
information about defendant's assets to plaintiff); see also David Perkins & Garry Mills,
Patent Infringement and Forum Shopping in the European Union, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
549, 586-87 (1996) (summarizing Norwich orders and their use in obtaining information
from third parties for purpose of Mareva injunction). But see Confusion in Obligation to
Disclose, TIMES (London), Dec. 24, 1992, at Features (highlighting that third parties, such
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injunction is indeed a powerful weapon against the feared
dissipation of assets. The underlying assumption is that the fear
of a single, nervous creditor somehow justifies such a substantial
invasion of defendant's privacy 204 and, in the case of worldwide
Mareva injunctions, a potential invasion of another country's
sovereignty. 205 Justifications aside, in reality, a defendant may
not receive notice of the freezing of his assets until months after
the order is issued.206
As with everything involving this process, the discharge 207 and
variation 208 procedures are without clear guidelines. What is
more troubling is that, even if a defendant is successful, it may
be too late to avert the crippling effect the initial grant of the
order had on his business. 209 As Mr. Justice Lloyd pointed out in
as banks, must not confuse Mareva orders with discovery and need not disclose all
material information regarding defendants' assets in response to Mareva orders).
204 See Grupo Torras SA v. Al-Sabah, [2001] Lloyd's Rep. PN 117 (Eng. C.A.); see also
Alexander, supra note 175, at 507 (explaining that since Mareva orders are granted ex
parte and defendants have no opportunity to object to plaintiffs Mareva request, U.S.
lawyers sometimes view Mareva orders as violating basic principles of due process which
require notice and hearing before defendants may be deprived of property). But see Aloe,
supra note 36, at 849-50 (discussing case in which New York court upheld Mareva order
against due process challenge because "English justice comports with due process").
205 See Alexander, supra note 2, at 499 (emphasizing English judiciary's historical
hesitancy to grant worldwide Mareva orders); see also Bishop, supra note 198, at 648
(suggesting worldwide Mareva orders are rarely issued due to their "broad and obtrusive
nature"). See generally Alexander, supra note 175, at 523 (commenting that worldwide
Mareva orders should only be utilized in extraordinary cases where defendants have been
"most egregious and underhanded in trying to frustrate the legitimate claims of plaintiffs
in English courts").
206 See Brief for Appellants at 15, CIBC Mellon Trust Co. v. Mora Hotel Corp., N.V.,
100 N.Y.2d 215, (2002) (No. 47) (noting defendant not served with Mareva order until
nine months after it was issued); see also Alexander, supra note 2, at 490 (suggesting
plaintiffs' goal in using Mareva injunction is to prevent defendant from being put on
notice of fact that assets will be frozen). See generally Perkins & Mills, supra note 203, at
562 (emphasizing plaintiffs' desire to prevent defendant from learning of asset freezing).
207 See Tetley, supra note 191, at 1953 (noting Mareva orders may be discharged
when they adversely affect rights of innocent third parties and when such discharge will
benefit defendant yet will not frustrate initial purpose of Mareva); see also Law Report:
Procedure for Discharging Orders Granted to One Side, TIMES (London), May 5, 1988, at
Issue 63073 (describing judge's refusal to discharge Mareva order at interlocutory hearing
although defendant alleged plaintiff was liable for damages in cross-undertaking). See
generally Mark Steene, Disgraced Magistrate Peter Liddy Has Failed to Have a Court-
Imposed Freeze on His Assets Lifted, ADVERTISER, Nov. 13, 2002, at 16 (summarizing
judge's refusal to lift Mareva order due to defendant's history of underhanded acts).
208 See Alexander, supra note 2, at 496 (explaining two permissible variations in
Mareva orders including defendant's request for living expenses and either parties'
request for alteration in original amount of frozen assets); see also Bishop, supra note 198,
at 648 (summarizing typical variations). See generally Alexander, supra note 175, at 511
(noting variations regarding original amount of assets frozen may be asserted by either
party in an inter partes hearing).
209 See Willoughby, supra note 23, at 479; see also Aviva Golden, Digest of Hilary
Term Cases, FIN. TIMES (London), May 1, 1992, at 12 (describing judge's decision to
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Ninemia Maritime Corporation v. Trave Schiffahrtsgesellschaft
M.B.H.und Co. K.G., (The 'Niedersachsen),
The damage done by the over-hasty grant of an injunction
may well be irretrievable, since an application for the
discharge of the injunction may come too late to save a
defendant whose liquidity has been abruptly shut down. The
cross-undertaking in damages is of no consolation to a
company which has been ruined. This being so, there may
perhaps be something to be said for imposing stricter
requirements at the ex parte stage than are called for by the
current practice, if this useful remedy is not to be a vehicle
for oppression. 210
From the cases and commentary, there are three grounds upon
which a defendant who has been made aware of the Mareva order
against him may argue for discharge of the injunction.211 One
ground is a counter-allegation (supported by evidence) of fraud
on the plaintiffs part. 212 A showing of fraud would demonstrate
that the initial grant of the Mareva injunction was per se
inequitable. 213 Another ground attacks the underlying policy of
the Mareva procedure itself - avoiding the risk of default. 214 A
discharge Mareva order because plaintiffs cause of action was speculative and order had
interfered with defendant's normal course of business). See generally Asset-Freezing
Injunction Rarely Appropriate Against Banks, TIMES (London), Mar. 24, 1992, at Features
(explaining that freezing assets of bank inherently runs risk of interfering with bank's
ordinary course of business since bank's stock in trade is generally money borrowed from
depositors).
210 Ninemia Maritime Corporation v. Trave Schiffahrtsgesellschaft M.B.H.und Co.
K.G, [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 600, 603(Eng. Q.B.) (affirming rare discharge of a Mareva
injunction where defendants demonstrated no real risk of default).
211 See BARNARD & HOUGHTON, supra note 18, at 249 (laying out requirements for
applications to discharge or vary Mareva orders); INGMAN, supra note 25, at 484-86
(discussing case law history of discharge and variation applications); see also Ninemia
Mar. Corp., [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 60 (entire case); Zicherman, supra note 16, at 675
(noting grounds that may exist for which Mareva injunction may be discharged).
212 BARNARD & HOUGHTON, supra note 18, at 249 (1993) (discussing grounds for
Mareva injunction); Alexander, supra note 175, at 518 (noting that full and fair disclosure
is requirement to obtain Mareva injunction); Zicherman, supra note 16, at 675 (stating
ground for discharge of injunction is failure to disclose all material facts to court).
213 Fraud in the plaintiffs application implicates any number of "equity maxims,"
including "equity follows the law," "he who seeks equity must do equity," and "he who
comes into equity must come with clean hands." See SNELL'S PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY, at
30-33.
214 Alexander, supra note 175 at 504 (stating that purpose of injunction is to prevent
defendant from withdrawing all assets from jurisdiction to prevent payment of judgment);
Seveg, supra note 10, at 58 (explaining that purpose of Mareva injunction is to prevent
defendant from defrauding court by moving assets); Zicherman, supra note 16, at 698
(noting that one reason for adopting Mareva injunctions is to keep defendant from
removing all assets in jurisdiction).
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defendant who can demonstrate that there is no such risk should
be entitled to a discharge of the Mareva order.215 Corollary to
that, a defendant who is willing to place at the court's disposal a
security large enough to guarantee plaintiffs claim is also likely
to succeed in a discharge application. 216 Large, reputable
companies with substantial assets would likely have little
problem meeting either of these burdens. 217 Smaller companies
in a less credit-worthy position, however, may have a more
difficult time satisfying this standard.2 18
The final ground on which a defendant might base a discharge
application is more complex. A defendant who can show that the
plaintiff made material misstatements or non-disclosures in his
initial request for the Mareva order and that the weight of the
plaintiffs evidence, absent his breach of duty, would have been
insufficient to support a granting of the injunction in the first
instance219 might have some success. 220 Misstatements or non-
215 BARNARD & HOUGHTON, supra note 18, at 249. See generally Alexander, supra
note 175, at 504 (discussing purpose of injunction being to prevent removal of assets);
Seveg, supra note 10, at 58 (explaining that purpose of injunction is solely to ensure
presence of property within jurisdiction).
216 BARNARD & HOUGHTON, supra note 18, at 249 (discussing reasons defendant can
get injunction discharged). See generally Alexander, supra note 175, at 511 (stating that
in issuing injunction court should allow defendant use of assets above claim amount while
injunction is in place); Zicherman, supra note 16, at 676 (explaining that court will
normally only grant injunction for assets required for payment of potential claim, not all
assets of defendant).
217 See, e.g., Ninemia Maritime Corporation, [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 605 (stating "No
one would wish any reputable foreign company to be plagued with a Mareva injunction
simply because it has agreed to London arbitration."); Alexander, supra note 175, at 522
(noting that worldwide Mareva injunctions are usually only cost effective when there is
large claim involved); Seveg, supra note 10, at 59 (discussing financial risks involved in
Mareva injunction application).
218 See generally Alexander, supra note 175, at 522 (discussing cost-benefits of
obtaining Mareva injunction); Seveg, supra note 10, at 59 (stating that both parties have
financial interests at stake in obtaining a Mareva injunction); Zicherman supra note 16,
at 668 (explaining different approaches to Mareva injunctions in United States and
United Kingdom).
219 BARNARD & HOUGHTON, supra note 18, at 249 (discussing requirement that
plaintiff show likely success of action to obtain injunction); Alexander, supra note 175, at
522 (noting that plaintiff must show "good arguable case on the merits" to obtain
injunction); Zicherman, supra note 16, at 673 (stating requirement that plaintiff show
"good arguable case" to obtain injunction initially).
220 There are no guarantees where Mareva orders are concerned. See INGMAN, supra
note 25, at 477, 485-86 (noting that Mareva injunctions are not always granted even
when bare requirements are met); Zicherman, supra note 16, at 673 (discussing
conditions under which court should, but not must, grant Mareva injunction). But see
Alexander, supra note 175, at 509 (stating that commentators have noted that use of
Mareva injunctions has become quite common in England).
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disclosures can regard either the facts or potential defenses. 221
The court retains a broad discretion in applications on this
ground to modify, continue, or discharge the Mareva order. 222
One concern is conducting what would in effect be a "trial within
a trial" on the merits.223 Analyzing the evidence in support of the
defendant's application and that of the plaintiffs original
application (and rebuttal) could consume a significant amount of
time and resources of the court.224
Any one of the stated grounds could be used in an application
to vary the terms of the Mareva order as well. Variation
applications are invariably fact- and context-sensitive. Such
terms as allowable living, business, and legal expenses achieve
more meaningful estimation only after a defendant has
demonstrated them to the court, rather than reliance on
plaintiffs speculation or approximation of what defendant may,
or may not, need or use. 225  There are two competing
considerations facing a court on an application for variation. 226
221 See BARNARD & HOUGHTON, supra note 18, at 249 (stating requirements for
applications to discharge or vary Mareva orders); INGMAN, supra note 25, at 484-86
(discussing history of discharge and variation applications for Mareva injunctions). But
see Alexander, supra note 175, at 506 (explaining that discharge applications are rare,
making injunction itself more forceful tool during settlement negotiations).
222 See generally BARNARD & HOUGHTON, supra note 18, at 249 (noting court may
grant injunction, and then modify it in order to fit actual requirements of case); Alexander
supra note 175, at 522 (discussing requirements for order initially, change of any of which
could be grounds to modify order); Zicherman, supra note 16, at 673 (explaining that court
has discretion in whether to grant injunction initially).
223 See BARNARD & HOUGHTON, supra note 18, at 249 (noting requirement that
plaintiff show probable success on the merits to meet their burden of proof); Alexander
supra note 175, at 522 (explaining that plaintiff must argue merits of case in order to
obtain injunction initially); Zicherman, supra note 16, at 673 (discussing requirement the
plaintiff show "good arguable case" in order for court to grant Mareva injunction).
224 Ninemia Mar. Corp., [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 603 (noting potential time and
resource use while hearing discharge petition could be high). See generally Alexander,
supra note 175, at 522 (discussing requirements for granting of injunction); Zicherman
supra note 16, at 673 (stating requirements without which Mareva injunction should not
be granted)..
225 See Ninemia Mar. Corp., 11983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 619 (noting that any decision to
vary or discharge initial grant of Mareva order is almost exclusively based on an inter
partes hearing where both sides produce evidence, regardless of whether initial grant,
based only on plaintiffs evidence, was proper). See generally Alexander, supra note 175,
at 522 (noting that original order is based on plaintiffs estimation only); Zicherman supra
note 16, at 673 (stating that since hearings are ex parte defendant does not get to present
any evidence before injunction is granted).
226 BARNARD & HOUGHTON, supra note 18, at 249 (noting that court must take into
consideration likelihood of defendant removing all assets from jurisdiction in order to
avoid paying potential judgment); Alexander, supra note 175, at 511 (stating that in
issuing injunction court should consider whether it is likely defendant will remove assets
from jurisdiction); Zicherman, supra note 16, at 676 (discussing requirement that court
only freeze assets sufficient to pay potential claim against plaintiff).
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On one hand, the reviewing judge has already made a
determination, based on plaintiffs "full disclosure," that there is
a real risk that the defendant will seek to undermine his
authority by failing to satisfy a judgment. 227 It would be entirely
inconsistent with that holding to allow the defendant too much
access to his assets, even for such things as living expenses. On
the other hand, there is oppression in the details.228 The limits of
the order effect real hardship on defendants who, to this point,
are merely suspected of wrongdoing. 229 To allow plaintiffs to
determine what is or is not a "reasonable" expense by the
defendant defies common sense and fundamentally undermines
the appearance of fairness in the proceedings. Lord Justice Kerr
recognized this problematic area in Ninemia Maritime
Corporation when he stated,
Further, it must always be remembered that if, or to the
extent that, the grant of a Mareva injunction inflicts
hardship on the defendants, their legitimate interests must
prevail over those of the plaintiffs, who seek to obtain
227 BARNARD & HOUGHTON, supra note 18, at 249 (discussing purpose of injunction is
to keep assets in jurisdiction); Alexander, supra note 175, at 504 (explaining that court,
once it takes into account plaintiffs papers, must make determination that defendant is
likely to withdraw assets from jurisdiction); Zicherman, supra note 16, at 698 (noting that
purpose of injunction is to ensure that assets remain in jurisdiction).
228 BARNARD & HOUGHTON, supra note 18, at 249 (discussing that defendant's assets
are to be frozen in order to satisfy potential judgment, not as punishment); Alexander,
supra note 175, at 511 (stating that in issuing injunction court should allow defendant use
of assets above claim amount while injunction is in place); Zicherman, supra note 16, at
676 (explaining that court will normally only grant injunction for assets required for
payment of potential claim, not all assets of defendant, though claim may exceed total of
all defendant assets).
229 See Ninemia Mar. Corp., [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 620 (acknowledging that Mareva
injunction can inflict hardship on defendants, and that defendant's interests are
paramount); see also Taylor, supra note 3, at 22, stating that:
The conundrum that defeats the fulfillment of that principle in practice is that where
a plaintiff obtains and holds a Mareva injunction the overwhelming probability is
that no judgment will follow and the existence of the plaintiff's right will never be put
to the definitive test of a trial. Instead, the plaintiff can advance his case in affidavit
evidence and where the defendant contradicts that evidence the court does not seek to
resolve that conflict and will by and large assume that the facts are as described by
the plaintiffs affidavits even though they may be denied by the defendant. In the
result, it is all too easy for the defendant's rights to suffer in the interests of
protecting a right of the plaintiff which in the ultimate analysis may be illusory.
Taylor, supra note 3, at 22.
See generally Willoughby, supra note 23 (noting that, where defendant does not actually
have assets, "the Mareva is in place for considerably longer than is justifiable, and
probably long enough to destroy his business").
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security for a claim which may appear to be well-founded but
which still remains to be established at the trial.230
It must also be remembered that in the case of worldwide
Mareva injunctions, a defendant who wishes to make either a
discharge or variation order must do so in an English court
located perhaps very far away from his home or business.231 This
will necessarily entail securing English solicitors, who might
naturally exhibit some pause when considering whether to accept
as a client one whose assets are frozen (and potentially
unavailable to satisfy their fees) and who has already been made
the subject of at least one adverse order by the judge before
whom they would have to argue the application. 23 2 The practical
ramifications of worldwide Mareva orders are more fully
considered in PART IV.
III. AMERICAN APPROACH TO MAREVA-STYLE REMEDIES
Because the American legal system shares a common lineage
with that of England,233 it is worthwhile to examine the approach
230 Ninemia Mar. Corp., [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 619 (describing potential difficulties
for defendants under Mareva injunctions).
231 See Theuer, supra note 42, at 438 (recognizing that worldwide Mareva injunctions
give courts "a large personal jurisdiction net," and that law allows for use of a Mareva
injunction over defendant without assets in jurisdiction, permitting worldwide service of
process on defendant). See generally Fabano, supra note 2, at 143-46 (weighing positive
and negative aspects of worldwide Mareva injunction); Tetley, supra note 191, at 1951
(describing worldwide Mareva injunctions and "consternation" they have caused among
many jurists).
232 See Virginia G. Maurer et al., Attorney Fee Arrangements: The U.S. and Western
European Perspectives, 19 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 272, 314 (1999) (noting that "it is
unlikely that a private solicitor will choose to fund any truly high risk cases, regardless of
their social merit, since he does not share proportionately in the gain from taking the
risk"); see also John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured
Person's Access to Justice, 42 AM. U.L. REV. 1567, 1609 (1993) (recognizing that English
solicitors often choose to avoid legal aid cases "because of increased paperwork, reduced
income, and perceived time delays"). See generally Janice Toran, Settlement, Sanctions,
and Attorney Fees: Comparing English Payment into Court and Proposed Rule 68, 35 AM.
U.L. REV. 301, 313-14 (1986) (describing role of solicitor in English legal system).
233 See Jennifer L. Groninger, No Duty to Rescue: Can Americans Really Leave a
Victim Lying in the Street? What Is Left of the American Rule, and Will It Survive
Unabated?, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 353, 370 (1999) (noting that "America's legal system is based
on English common law" in analyzing differences between American and French legal
heritage); see also Lance A. Wade, Honda Meets Anastasoff: The Procedural Due Process
Argument Against Rules Prohibiting Citation to Unpublished Judicial Decisions, 42 B.C.
L. REV 695, 703-05 (2001) (reviewing development of American legal system and its roots
in English common law). See generally Bruce D. Greenberg & Gary K. Wolinetz, The
Right to a Civil Jury Trial in New Jersey, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 1461, 1466 (1995)
(discussing history of law and chancery courts in New Jersey and observing that "[]ike
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taken by American courts with regard to remedies such as the
Mareva injunction. England, after all, has no monopoly on either
equity jurisdiction or jittery creditors seeking prompt
repayment.234 The power of the Mareva order is undeniable, and
it was only a matter of time before industrious American
plaintiffs sought to secure this equitable weapon of mass
destruction, this "nuclear weapon of the law."
As the law stands now, a federal court has no authority to
grant a pre-judgment injunction to prevent defendants from
dissipating their assets in a case where a plaintiff has made only
legal claims, e.g., claims for money damages. 235 Thus, the classic
Mareva scenario was explicitly foreclosed by the Supreme Court
of the United States in 1999 in Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo v.
Alliance Bond Fund.236
Justice Scalia's opinion in Grupo Mexicano concluded that
federal courts were constrained with regard to available
equitable remedies by the Judiciary Act of 1789 which limited
equitable remedies to those which were "being administered by
the English Court of Chancery at the time of the separation of
the two countries."237 In reaching the decision of the Court to
reverse the grant of such a preliminary remedy by the United
many states, New Jersey's court system was based on English common law and equity
principles").
234 Seee.g., Johansson, supra note 43, at 1103 (opining that "realities of the modern
world" should compel American plaintiffs to propose Mareva-like remedies). See generally
John R. Kroger, Supreme Court Equity, 1789-1835, And The History of American Judging,
34 HOUS. L. REV. 1425,1430 (1998) (identifying Article III, section 2 of the U.S.
Constitution as source of American equity jurisdiction); Luize E. Zubrow, Rethinking
Article 9 Remedies: Economic and Fiduciary Perspectives, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 445, 446
(1994) (mentioning "the creditor's interest in prompt repayment" in context of Article 9 of
the American Uniform Commercial Code).
235 See JSC Foreign Econ. Ass'n Technostroyexport v. Int'l Dev. & Trade Servs., 295
F. Supp. 2d 366, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that "this Court's equitable power to issue a
preliminary injunction to prevent a defendant from transferring assets does not extend to
an action for money damages where the plaintiff claims no lien or equitable interest in the
assets sought to be enjoined"); see also Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Beck Dev.
Corp., 95 F. Supp. 2d 549, 552 (E.D. Va. 2000) (explaining that "a district court lacks the
power... to issue an injunction preventing the transfer of assets in an action solely for
money damages where the party seeking the injunction has no lien or equitable interest
in the property"); Silverman & Kirshner, supra note 10, at 24 (recognizing that American
courts have "looked with disfavor upon the use of prejudgment injunctions that restrain a
defendant in a suit from dissipating or transferring assets where the plaintiff simply
seeks money damages and claims no interest in specific property belonging to the
defendant").
236 527 U.S. 308 (1999).
237 Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 308, 318 (1999)
(considering proper scope of equity jurisdiction of federal courts).
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States District Court for the Southern District of New York and
affirmed by the Second Circuit,238 Justice Scalia noted that
federal equity courts had typically rejected this form of relief.239
He reiterated the rule (as exemplified in England by Lister v.
Stubbs and in numerous American cases 240) that "a general
creditor (one without a judgment) had no cognizable interest,
either at law or in equity, in the property of his debtor, and
therefore could not interfere with the debtor's use of that
property."241 Justice Ginsburg's dissent posited that the
increasing complexity of international transactions required an
invocation of the "grand aims of equity,"242 conferring an
expansive power in the federal courts to craft new remedies to
deal with new problems. Justice Scalia, in response, did not
dispute the inherent flexibility of equitable remedies to deal with
emerging problems, 243 but he did take issue with allowing that
flexibility to extend beyond the "broad boundaries of traditional
238 Id. at 312-13 (concluding that preliminary injunction restrained petitioners from
"dissipating, disbursing, transferring, conveying, encumbering, or otherwise distributing
or affecting any right to, interest in, title to or right to receive or retain" any of assets of
defendant).
239 Id. at 319-20 (citing several historical cases confirming "well established" general
rule restricting right to bring creditor's bill only to those creditors who had already
obtained judgment establishing debt); see, e.g., Hollins v. Brierfield Coal & Iron Co., 150
U.S. 371, 378-379 (1893) (stating that, where creditors' claims had not been reduced to
judgment and had no express lien, "such creditors cannot come into a court of equity to
obtain the seizure of the property of their debtor"); Nat'l Tube Works Co. v. Ballou, 146
U.S. 517, 521 (1892) (holding that creditor "must do all that he can at law to obtain his
rights," and only "if he is then still without remedy" will court of equity hear case).
240 Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 319-20 (citing Chancellor Kent's description of rule's
purpose as seeking to prevent unnecessary and possibly fruitless or oppressive
interference with rights of debtor); see, e.g., Adler v. Fenton, 65 U.S. 407, 411-13 (1861)
(holding that court of chancery "will not interfere to prevent an insolvent dobtor [sic] from
alienating his property to avoid an existing or prospective debt, even when there is a suit
pending to establish it"); Shufeldt v. Boehm, 96 Ill. 560, 564 (1880) (insisting that rule
forbidding interposition of court of equity in such cases until judgment at law is first
obtained was "founded upon the wisest policy" because, if law were otherwise, debtors
"would be constantly exposed to the greatest hardships and grossest frauds, for which the
law would afford no adequate remedy").
241 Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 319-20 (stating that rule requiring judgment was
product of both procedural and substantive law).
242 Id. at 342 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (concluding that "[n]o countervailing
precedent or principle holds the federal courts powerless to prevent a defendant from
dissipating assets, to the destruction of a plaintiffs claim, during the course of judicial
proceedings").
243 Id. at 322 (conceding that "[wie do not question the proposition that equity is
flexible"); see also Brown v. Bd. of Education (II), 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (stating that
"[traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its
remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs."). See
generally New York v. Cathedral Acad., 434 U.S. 125, 129 (1977) (recognizing "unique
flexibility of equity").
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equitable relief."244 Further, he observed that the scenario of
debtors seeking to avoid payment of their debts and creditors
seeking prompt repayment was certainly not a new problem, let
alone one which required a "wrenching departure from past
practice."24 5
Having decided it was beyond the power of the federal courts to
issue a Mareva-style injunction, the Court did not need to reach a
conclusion as to whether it would be an advisable remedy to
adopt.246  Nevertheless, Justice Scalia examined England's
Mareva procedure explicitly 247 and articulated the arguments for
and against creation of a Mareva-style remedy. 248 Importantly,
he asserted several "weighty considerations" 249  against a
Mareva-style injunction. First, he asserted the traditional rule
that unsecured creditors had no rights in the property of the
debtor before judgment.250 Citing a well-known treatise writer,
he agreed that any remedy that changed that rule "would
manifestly be susceptible of the grossest abuse. A more powerful
weapon of oppression could not be placed at the disposal of
unscrupulous litigants."251 Second, he stated that such a remedy
could radically alter the balance between the respective rights of
244 Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 322 (refusing to extend boundaries of equitable
flexibility to "a type of relief that has been specifically disclaimed by longstanding judicial
precedent").
245 Id. at 322 (indicating that "we suspect there is absolutely nothing new about
debtors' trying to avoid paying their debts, or seeking to favor some creditors over
others").
246 Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 332 (stating that "[w]e do not decide which side has
the better of these arguments"). See generally Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The
Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 INDIANA L.J. 223, 234-36 (2003)
(critiquing Justice Scalia's "rhetorical flourish" in analysis of Grupo Mexicano); Tracy A.
Thomas, Justice Scalia Reinvents Restitution, 36 LOy. L.A. L. REV. 1063, 1070 (2003)
(opining that Justice Scalia's historical equity review in Grupo Mexicano contradicts his
approach in previous cases).
247 Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 327-29 (reasoning that "[a]s further support for the
proposition that the relief accorded here was unknown to traditional equity practice, it is
instructive that the English Court of Chancery, from which the First Congress borrowed
in conferring equitable powers on the federal courts, did not provide an injunctive remedy
such as this until 1975").
248 See id. at 329-30 (balancing factors that weigh in favor of Mareva remedy,
including simplicity and uniformity of procedures, prevention of inequitable conduct on
part of defendant, and preserving United States as center of financial transactions,
against considerations against remedy, chiefly, traditional principle that unsecured
creditor has no right at law or in equity in property of his debtor and that remedy could
easily be abused by unscrupulous litigators as tool of oppression).
249 Id. at 330.
250 See id. at 319 (stating that "[i]t was well established...that as a general rule, a
creditor's bill could be brought only by a creditor who has already obtained a judgment").
251 Id. at 330 (citing WAIT, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES § 73, at 110-11).
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creditors and debtors which has been developed over centuries
through many laws, including those relating to bankruptcy,
fraudulent conveyances, and preferences. 252 Third, and most
important, he impliedly asserted that the Mareva procedure in
England may be expanding faster than can be controlled by the
judges who are responsible for administering it. Justice Scalia
noted the application of the Mareva procedure in an "ever-
increasing set of circumstances" and to an "ever-expanding
number of plaintiffs."253 The fact that the procedure was now
subject to a "steady flow" of litigants making applications in
English courts for Mareva orders, numbering in excess of a
thousand per month, was cited as further evidence. 254
Concluding that the Supreme Court had no authority to "craft
a nuclear weapon of the law like the one advocated here,"255
Justice Scalia succinctly summed up the Court's holding as
follows:
[F]ederal courts in this country have traditionally applied
the principle that courts of equity will not, as a general
matter, interfere with the debtor's disposition of his property
at the instance of a nonjudgment creditor. We think it
incompatible with our traditionally cautious approach to
equitable powers, which leaves any substantial expansion of
252 Id. at 331 (stating that "the new rule could radically alter the balance between
debtor's and creditor's rights which has been developed over centuries through many
laws-including those relating to bankruptcy, fraudulent conveyances, and preferences").
253 See id. at 331(noting that "[slince 1975, the English courts have awarded Mareva
injunctions to freeze assets in an ever-increasing set of circumstances both within and
beyond the commercial setting to an ever-expanding number of plaintiffs") (citing
Wasserman, supra note 4, at 339); see also Taylor, supra note 3, at 22 (stating that "the
courts have become clogged with the business of obtaining, varying and discharging
Mareva injunctions"). See generally Howard Johnson, Mareva Injunctions: Practice Makes
Perfect, INT'L BANKING AND FIN. L., 13(7), 74-76 (1994) (calling it "expanding and
potentially draconian remedy").
254 See Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 331-32 (highlighting that "[a]s early as 1984,
one observer stated that "there are now a steady flow of such applications to our Courts
which have been estimated to exceed one thousand per month.""); see also Ninemia Mar.
Corp. v. Trave Schiffahrtsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, [19831 2 Lloyd's Rep. 600, 602
(Eng. C.A.) (highlighting that "[t]hese developments have been accompanied by a rapid
and sustained increase in the number of applications for Mareva relief."); Silverman &
Kirshner, supra note 10, at 24 (describing requests for Mareva remedies as
"commonplace"). See generally John Goldring, Consumer Protection, Globalization, and
Democracy, 6 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, n.208 (1998) (positing that such orders are
now "usual" in English and Australian courts).
255 Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 332.
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past practice to Congress, to decree the elimination of this
significant protection for debtors. 256
Almost immediately, 257 the federal courts distinguished the
Grupo Mexicano decision and limited it to its contextual basis -
requests under the federal courts' traditional equitable powers
for preliminary injunctions where only legal claims for money
damages were asserted. In doing so, the lower federal courts
have established three broad exceptions to the Grupo Mexicano
rule, exceptions which effectively obliterate the rule.
The first exception addresses the authority of the issuing court.
While Grupo Mexicano states that the "traditional" equitable
authority of a federal court does not countenance a Mareva-style
remedy, it does not foreclose a court to issue such a remedy
where it does so under the authority of a statute. For example,
state258 and federal 259 laws specifically grant courts the ability to
issue temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions
to aid in enforcement of the statutory scheme, especially in aid of
racketeering and securities violations. 260 Federal courts have not
256 Id. at 329.
257 See Rahman v. Oncology Assocs., 198 F. 3d 489, 496 (4th Cir. 1999) (limiting
holding in Grupo Mexicano to premise that "the general equitable powers of the federal
courts do not include the authority to issue preliminary injunctions in actions solely at
law"); see also Fairview Mach. & Tool Co. v. Oakbrook Int'l, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d 199,
202(D. Mass. 1999) (finding that "Grupo Mexicano's holding ...is limited to cases where a
creditor plaintiff has no lien or equitable interest in defendants assets"). See generally
Walczak v. EPL Prolong, Inc., 198 F.3d 725, 730 (9th Cir. 1999) (confining holding in
Grupo Mexicano to prohibition of injunctions that completely prohibit Appellants from
taking any action with regard to their assets).
258 See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Kozeny, 19 Fed. Appx. 815, 822-23 (10th Cir.
2001) (issuing preliminary injunction under authority of Colorado Organized Crime
Control Act ["COCCA']); see also People ex rel. White v. Travnick, 346 Ill. App. 3d
1053, 1055 (2nd Dist. 2004) (issuing preliminary injunction for violation of Illinois
securities law). See generally Burnham Broad. Co. v. Williams, 629 So. 2d 1335, 1337 (La.
Ct. App. 1994) (noting that Louisiana state court, pursuant to state statute, has ability to
issue preliminary injunction when there is risk of irreparable injury, loss, or damage).
259 See Newby v. Enron Corp., 188 F. Supp. 2d 684, 702 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (concluding
that there was appropriate authority to grant preliminary injunction under Securities
Exchange Act of 1934); see also Michael S. Kelley, "Something Beyond" The
Unconstitutional Vagueness of RICO's Pattern Requirement, 40 CATH. U.L. REV. 331, 339
(1991) (noting that, under RICO, district court has authority to issue injunction or
temporary restraining order against those allegedly involved in alleged pattern of
racketeering). See generally Alexander, supra note 2, at 512 (noting that as part of its
broad authority to issue injunctive relief, Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
authorizes U.S. district courts to issue temporary restraining orders to freeze assets when
those assets are subject matter in dispute).
260 See Rep. of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1988) (arising
from RICO claim in which district court issued, and 9th Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed, an in personam freezing injunction - no different from Mareva order -
preventing defendants from dissipating assets not within United States territorial
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hesitated to issue Mareva-style freezing injunctions under that
authority.261 Likewise, at least two bankruptcy courts and one
circuit Court of Appeals have discounted Grupo Mexicano's
precedential value as a limit on the equitable powers of
bankruptcy courts. 262 A corollary exception might also exist
where the plaintiff is seeking to vindicate the public interest.
Courts have held that, in such cases, the "traditional" equity
power of the federal courts is expanded and that "courts of equity
may, and frequently do, go much farther both to give and
withhold relief in furtherance of the public interest than they are
accustomed to when only private interests are involved."263 The
Court in Grupo Mexicano did not address whether this "public
interest" truly expands - and if so, to what extent - the authority
of court. 264
The second exception occurs where the plaintiff seeks only
equitable remedies. The Fourth Circuit's decision in Rahman v.
jurisdiction); see also In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d
1467, 1480 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding similarly in related case). See generally Fed. Trade
Comm'n v. Verity Int'l, No. 00 Civ. 7422, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6097, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (finding authority to grant preliminary injunctions under Federal Trade
Commission Act).
261 See Marcos, 862 F.2d at 1361 (finding that "the court has power to preserve the
status quo by equitable means" and "[a] preliminary injunction is such a means"); see also
In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1480 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding similarly in
related case). See generally Verity Int'l, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6097, at *6 (finding
authority to grant preliminary injunctions under Federal Trade Commission Act).
262 See In re Stone & Webster, 286 B.R. 532, 537-38 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (positing
that holding in Grupo Mexicano has nothing to do with substantive consolidation or
authority of bankruptcy court to grant remedy of substantive consolidation); see also
Official Comm. of Asbestos Claimants v. G-I Holdings, Inc. (In re G-I Holdings, Inc.), No.
01-30135, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 2029, at *7 (Bankr. D. N.J. 2001) (granting substantive
consolidation remedy notwithstanding Grupo Mexicano); cf. In re Dow Corning Corp., 280
F.3d 648, 657-58 (6th Cir. 2002) (calling bankruptcy court's reliance on Grupo Mexicano
"misplaced"). See generally Silverman & Kirshner, supra note 10, at 24-25 (examining
effect of Grupo Mexicano decision on bankruptcy courts).
263 Rahman v. Oncology Assocs., 198 F. 3d 489, 497 (4th Cir. 1999)
264 See Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 308, 326
(1999) (recognizing "doctrine that courts of equity will go much further both to give and
withhold relief in furtherance of the public interest than they are accustomed to go when
only private interests are involved", but declining to further address doctrine); see also
Resnik, supra note 246, at 249 (highlighting that "[q]uestions remain about what to make
of Justice Scalia's comment [in Grupo Mexicano] that federal equity could be more far-
reaching if acting "in furtherance of the public interest," as contrasted with private
interests" and that court does not explain relationship between that more permissive
attitude toward affirmative public interest litigation and its general prohibition on
remedies "unknown in traditional equity practice."). See generally Newby, 188 F. Supp.
2d at 695 (noting that Grupo Mexicano Court distinguished United States v. First Nat'l
City Bank, on grounds that injunction issued in that case was justified based on public
interest).
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Oncology Associates265 concluded that the Grupo Mexicano
decision is inapposite in such cases, relying instead on the
Supreme Court's holding in Deckert v. Independence Shares
Corp.2 6 6 which authorized a preliminary injunction freezing
assets in aid of a claim for rescission.267 The third exception
follows close on from the second, allowing preliminary
injunctions where a plaintiff asserts a combination of legal and
equitable claims.268
Thus, with some "artful" pleading, 269 it has been suggested
that a plaintiff in an American federal court may entirely avoid
the holding of Grupo Mexicano and secure a Mareva-style
remedy.270 To avoid making Grupo Mexicano an entirely hollow
holding, avoidable with the mere assertion of some equitable
remedy in a case predominantly founded in money damages, the
federal courts have utilized the existing requirements for the
265 198 F. 3d 489 (4th Cir. 1999).
266 311 U.S. 282 (1940).
267 See Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 290 (1940) (holding
injunction to be reasonable measure within discretion of trial court); Rahman, 198 F.3d at
498-99 (finding justification for preliminary injunction where claim fell squarely within
court's traditional equitable power, even though money damages were also sought); see
also Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc., 903 F.2d 186, 196 (3d Cir. 1990)
(discussing permissibility of issuing preliminary injunction by referring to Deckert
rationale).
268 Federal courts have taken essentially one of two approaches with regard to the
precedential effect of Grupo Mexicano, and it is still uncertain which approach will be the
dominant one. The first is a more limited approach that simply confines Grupo Mexicano
to cases that present claims for money damages only, e.g., Rahman v. Oncology Assoc.
P.C., 198 F.3d at 498-99, while the other is a more flexible approach that adheres to both
the spirit and letter of the Grupo Mexicano decision by employing a "primarily legal"
versus "primarily equitable" categorization, e.g., Algonquin Power Corp., Inc. v. Trafalgar
Power, Inc., No. CIVA5: 00CV1246, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20331, at *1, *54 (N.D.N.Y.
Nov. 8, 2000). To avoid a plaintiffs attempt to "draft around" Grupo Mexicano, the
reviewing court determines the predominant remedy sought in the case as an initial
matter, applying Grupo Mexicano if the remedy is "primarily legal," e.g., JSC Econ. Ass'n
Technostroyexport v. Int'l Dev. & Trade Svcs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 2d 366, 388 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
269 See Rahman, 198 F.3d at 495 (detailing defendants' contention that any skilled
pleader could circumvent Grupo Mexicano in suit at law through inclusion of equitable
claim); Newby, 188 F. Supp. at 701 (discussing defendants' contention that plaintiffs
claim is primarily for money damages rather than equitable relief); see also Silverman &
Kirshner, supra note 10, at 24 (demonstrating how plaintiffs can "plead around" Grupo
Mexicano by including equitable claims in addition to existing predominant legal claims
when arguing for adoption of Mareva remedy).
270 See Walczak v. EPL Prolong, Inc., 198 F.3d 725, 730 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating how
injunction at issue simply restrained appellants from liquidating their assets as opposed
to more prohibitive injunction seen in Grupo Mexicano); Rahman, 198 F.3d at 497-98
(permitting preliminary injunction where claims in both law and equity were asserted in
single action); see also Newby, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 708-09 (permitting court to consider
prejudgment restraint on assets of defendant, but denying temporary injunction due to
failure to fulfill necessary requirements based on record).
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granting of preliminary injunctions.271 These require plaintiffs to
establish four elements before receiving such relief: 1) a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits, 2) a substantial
threat that plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury272 if the
injunction is denied, 3) that the threatened injury outweighs any
damage that the injunction might cause defendants, and 4) that
the injunction will not disserve the public interest.273
Another potential minefield for defendants is presented by
Rule 64 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 274 Each state has
established its own statutory scheme for providing authority for
its state courts to issue prejudgment relief.275 The ability of
federal courts to utilize the remedies available to the state courts
271 See Charlesbank Equity Fund II v. Blinds to Go, Inc., 370 F.3d 151,163 (1st Cir.
2004) (denying preliminary injunction due to lack of irreparable harm shown); JSC
Foreign Econ. Ass'n Technostroyexport, 295 F. Supp. 2d at 390-91 (denying injunctive
relief in line with Grupo Mexicano, but also stating that failure to fulfill preliminary
injunction requirements also occurred); Newby v. Enron Corp., 188 F. Supp. 2d 684, 708-
09 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (denying preliminary injunction because of plaintiffs inability to fulfill
necessary requirements).
272 JSG Trading Corp. v. Tray-Wrap, Inc., 917 F.2d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1990) ("Irreparable
injury is one that cannot be redressed through a monetary award. Where money damages
are adequate compensation a preliminary injunction should not issue."); Jackson Dairy,
Inc. v. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979) (stating that irreparable
injury cannot be remedied through monetary award); see JSC Foreign Econ. Ass'n
Technostroyexport, 295 F. Supp. 2d at 389 ("[A] showing of probable irreparable harm is
the single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction."
(quoting Reuters Ltd. v. United Press Int'l Inc., 903 F.2d 904, 907 (2d Cir. 1990)));
Blackwelder Furniture Co. of Statesville, Inc. v. Selig Mfg. Co., Inc., 550 F.2d 189, 196
(4th Cir. 1977) (determining that irreparable injury is one of two most important factors
in deciding whether to grant injunctive relie.
273 See Charlesbank Equity Fund II, 370 F.3d at 162 (applying four elements in
preliminary injunction analysis), Reuters Ltd., 903 F.2d at 909-10 (granting preliminary
injunctive relief based on fulfillment of four requirements); Newby, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 707
(analyzing four elements in denying preliminary injunctive relie.
274 The rule reads:
At the commencement of and during the course of an action, all remedies providing
for seizure of person or property for the purpose of securing satisfaction of the
judgment ultimately to be entered in the action are available under the
circumstances and in the manner provided by the law of the state in which the
district court is held.
FED. R. CIV. P. 64.
275 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 484.010-090 (2004) (stating that state courts in
California can issue prejudgment relief if, "(1) The claim is one where attachment can be
issued. (2) The plaintiff has established the probable validity of the claim upon which the
attachment is based. (3) The attachment is not sought for a purpose other than the
recovery on the claim upon which the attachment is based. (4) The amount to be secured
by the attachment is greater than zero."); CONN. GEN. STAT. §52-278(a)-(g) (2004)
(detailing various requirements in seeking prejudgment relief); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-
101 (2004) (allowing Illinois state courts to issue order of attachment against property of
debtor at time of action's commencement in variety of situations when claim exceeds
twenty dollars including where debtor is non-resident of Illinois or attempts to prevent
service of process upon them).
2005] MAREVA ORDERS
in the districts in which they sit will potentially create 50
separate "federal" decisional rules with regard to prejudgment
remedies, some or none of which may correspond to Grupo
Mexicano.276  For example, an Illinois federal court 277 has
recently held that the state prejudgment attachment statute can
be extended to assets not within the jurisdiction granting the
authority, apparently a "constructive attachment" of sorts, 278 in
advance of judgment, in aid of a legal claim for damages.
Not all state courts have been as quick to expand the equitable
power of their courts. 279 New York, for example, has specifically
endorsed the Grupo Mexicano decision, restraining New York
state courts from issuing Mareva-style relief in cases claiming
276 In re Fredeman Litig., 843 F.2d 821, 826 (5th Cir. 1988) (concluding that
attachment was unavailable to plaintiffs under Texas state law because defendants were
available for personal service within Texas and plaintiffs' claims were unliquidated);
EBSCO Indus., Inc. v. Lilly, 840 F.2d 333, 336 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding attachment
inadequate under Ohio state law due to various reasons including large monetary sum
necessary to fulfill statutory bond requirement), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 825 (1988); Jeri T.
Moskovitz, Equity-Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc.: Use of a Preliminary
Injunction to Secure a Future Damage Remedy, 21 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 773, 777-78 (1991)
(observing that certain state statutes may not permit attachment due to type of relief
demanded in underlying suit).
277 See M.S. Distrib. Co. v. Web Records, Inc., No. 00 C 1436, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9092, at *1, *10 (N.D. Ill. May 29, 2003), for a curious situation where the court cited
Grupo Mexicano as a source of authority for granting this Mareva-style remedy. See also
the opinion in Philips Med. Sys. Int'l B.V. v. Bruetman, 8 F.3d 600, 604 (7th Cir. 1993),
which authorized an order for defendant to deposit money into court prior to final
judgment in order to protect such judgment once final. Compare Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford
v. Trustmark Ins. Co., Civ. No. 3:01cv2198 (PCD), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25343, at **1,
**7 (D. Conn. Jan. 31, 2003), where Grupo Mexicano's decision is described as "rather
narrow" and, though the court refused to do so pursuant to Connecticut statute, a federal
court is not barred from issuing such relief if granted under state substantive law. In
effect, the court reduces Grupo Mexicano to a decision less about the general equitable
powers of federal courts than merely an explication of FED. R. OF CIV. P. Rule 65(a),
dealing with the issuance of preliminary injunctions. Id.
278 See M.S. Distrib. Co., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9092, at *4, where an Illinois statute
required the sheriff to attach only property "found in the county" - the classic attachment
scenario - which, even though such attachment could not be accomplished in the case at
issue, the court deemed this a mere "complication." The court theorized that since state
law granted it power to force defendants to bring assets into the jurisdiction for
attachment, it could restrain disposition of those assets outside of the jurisdiction with
equal authority, clearly demonstrating the lengths a court can and will go to grant this
type of relief. Id.
279 See In re Enron Corp. Litig., No. CIVA. G-02-0084, H-01-3624, 01-CV-3645, 2002
WL 1001058, at *1, *4 (S.D. Tex. May 16, 2002) (following Grupo Mexicano in denying
motion for preliminary injunction on action at law); Credit Agricole Indosuez v. Rossiyskiy
Kredit Bank, 94 N.Y.2d 541, 551 (2000) (concluding that issuance of injunction would be
instance of "ad hoc judicial decision-making"); see also JSC Econ. Ass'n Technostroyexport
v. Int'l Dev. & Trade Svcs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 2d 366, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (denying
equitable relief based on lack of equitable authority in case at issue).
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money damages. 280 Whether state courts will become the new
litigation battlefield for extension down this path remains to be
seen, but appears inevitable.
So, in sum, while American courts have not embraced the
"nuclear weapon" of the Mareva injunction per se, they are not
without other devastating devices in practice.281 They can also, in
appropriate cases,. issue preliminary injunctions to freeze the
assets of defendants in advance of judgments, despite the
hardships it may place on them.282 For some commentators, 283 at
least one circuit of the Court of Appeals,284 and four Justices of
the Supreme Court,285 even these means remain insufficient.
280 See Credit Agricole Indosuez, 94 N.Y.2d at 551 (2000) (commenting that deciding
in contrast to Grupo Mexicano could have drastic ramifications on current balance
between debtors' and creditors' rights); see also JSC Econ. Ass'n Technostroyexport, 295 F.
Supp. 2d at 366 (refusing to enjoin assets of potential third party alter egos in primarily
legal claim pursuant to Grupo Mexicano); Kuriakose v. Gray, 302 A.D.2d 434, 434 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2003) (abiding by Grupo Mexicano holding in denying injunction).
281 See M.S. Distrib. Co., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *4 (eviscerating Grupo Mexicano
holding by resorting to Illinois substantive prejudgment attachment statute to restrain
defendant from dealing with assets located outside of Illinois); Philips Med. Sys. Int'l B. V.,
8 F.3d at 604 (7th Cir. 1993) (affirming order on defendant to deposit money into court
prior to final judgment by noting that federal courts have power to issue orders "necessary
and proper to protect the enforceability of a judgment before it becomes final, provided
only that the forum state equips its own courts with such remedies."); cf. JSC Econ. Ass'n
Technostroyexport, 295 F. Supp. 2d at 393 (suggesting that plaintiffs are not hesitant to
utilize state practices in federal court to make "end run" around Grupo Mexicano decision
due to possibility of success in court).
282 See In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1478
(9th Cir. 1994) (affirming temporary injunction to enjoin Estate from transferring,
secreting, or dissipating Estate's assets pendente lite); Rep. of the Philippines v. Marcos,
862 F.2d 1355, 1364 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming freezing injunction to prevent defendants
from dissipating assets not within United States territorial jurisdiction); see also Fed.
Trade Comm'n v. Verity Int'l, 00 Civ. 7422, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6097, at *1, *10
(S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2001) (denying defendant's motion to vacate or modify preliminary
injunction).
283 See David D. Siegel, News, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 2, 2003, at s3 (stating that "[Tihe
whole Mareva procedure can serve as an inspiration for what any American court might
do in similar circumstances," perhaps with proper legislative assistance) (alteration in
original); Silverman & Kirshner, supra note 10, at 24 (suggesting that Mareva-style
injunctions should be used domestically); Wasserman, supra note 4, at 348 (advocating for
adoption of Mareva-style injunctions in United States).
284 See Alliance Bond Fund, Inc. v. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, 143 F.3d 688, 696
(2d Cir. 1998) (complimenting England's successful use of Mareva injunctions), rev'd, 527
U.S. 308 (1999). But see Rosen v. Cascade Int'l Inc., 21 F.3d 1520,1522 (11th Cir. 1994)
(refusing to issue Mareva-type injunction); In re Fredeman Litig., 843 F.2d 821, 831 (5th
Cir. 1988) (denying Mareva-type injunction to preserve assets unrelated to litigation).
285 See Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 308, 342
(1999) (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (joined by Justices Stevens, Breyer, and Souter)
(contending that federal courts need to flexibly protect rights of parties involved in both
legal and equitable situations); see also David B. Stratton, Equitable Remedies in
Bankruptcy Court: Grupo Mexicano, Substantive Consolidation and Beyond, 22-2 AM.
BANKR. INST. J. 24, 25 (2003) (expressing concern for majority's "narrow view" towards
federal courts' ability to issue equitable remedies); J. Maxwell Tucker, Grupo Mexicano
2005] MAREVA ORDERS
A. Extraterritorial Abuse of Sovereignty
"By international law every sovereign state has no sovereignty
beyond its own frontiers."286 The worldwide Mareva injunction
certainly should be considered in light of this admonition - as
should all exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction, by every
nation.287 It is a bedrock principle of international law. All the
more ironic, of course, is that these are the words of Lord
Denning,288 and it is his creation that stands out as a glaring
violation of this very principle.
What makes it permissible to order a defendant who is not a
resident of England, who has never been to the country, and who
maintains no assets there to "freeze" all activities related to his
property? Why, then, is it equally impermissible to simply
"seize" those assets abroad? Is it a distinction between the legal
effect of "freezing" and "seizing"? Is there any distinction at all?
The answers to all of these questions lie in the ethereal world of
equity, a world in which judges - English and American - reside,
a world, of course, where no one else lives.
and the Death of Substantive Consolidation, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 427, 441 (2000)
(discussing how Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion demonstrates concern for majority's
static approach to equitable remedy expansion).
286 In re State of Norway's Application, [1990] A.C. 723 (citing Attorney-General of
New Zealand v. Ortiz (1984] A.C. 1, 21).
287 Unfortunately, such consideration of extraterritorial effect is very rarely a salient
consideration, even in American courts. See George A. Bermann, Provisional Relief in
Transnational Litigation, 35 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 553, 565-66 (1997), which
examines American cases which have frozen or considered freezing extraterritorial assets,
concluding that the "extraterritorial" nature of the action was of little moment. See also
THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAwS 53 (1971), echoing this principle: "A
state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction to order a person, who is subject to its
judicial jurisdiction, to do an act, or to refrain from doing an act, in another state." See
generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Bitter with the Sweet: Tradition, History, and
Limitations on Federal Judicial Power - A Case Study, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291,
1338 (2000), discussing "the powers of a court of equity to fasten on jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant and thence to derive power to fashion relief having
extraterritorial effect on property."
288 See In re State of Norway's Application, [1990] A.C. 723 (citing Attorney-General
of New Zealand v. Ortiz [1984] A.C. 1, 21) (quoting Lord Denning: "By international law
every sovereign state has no sovereignty beyond its own frontiers. The courts of other
countries will not allow it to go beyond the bounds. They will not enforce any of its laws
which purport to exercise sovereignty beyond the limits of its authority."); see also
Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 268 F.3d 103, 112 (2d Cir. 2001)
(stating "As Lord Denning explained... By international law every sovereign state has
no sovereignty beyond its own frontiers"). See generally Michael Tilbury, Remedy
Discussion Forum: Teaching Remedies in Australia, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 587, 589 (2001)
(explaining Mareva injunctions were invented in 1975 by the English Court of Appeal
under Lord Denning).
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This justification alluded to earlier is rooted in the distinction
between a court's authority to act in rem versus its authority to
act in personam.289 Simply put, they are both forms of
jurisdiction; they differ only as to the subject matter over which
that jurisdiction applies.290 In rem actions apply directly to the
"res" - the "thing" - and so where those "things" are located is
important.291 In personam actions apply to the "person" who has
been made subject to a court's jurisdiction. 292 Where he or she is
289 See generally Burbank, supra note 287, at 1338 (arguing when court of equity
exercises jurisdiction over defendant and derives power to fashion relief having
extraterritorial effect on property, there is no harm done, "so long as one does not pretend
that this exercise of power in personam is any less an exercise of power in rem than any
exercise of power in rem is an exercise of power in personam"); James Crawford,
Execution of Judgments and Foreign Sovereign Immunity, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 820, 868
(1981) (explaining while Mareva injunctions operate formally in personam, their effect on
property is similar to conditional attachment); Bethany Kohl Hipp, Defending Expanded
Presidential Authority to Regulate Foreign Assets and Transactions, 17 EMORY INT'L L.
REV. 1311, 1345-46 (2003) (explaining distinction between vesting assets and freezing
assets: "[fireezing... is not taking assets; rather it is a short-or long-term deprivation of
the assets or the usage thereof. Freezing does not involve a transfer of title ... The
blocking, or freezing, and vesting of foreign assets have never been held to be
unconstitutional.").
290 See Matthew C. Solomon, The Perils of Minimalism: United States v. Bajakajian
in the Wake of the Supreme Court's Civil Double Jeopardy Excursion, 87 GEO. L.J. 849,
n.78 (1999) (explaining "[tiraditionally, an in personam penalty was understood to punish
the wrongdoer (the 'person'). In an in rem forfeiture, by contrast, the government proceeds
against the property (the 'thing')"); Steven F. Poe, Note and Comment, Civil Forfeiture
and the Eighth Amendment: The Constitutional Mandate of Proportionality in
Punishment in the Wake of Austin v. United States, 70 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 237, 255 (1994)
(noting "under the common law, in rem actions are pursued against the property itself,
not the owner of the property"); see also Sean M. Dunn, Note, United States v. Ursery:
Drug Offenders Forfeit their Fifth Amendment Rights, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1207, 1235 (1997)
(highlighting "[tihe primary purpose behind creation of the in rem fiction was to expand
judicial jurisdiction over property in situations where the courts lacked in personam
jurisdiction over individuals.").
291 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 30 and 856 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "action in rem:
an action determining the title to property and the rights of the parties . .. claiming an
interest in that property" and "in rem jurisdiction: a court's power to adjudicate the rights
to a given piece of property, including the power to seize and hold it."); see also Zohar
Efroni, A Barcelona.com Analysis: Toward a Better Model for Adjudication of
International Domain Name Disputes, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 29,
39 (2003) (explaining "[i]n rem jurisdiction facilitates legal action against the thing (or the
res) itself'); Sheree R. Weisz, Comment, Constitutional Law--Federal Indian Law: The
Erosion of Tribal Sovereignty as the Protection of the Nonintercourse Act Continues to be
Redefined More Narrowly, 80 N.D. L. REV. 205, 210 (2004) (noting "[ilf a court's
jurisdiction is based on its power over property within its territory, it is exercising in rem
jurisdiction.").
292 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 30 and 857 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "action in
personam: an action determining the rights and interests of the parties themselves in the
subject matter of the case" and "in personam jurisdiction: a court's power to bring a
person into its adjudicative process; jurisdiction over a defendant's personal rights, rather
than merely over property interests"); see also Efroni, supra note 291, at 35 (explaining
"in personam jurisdiction determines when a defendant is subject to adjudicative process
of the court"); Weisz, supra note 291, at 210 (clarifying "[i]f a court's jurisdiction is based
on its authority over the defendant, it is defined as in personam jurisdiction. When the
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located is less important. While most business owners do not
care to appreciate the subtlety of the distinction, it is a weighty
one, as you might imagine, in the mind of a judge. 293 After all,
without it, a worldwide Mareva injunction over assets beyond the
jurisdiction of England is a naked violation of international law,
an affront to the sovereignty of every state in which it applies, as
well as wholly inappropriate - a fact the English judges
recognized when they extended the Mareva procedure to
worldwide assets in Babanaft International Co. S.A. v.
Bassatne.294
The Court of Appeal made sure to state in no uncertain terms
that the Mareva remedy would not operate abroad as an in rem
injunction. Lord Justice Kerr stated,
[T]here can be no question of such orders operating directly
upon the foreign assets by way of attachment, or upon third
parties, such as banks, holding the assets. The effectiveness
of such orders for these purposes can only derive from their
recognition and enforcement by the local courts, as should be
made clear in the terms of the orders to avoid any
misunderstanding suggesting an unwarranted assumption of
extraterritorial jurisdiction. 295
Lord Justice Nicholls seconded that by saying,
The enforcement of the judgment in other countries, by
attachment or like process, in respect of assets which are
situated there is not affected by the order. The order does not
attach those assets. It does not create, or purport to create, a
charge on those assets, nor does it give the plaintiff any
proprietary interest in then. The English court is not
court exercises in personam jurisdiction, it has the power to impose a personal obligation
on the defendant.") (hereinafter Erosion of Tribal Sovereignty).
293 See generally Carlos Fabano, Maximizing Plaintiff Protection in the World of Asset
Freezing and Bypassing the Due Process Requirement of Notice: The Mareva Injunction as
an Alternative to the American Legal Remedies, 9 ILSA J INr'L & COMP. L. 131, 140 (2002)
(highlighting "[tihe fact that [the Mareva injunction] applies in rem in some
circumstances, presents complications when it requires the court to have jurisdiction over
foreign assets"); Johansson, supra note 43, at 1095 (noting "[c]ourts can reach worldwide
assets because [they] now base the injunction on in personam rather than in rem
jurisdiction."); James R. Theuer, Pre-Judgment Restraint of Assets for Claims of Damages:
Should the United States Follow England's Lead?, 25 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 419,
438 (2000) (arguing courts' only restraint when granting Mareva injunctions is
requirement of personal jurisdiction over defendant).
294 [1989] 2 W.L.R. 232.
295 Societe Eram Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Compagnie Internationale de Navigation,
[2003] 2 All E.R. (Comm.) 65, para. 23 (2003) (citing Babanaft, at 32).
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attempting in any way to interfere with or control the
enforcement process in respect of those assets.296
Mareva orders - at least in theory - operate as in personam
remedies. 297 As such, a much broader justification exists for their
extension beyond the boundaries of English jurisdiction.298 In
British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Industries,
Ltd. ,299 the Court of Appeal observed,
There is no doubt that it is competent for the court of a
particular country, in a suit between persons who are either
nationals or subjects of that country or are otherwise subject
to its jurisdiction, to make orders in personam against one
such party - directing it, for example, to do something or to
refrain from doing something in another country affecting
the other party to the action.300
In sum, so long as English courts continue to believe that the
injunction operates only in personam and not in rem,
international comity is not implicated, and they are free to
continue the practice unabated. But do they actually believe
that? It is certainly debatable, especially when one considers the
words of Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson who held the position of
Senior Law Lord, Britain's most senior permanent judicial
296 Id. at 65, para. 23 (2003) (citing Babanaft at 44).
297 See Johansson, supra note 43, at 1096 (explaining "[a]lthough the Mareva
injunction operates in personam, it can affect defendants' assets in ways that would
ordinarily require courts to have in rem jurisdiction"); Theuer, supra note 293, at 433
(noting nature of Mareva injunctions is in personam because they do not have any 'legal"
in rem effect on assets themselves or defendant's title to them); see also David L.
Zicherman, Note, The Use of Pre-Judgment Attachments and Temporary Injunctions in
International Commercial Arbitration Proceedings: A Comparative Analysis of the British
and American Approaches, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 667, 674 (1989) (stating although Mareva
injunctions operate in rem, they are in personam orders).
298 See generally John Rothchild, Protecting the Digital Consumer: The Limits of
Cyberspace Utopianism, 74 IND. L.J. 893, n.114 (1999) (listing countries that grant
Mareva injunctions, including Australia, New Zealand, Antigua, the Bahamas, Canada,
Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Singapore); Fabano, supra note 293, at 141 (commenting
"[m]any countries use the Mareva injunction, and the trend is toward giving it more
recognition and use as a tool to protect plaintiffs from insolvent or untrustworthy
defendants"); Zicherman, supra note 297, at 676-77 (noting Mareva injunctions have been
granted in the High Court of Australia, New South Wales, Queensland, Western
Australia, Victoria, Australian Capital Territories, the Federal Court of Australia, New
Zealand, the Canadian Federal Court, Provincial Courts of Ontario, British Columbia,
New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Manitoba, the Court of the North West Territories,
Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Singapore).
299 [1953] Ch. 19, at *1.
300 Id. at *5.
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position, until 2000.301 In an article in 1991,302 he stated that the
worldwide Mareva injunction comes "very close to unwarranted
interference with the jurisdiction of the courts of the place where
the assets are situated."303 This was so, he continued, because
the distinction between in rem and in personam in practical
effect was a legal "fiction."304
One of the reasons the Mareva procedure is so effective stems
from its in personam classification.305 Orders that operate over
the person of the defendant are enforced through the contempt
authority of the court. 306 A defendant who violates the terms of
the Mareva order can be subject to fines, imprisonment, the
301 See Burbank, supra note 287, at 1338 (discussing importance of distinction
between in personam and in rem jurisdiction). See generally Allison L. Alford, 0 Yea! 0
Yea! An Alabama Lawyer Goes to London, 59 ALA. LAW. 383, 385 (1998) (noting Senior
Law Lord is equivalent to Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court); Overlord; In
his first exclusive interview since being appointed senior Law Lord, Lord Nicolas Browne-
Wilkinson talks to Robert Mendick, THE LAW., May 17, 1999 at 22 (stating Lord Browne-
Wilkinson was appointed Senior Law Lord in September 1999).
302 Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson, Territorial Jurisdiction and the New Technologies,
25 ISR. L. REV. 145 (1991).
303 Id. at 152. With all due deference to Lord Browne-Wilkinson, this author feels
that it does more than "come very close." The author suspects a measure of renowned
British understatement probably best explains the statement.
304 See id. (also suggesting that line between in rem and in personam is further
blurred where Mareva order is applied to defendants in civil law countries). See generally
Catherine Kessedjian, Note on Provisional and Protective Measures in Private
International Law and Comparative Law, Preliminary Document No. 10, HAGUE
CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW - ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS (Oct.
1998) available at http://www.hcch.net/doc/jdgmpdlO.doc (last visited June 20, 2004)
(noting many European nations (with civil law systems) have at least one procedure -
such as arrest and einstweilige Verfigung in Germany, which operate both in rem and in
personam, depending on the nature of the claim, over 30 variations of protective remedies,
including attachment, in France, protective attachment and kort geding in The
Netherlands, and sequestration orders in Switzerland, - which operates similarly to
Mareva procedure, only it does so, generally speaking, on theory of in rem jurisdiction).
305 See Alan Reed, A New Model of Jurisdictional Propriety for Anglo-American
Foreign Judgment Recognition and Enforcement: Something Old, Something Borrowed,
Something New?, 25 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 243, 305 n.328 (2003) (describing
nature of the Mareva injunction); see also Fabano, supra note 293, at 139-40 (2002)
(explaining that although Mareva injunction applies on an in rem basis it is actually in
personam order, taking immediate effect on every asset of defendant). See generally
Richard Aird, The Scottish Arrestment and the English Freezing Order, 51 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 155, 160 (2002) (illustrating scope and power of Mareva Injunction over defendant
and his assets).
306 See Fabano, supra note 293, at 141 (stating that trustee who violates Mareva
injunction by transferring funds outside of named jurisdiction will face contempt of court
charges and can be charged with fraudulent transfer); see also Michael Polonsky, Making
Use of the English "Freezing Order," 648 PRACT. L. INST. 443, 462 (2001) (explaining that
because freezing injunction operates in personam, any violation of such order is
punishable by contempt); William Tetley, Arrest, Attachment, and Related Maritime Law
Procedures, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1895, 1956 (1999) (asserting that Mareva injunction prohibits
removal or dispersion of assets in question at risk of being charged with contempt).
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drawing of unfavorable inferences based on existing evidence,
discovery sanctions, and ultimately, default judgment (i.e.,
inability to argue the merits).307 A recent example of this power
came in the case of CIBC Mellon Trust Co. v. Mora Hotel Corp.308
in which two secondary defendants - part of a two-tiered group of
a dozen or so alleged conspirators - were subject to default
judgment for the entire sum sought by plaintiffs over all
defendants, an amount in excess of $300 million for violating the
terms of a worldwide Mareva injunction. 309 The asset subject to
the order consisted of a $40 million hotel in New York.310
The threat of contempt is more complex for banks who become
involved in Mareva-related procedures. More often than not, the
"assets" sought to be frozen by Mareva orders are bank
accounts. 311 Some countries have enacted bank secrecy laws
which prevent them from revealing information about their
307 The U.K. Practice Directions, Part 25, Appendix A provide a sample template
Mareva order (or "freezing injunction" as it is now called) to be filled in by plaintiffs and
presented ex parte to the court. On its face, it reads, "[If you] disobey this order you may
be held in contempt of court and may be imprisoned, fined or have your assets seized."
One sanction specifically discussed in Mareva cases is debarment of the defendant from
defending the action entirely. Lord Donaldson, in Derby & Co. Ltd v. Weldon (Nos. 3 & 4),
[1990] 1 Ch. 65, 81-82 (Eng. C.A.), stated (or, perhaps, understated),
In the context of the grant of the Mareva injunction, I think that a sufficient sanction
exists in the fact that, in the event of disobedience, the court could bar the
defendant's right to defend. This is not a consequence which it could contemplate
lightly as it would become a fugitive from a final judgment given against it without
its explanations having been heard and which might well be enforced against it by
other courts.
Derby & Co. Ltd v. Weldon (Nos. 3 & 4), [1990] 1 Ch. 65, 81-82 (Eng. C.A.) (emphasis
added).
[The] only means available to the court to enforce its order is the quasi-criminal
procedure of punishment for contempt. This is a powerful weapon; so powerful in fact
as often to be unsuitable as an instrument for adjudicating upon the disputes which
may arise over whether a business is being run in accordance with the court's order.
The heavy-handed nature of the enforcement mechanism is a consideration which
may go to the exercise of the court's discretion in other cases as well, but its use to
compel the running of a business is perhaps the paradigm case of its disadvantages.
308 CIBC Mellon Trust Co. v. Mora Hotel Corp., NV, [2003] 1 All E.R. 564.
309 Id,
310 Id. (illustrating orders are not applied only to bank accounts).
311 See K. X. Li, Maritime Jurisdiction and Arrest of Ships Under China's Maritime
Procedure Law, 32 J. MAR. L. & COM. 655, 671 (2001) (explaining that Mareva injunction
applies to assets, i.e. things that are tangible or intangible, real or personal, including
bank accounts); see also R. Doak Bishop, et al, Strategic Options Available When
Catasrophe Strikes the Major International Energy Project, 36 TEx. INT'L L.J. 635, 647
(2001) (describing nature of assets affected by Mareva injunction). See generally United
States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378 (1965) (holding that where in personam
jurisdiction over New York bank was obtained, the District Court had authority to issue
temporary injunction preserving assets in question).
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depositors. 312 A Mareva order over them places the bank in the
unenviable position of either violating the English order -
placing them in contempt - or violating the substantive secrecy
law of the country in which they operate, which often carries
criminal penalties.313 That parties and non-parties might be
placed in such a position is further evidence of the improper
extraterritorial reach of worldwide Mareva injunctions.314
Were the Mareva procedure to be classified as in rem, plaintiffs
would have to seek enforcement from local courts to enforce the
Mareva order; that is, from courts in the jurisdictions where the
312 See Ralph C. Ferrarra & J. Triplett Mackintosh, Legal Representation in the
International Securities Market: Representing a Party or Witness in an SEC or SRO
Proceeding, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 893, 912 (1989) (describing approaches in various
countries, noting France, Switzerland, the Cayman Islands, and the Bahamas have all
enacted bank secrecy laws, many of which subject violators to criminal penalties). See
generally Madelyn J. Daley, Effectiveness of United States and International Efforts to
Combat International Money Laundering, 2000 ST. LOUIS-WARSAw TRANSATLANTIC L.J.
175, 199 (2000) (discussing way in which bank secrecy laws block gathering of evidence
and act as barrier to shield money launderers from detection); Alson R. Martin,
Representing the Professional and Closely Held Business: Qualified Plans, Welfare
Benefits, and Tax Planning, SJ072 ALI-ABA 197, 282 (2004) (stating that although bank
secrecy laws are questionable, they still provide benefits regarding anonymity and
exposure).
313 See Societe Eram Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Compagnie Internationale de Navigation,
[2003] 2 All E.R. (Comm.) 65, para. 23 (2003) (citing Justice Hoffmann)
The need to exercise the court's jurisdiction with due regard to the sovereignty of
others is particularly important in the case of banks. Banks are in a special position
because their documents are concerned not only with their own business but with
that of their customers. They will owe their customers a duty of confidence regulated
by the law of the country where the account is kept. That duty is in some countries
reinforced by criminal sanctions and sometimes by 'blocking statutes' which
specifically forbid the bank to provide information for the purpose of foreign legal
proceedings (compare s 2 of our Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980). If every
country where a bank happened to carry on business asserted a right to require that
bank to produce documents relating to accounts kept in any other such country,
banks would be in the unhappy position of being forced to submit to whichever
sovereign was able to apply the greatest pressure.
See Stephen J. Pearson, Using the English Courts to Assist with U.S. Proceedings, 688
PRACT. L. INST. 293, 326 (2003), stating that the Mareva injunction contains a penal notice
warning the defendant of the penalty for violating the order, including imprisonment,
imposing of fines, and the seizing of property. see also Fabano, supra note 293, at 140,
indicating that a bank in possession of the assets targeted by a Mareva injunction may
not "aid and abet a breach of its orders" - violation of such order will result in contempt of
court charges for the third party bank.
314 See Jurisdiction: Freezing Order, J. OF INT'L BANKING L., 17(4), n.29-30 (2002)
(discussing extraterritorial effects on third parties and possible reforms); see also Bank of
China v. NBM LLC, [2002] 1 All E.R. 717 (C.A.) (2002) (involving conflicting legal
obligations of banks by laws in their home country and Mareva orders); Alexander Fox,
Global Warming to Comity? The Worldwide Freezing Order Begins its Thaw, J. OF INT'L
FIN. MKTS., 4(3), 108-09 (2002) (suggesting English courts may have to re-think their
strategy with regard to issuing extraterritorial orders over third parties, e.g., banks,
because of compliance difficulties which are engendered).
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assets are located. 315 This would almost certainly take the teeth
out of the procedure as it would require plaintiffs, in the United
States at least, to notify the defendant of the case against him if
not right away, at least soon after any ex parte proceeding,
precisely what the Mareva order is designed to prevent.316 A
defendant would then have recourse to argue in his local court -
prior to an enforcement proceeding 317 - whether or not the
jurisdiction of the English court over him was proper in the first
instance before all or a large part of his assets were frozen.318
This would tend to throw sunshine on the proceedings, taking it
from the shadows where, as it stands now, English courts and
nervous plaintiffs lurk about behind the defendant's back, strong-
arming his confidential fiduciaries into turning over the details of
his private finances. 319
315 See Jennifer M. Anglim, Crossroads in the Great Race: Moving Beyond the
International Race to Judgment in Disputes Over Artwork and Other Chattels, 45 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 239, 244 (2004) (discussing fact that court with in rem jurisdiction will have
most control over ultimate disposition of property); see also Frederick J. Tansil, Asset
Protection Trusts (Apts): Non-Tax Issues, SJ027 ALI-ABA 291, 332 (2003) (stating that
14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution typically requires forum court to either have
in personam jurisdiction over trustee of trust or in rem jurisdiction over property). See
generally Malis v. Zinman, 261 A.2d 875, 878 (1970) (holding that trial court had in rem
jurisdiction over property in question and therefore had authority to determine outcome
of suit by creditors).
316 See Michael Polonsky, Use of the English "Freezing Order" in Support of
Motorola's Litigation in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, 704
PRACT. L. INST. 145, 193-94 (2004) (stating that Mareva injunction is often issued without
notice to defendant). See generally Kern Alexander, The Mareva Injunction and Anton
Pillar Order: The Nuclear Weapons of English Commercial Litigation, 11 FLA. J. INT'L. 487
(1997) (discussing nature and purpose of Mareva injunction and the way in which it is
issued to defendant); Stephen J. Pearson, Using the English Courts to Assist with U.S.
Proceedings, 688 PRACT. L. INST. 293 (2003) (describing effect of Mareva injunction on
defendant).
317 See PART IV.D. infra for further discussion.
318 See generally Hon. Allan L. Gropper, Current Developments in International
Insolvency Law: A United States Perspective, 863 PRACT. L. INST. 815 (2004) (discussing
extraterritorial jurisdictional issues surrounding Mareva orders); Polonsky, supra note
316, at 145 (describing effect of freezing orders on defendant's assets); David B. Young,
Preferences and Fraudulent Transfers, 861 PRAC. L. INST. 637 (2004) (explaining nature
and effect of fraudulent transfers).
319 Lord Acton once said, "Everything secret degenerates, even the administration of
justice; nothing is safe that does not show how it can bear discussion and publicity."
Letter of Jan. 23, 1861. See Carlos G. Garcia, All the Other Dirty Little Secrets: Investment
Treaties, Latin America, and the Necessary Evil of Investor-State Arbitration, 16 FLA. J.
INT'L. 301, 354-355 (2004), arguing for transparency in international arbitration
proceedings as they greatly affect public policy. See also Samuel A. Marcosson, A Price
Too High: Enforcing the Ban on Gays and Lesbians in the Military and the Inevitably of
Intrusiveness, 64 UMKC L. REV. 59, 97 n.210 (1995), discussing the implication of the
secrecy of proceedings.
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As to the extraterritorial propriety of the Mareva procedure,
the words of Lord Browne-Wilkinson (if not his later actions 320)
speak volumes:
In seeking to combat international fraud, the international
Mareva is better than nothing. However, in my view, it does
not provide a very promising route forward. It smacks too
much of the arrogance of a former imperial power sending a
gun-boat when there is trouble abroad. That was never an
effective remedy against land-locked countries such as
Switzerland and Lichtenstein: in the modern world it is, in
my view, quite inappropriate. 321
The bottom line is that while equity may draw a fine
distinction between in rem and in personam jurisdiction,
practical application does not.322 It makes little difference to a
defendant whether his business has been "frozen" or "seized" by a
foreign court. Either way, it is a slender reed on which to hang
such a violation of international principles of sovereignty.
B. Extortionate Effect on Defendants to Force Settlements
Another important implication of application of a Mareva order
is the real, disproportionate effect it has on the relative
320 Lord Browne-Wilkinson maintains his own contradictory place in the history of
the Mareva injunction. One of the only "hard-and-fast" rules (if there are such things
when it comes to this device) was that a Mareva order could only be used as a procedure
where a plaintiff had an underlying legal or equitable right to protect, i.e., the Mareva
procedure was not a substantive cause of action itself. Lord Browne-Wilkinson called even
that requirement into question with his decision in Channel Tunnel Group v. Balfour,
[1993] 1 All ER 664. See generally Howard Johnson, Mareva Injunctions: Practice Makes
Perfect, INT'L BANKING AND FIN. L., 13(7), 74-76 (1994); Raymond J. Werbicki, Arbitral
Interim Measures: Fact or Fiction?, 57-JAN DISP. RESOL. J. 62 (2003), discussing the affect
of arbitral interim measures.
321 See Browne-Wilkinson, supra note 38, at 153. Lord Browne-Wilkinson does not
mention Switzerland and Lichtenstein simply for their geographic attributes. Switzerland
has a host of bank secrecy laws which stand in the way of effective enforcement of
worldwide Mareva orders. Id. And, Lichtenstein's corporate laws forbid the disclosure of
beneficial ownership of corporations organized under those laws, another frustrating
obstacle to plaintiffs seeking to "trace" assets. Id. at 149-50.
322 See generally Jennifer M. Anglim, Crossroads in the Great Race: Moving Beyond
the International Race to Judgment in Disputes Over Artwork and Other Chattels, 45
HARV. INT'L L.J. 239, 244 (2004) (describing differences between in rem jurisdiction and in
personam jurisdiction); Fabano, supra note 293, at 131 (outlining distinction between in
rem and in personam jurisdcitions); K. X. Li, Maritime Jurisdiction and Arrest of Ships
Under China's Maritime Procedure Law, 32 J. MAR. L. & COM. 655, 664 (1999) (stating
nature and differences of in rem jurisdiction and in personam jurisdiction).
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bargaining position of the parties involved. 323 This effect is made
more acute when the order is applied to foreign defendants.324
English courts have recognized that plaintiffs might use the
Mareva injunction to secure an oppressive settlement advantage,
but there is little concern that were a judge to ascertain this
intent from a plaintiff, that she would not issue an injunction in
such a case. 325 It would undermine the equitable underpinnings
of the procedure itself.326 This "active" abuse of the system is not
the precise concern of this section. Rather, the "passive" effects
that result from merely complying with the order as issued are
equally, if not more, devious.
The passive yet extortionate effects the Mareva order has on a
defendant are manifold. By the time he receives notice of the
order, the defendant's privacy has been unquestionably invaded
by the third party disclosures which have been made without his
knowledge, usually by parties in whom he places the confidences
of his personal finances. 327 It is reasonable to assume that a bank
323 See e.g., Grupo Mexicano De Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 119 S.
Ct. 1961 (1999) (holding that because traditional English chancery courts did not have
jurisdiction to restrain party's assets when no final judgment had been made, trial court
lacked jurisdiction to grant preliminary injunction). See generally Mary A. Nation,
Granting a Preliminary Injunction Freezing Assets Not Part of the Pending Litigation:
Abuse of Discretion or an Important Advance in Creditors' Rights?, 7 TUL. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 367 (1999) (discussing way in which grant of preliminary injunction may be
abuse of discretion); Dr. Mark S.W. Hoyle, The Mareva Injunction and Related Orders, 39
VA. J. INT'L L. 503 (1999) (analyzing way in which Mareva injunction affects defendant).
324 See Zicherman, supra note 297, at 673 (discussing importance of the Mareva
injunction when foreign defendant is involved); see also Alexander, supra note 316, at 515
(noting that order is valuable pretrial tactic); cf. Bermann, supra note 287, at 563 (giving
examples of many strains Mareva orders place of foreign defendants).
325 See Z Ltd. v. A-Z and AA-LL, [1982] Q.B. 558, 586 (1982) (Kerr, LJ) (warning "the
great value of this jurisdiction must not be debased by allowing it to become something
which is invoked simply to obtain security for a judgment in advance, and still less as a
means of pressuring defendants into settlements."); see also Bermann, supra note 287, at
569; cf. Alexander, supra note 316, at 498 (noting courts most often grant injunction but
may provide remedy to injured defendant).
326 See Rhonda Wasserman, Equity Renewed: Preliminary Injunctions to Secure
Potential Money Judgments, 67 WASH. L. REV. 257, 345 (1992) (commenting that purpose
of the injunction is to prevent defendant from disposing of foreign assets); see also Grupo
Mexicano De Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 308, 329 (1961) (recognizing
injunction as powerful tool for creditors); cf. Johansson, supra note 43, at 1095 (noting
that plaintiff has burden of proving that defendant poses risk before injunction will be
granted). .
327 See Bermann, supra note 287, at 569 (labeling Mareva order "Draconian"); see also
Wasserman, supra note 326, at 347 (noting that discovery order is issued to third party
bankers with knowledge of defendant's assets). See generally, Mark S.W. Hoyle, The
Mareva Injunction and Related Orders, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 503, 505-06 (1999) (explaining
"[T]o maintain the element of surprise, speed and secrecy are required in applying for a
Mareva Order.")
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who is made subject to a tracing order will rethink any future
evaluation of a defendant's liquidity, creditworthiness, and
reputation 328 in light of the accusations of the plaintiff. If the
English proceedings do not put him out of business, his ability to
deal with his banks will be forever diminished. 329 Even if the
defendants eventually succeeds in defending on the merits, it is
not possible to "undo [this] invasion of his privacy."330
When notice is finally made to him, he will almost immediately
seek assistance of counsel locally. 331  That counsel, upon
researching this hitherto obscure English procedure, will then
inform him that he must also secure English counsel. 332 As
mentioned above, securing both sets of counsel is made all the
more difficult with frozen assets and the preliminary "judgment"
against him represented by the Mareva order itself.333 If the
order specifies an amount a defendant can spend on "reasonable
legal expenses," any counsel of his will then ascertain whether
that amount is sufficient to cover the likely expense of defending
the order - and later the suit.334 Add to that the fees involved
with defending a suit in England.335
328 See Tim Taylor, Worldwide Marevas in the Real Wide World, 86 LAW SOCIETY'S
GAZETTE 22 (1989) (discussing reputational effects such orders have on defendants in
business community); see also Hoyle, supra note 327, at 510-11 (stating that plaintiff may
give notice of injunction to third parties in control of defendant's assets); Wasserman,
supra note 327, at 347 (noting that third party bankers receive notice of injunction).
329 See Hoyle, supra note 327, at 506 (arguing that those with knowledge of
defendants' assets are informed of injunction); see also Wasserman, supra note 326, at 347
(including bankers in list of those informed of injunction); cf. Fabano, supra note 293, at
191 (discussing some of plaintiffs potential liabilities).
330 See Grupo Torras SA v. Sheikh Fahad Mohammed Al-Sabah, Court of Appeal
(Civil Div.), Hearing Transcript, Feb. 16, 1994.
331 See generally Hoyle, supra note 327, at 506 (discussing procedure); see also
Alexander, supra note 316, at 494 (commenting on British court authority); cf. Johansson,
supra note 43, at 1094 (noting history of order).
332 Compare Hoyle, supra note 327, at 509-10 (discussing procedure) with George A.
Bermann, supra note 287, at 571 (commenting on importance of knowledge of British
legal system); see also Zicherman, supra note 297, at 667 (noting that English courts must
have jurisdiction over parties).
333 See Hoyle, supra note 327, at 512 (discussing legal costs); see also Bermann, supra
note 287, at 571 (noting that if defendant disobeys injunction he may lose his right to
defend); cf. Johansson, supra note 43, at 1094 (arguing that courts have wide latitude in
enforcing injunctions).
334 See generally Michael Steiner, Adding Insult to Injury: Defendant's Use of Assets
to Pay Legal Costs Following a Mareva, INSOLVENCY INTEL., 12(3), 17-20 (1999); see also
Wasserman, supra note 326, at 345 (listing protections developed to mitigate potential
harm to defendant); cf. Alexander, supra note 316, at 496 (discussing living expense
deduction).
335 See Hoyle, supra note 327, at 512 (discussing legal costs); see also Alexander,
supra note 316, at 498 (noting possible costs to defendants).
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If he has managed to secure counsel, the defendant must then
assess whether he can still conduct business and live on the
allowances for expenses provided in the order, which was likely
made in a hurry and with little knowledge of the defendant's
weekly or monthly expenses. 336 One practitioner has estimated
that defendants subject to a Mareva order can usually expect to
be able to keep their business open for only one to two weeks
following its application. 337 Payment of any outstanding debts
that do not fall within the "ordinary business expense" category
must be approved in advance by plaintiffs solicitors as does
almost every other matter relating to the defendant's assets.338
In reality, the court does not police the Mareva order; that is
done almost exclusively by the plaintiffs solicitors. 339 This
peculiar arrangement is wholly dependent upon the flexibility,
responsiveness, and willingness to compromise of the plaintiffs
counsel - the defendant's adversaries who are seeking to
maximize their client's recovery. 340 One would certainly expect
those adversaries to view with almost utter disdain any attempt
to free up assets for purposes other than paying their client. As
one commentator pointed out, "The plaintiffs solicitor,
continuously looking for sinister implications in the defendant's
activities, can, whilst appearing not to be delaying matters,
effectively paralyse [sic] the defendant's business by diligent
policing of the Mareva order."341
336 See Bermann, supra note 287, at 564 (discussing prohibition against disposing of
assets except to pay legal fees) (1999); see also Wasserman, supra note 326, at 344-45
(noting procedures to protect defendants because of possible financial consequences); cf.
Hoyle, supra note 327, at 511 (discussing amount plaintiffs take into consideration during
calculation).
337 See Tony Willoughby, The Mareva Injunction: A Cruel Tyranny, E.L.P.R. 1997,
19(8), 479, 480 (1997) (stating that, in his experience, few businesses can survive
imposition of Mareva order for more than week or two); see also Grupo Mexicano De
Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 308, 329 (1961) (noting that injunction is
powerful tool for creditors); cf. Wasserman, supra note-326, at 345 (discussing hardship to
defendants).
338 See Taylor, supra note 2 (noting consent requirement associated with Mareva
orders); see also Hoyle, supra note 327, at 509-10 (discussing procedure). But see
Alexander, supra note 316, at 497 (stating that plaintiff calculates costs).
339 See Taylor, supra note 2 (discussing requirement of consent from plaintiffs
solicitor); Willoughby, supra note 24, at 480 (pointing out that every proposed transaction
by defendant is noticed to and vetted by plaintiffs solicitors); see also Hoyle, supra note
327, at 509-10. See generally Alexander, supra note 316, at 497 (stating that plaintiff
calculates costs).
340 See Hoyle, supra note 327, at 512; cf. Seveg, supra note 35, at 58 (listing various
burdens of proof imposed on plaintiff to secure an injunction).
341 See Taylor, supra note 2.
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Assuming he can manage his personal and business affairs on
his "allowance," there is still the matter of the duration of the
defendant's wait on this financial death row.342 Should a foreign
defendant challenge the jurisdiction of the issuing court, the
Mareva order remains in place through the entire challenge,
including the appeals process.343 Should he lose that challenge, it
then remains in place until the trial and indeed may be extended
post-judgment. 344
Nothing in this process, save some less-than-cooperative
behavior from plaintiffs solicitors perhaps, has explicitly forced
the defendant's hand with regard to settling his claim. 345 Yet
every part of it forcibly suggests his only real option is to settle
the case. The Mareva order, however, has tipped the scales in
favor of the plaintiff in settlement negotiations as well. 346 The
plaintiff, after all, has been made aware through the defendant's
banks of exactly how much the defendant can afford to spend. 347
It would be tantamount to legal malpractice for a plaintiffs
solicitor to come down from his initial damage claim absent an
342 See Taylor, supra note 2 (indicating that expenditures permitted by defendants for
personal and legal expenses are commonly set at "completely unrealistic levels"); cf.Alon
Seveg, Investments: When Countries go Bust: Proposals for Debtor and Creditor
Resolution, 3 ASPER REV. INT'L Bus. & TRADE L. 25, (2003) (noting naively that order does
not affect defendants right to conduct business); Alexander, supra note 316, at 497
(discussing seriousness of calculations).
343 See Grupo Torras SA v. Sheikh Fahad Mohammed Al-Sabah, Court of Appeal
(Civil Div.), Hearing Transcript, Feb. 16, 1994 (discussing duration of Mareva order
during appeals); Johansson, supra note 43, at 1104 (proposing courts consider due process
prior to issuing order by determining whether it has in personam jurisdiction over
defendant). But see Samuel K. Alexander, III, The Mareva Injunction and Related Orders,
39 VA. J. INT'L L. 503, 521-22 (1997) (explaining Mareva order must be recognized by
foreign court before enforcement against foreign defendant; see Part V).
344 See Zicherman, supra note 297, at 672 (explaining Mareva injunctions operate on
assets located within jurisdiction of court); Alexander, supra note 343, at 513 (stating
defendant within court's jurisdiction may be subject to Mareva orders); Johansson, supra
note 43, at 1096 (noting Mareva injunctions function in personam but affect defendant's
assets as if court had in rem jurisdiction).
345 See Alexander, supra note 316, at 488 (explaining Mareva injunctions often affect
outcome of litigation); Alexander, supra note 343, at 506 (stating Mareva orders are tools
used to convince defendants to settle); But see Peter S. O'Driscoll, Performance Bonds,
Bankers' Guarantees, and the Mareva Injunction, 7 N.W. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 380, 408 (1985)
(arguing Mareva injunctions lead to arbitration or litigation).
346 See Alexander, supra note 316, at 488 (stating Mareva injunctions often influence
outcome of litigation); Alexander, supra note 343, at 506 (arguing settlement is aim of
Mareva orders); But see O'Driscoll, supra note 345, at 408 (hinting defendants can either
settle or, assuming they can free up sufficient funds, litigate).
347 See O'Driscoll, supra note 345, at 398 (stating banks either indemnify or pay
bond); Alexander, supra note 343, at 496-97 (stating plaintiff should determine maximum
amount of defendant's assets to freeze); Zicherman, supra note 297, at 676 (stating order
granting injunction typically mentions amount to be frozen).
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exceedingly compelling circumstance. 348  Any vestige of fair
negotiation has long since disappeared once one side has all the
information while the other side has no leverage with which to
bargain. 349 One commentator suggested that settling the case
may not even be the end of a defendant's troubles,
Whether or not the worldwide Mareva becomes as common
as the defendants' arguments in Derby & Co predicted
["common as confetti"], the availability of worldwide Mareva
relief can only increase the attractions of London as a forum
for international litigation. Perhaps even greater than the
attraction of being able to prevent the defendant from
dealing with his assets on a worldwide basis is the facility to
require the defendant to disclose his assets worldwide. This
offers an incomparable advantage to plaintiffs who can this
use proceedings in London as a platform for going into
litigation abroad (subject to leave of the English court)
armed with information which would frequently be
unobtainable in the foreign proceedings. 350
It is impossible to know exactly what percentage of these cases
end in settlement but it is not unrealistic to suggest that the
number is dramatically higher than in cases not utilizing the
Mareva procedure. Lest we forget, in the English "loser pays"
system, for all of his troubles, the defendant will also be required
to pay the plaintiffs legal fees, a figure which may dwarf the
actual damages in the case. 351
348 See Alexander, supra note 343, at 510 (stating full disclosure is necessary or judge
may reject Mareva order application); Alexander, supra note 316, at 495 (explaining all
undertakings given by plaintiff to the court are plaintiffs personally); O'Driscoll, supra
note 345, at 403 (stating plaintiff should specify maximum amount of funds to freeze to
prevent defendant dealing with excess funds).
349 See Alexander, supra note 316, at 494 (suggesting plaintiff submit ex parte
application to prevent defendant from having notice because notice gives defendant
incentive to remove or destroy evidence); Johansson, supra note 43, at 1105 (stating
Mareva orders should only be discharged when no real risk of asset removal exists); see
also O'Driscoll, supra note 345, at 400 (hinting defendant may dispose of his assets when
real risk of owing debt exists).
350 Taylor, supra note 2.
351 See Willoughby, supra note 24, at 480 (explaining defendant may be liable to pay
plaintiffs legal costs); Alexander, supra note 343, at 511 (claiming maximum amount of
frozen assets should include legal fees); cf. Zicherman, supra note 297, at 676 (stating
courts limit frozen amount to ensure that it simply satisfies plaintiffs claim).
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C. Lack of Ability to Raise Due Process Concerns
Readers familiar with American due process protections have
undoubtedly been hearing alarm bells in their heads for some
time while reading this Note. The lack of notice to the defendant
for what could be months and the ex parte nature of the
proceeding are obvious concerns, not wholly assuaged by the
protections which are provided - and constantly whittled away -
by the English courts. 352 More distressing, though, is that an
American defendant subject to a Mareva injunction may never
gain the ear of a judge, foreign or domestic, to address those
issues.353 The persuasiveness of those arguments, for or against,
is really immaterial and secondary to the main problem: the lack
of an ability to simply raise the argument in the first place.
What should be obvious by now is that an American defendant
who wishes to argue the finer points of American due process in
an English court will find his arguments fall on deaf ears. The
English legal system is concerned with English due process, not
that of the United States. 354 So long as the English court has
properly secured jurisdiction over the American defendant, the
Mareva procedure is not incompatible with English notions of
due process. 355 Period. End of discussion. An English court, it
will argue, has all of the authority the English laws allow and
those laws are not tempered and that authority is not diminished
or qualified because an American defendant might have recourse
352 See Alexander, supra note 343, at 506 (claiming ex parte orders necessary to
prevent defendant from dissipating his assets); Johansson, supra note 43, at 1092
(arguing courts hesitate to grant Mareva order because it is ordered prior to determining
whether defendants are in the wrong); see also O'Driscoll, supra note 345, at 398 (stating
Mareva injunctions are ex parte in nature and are issued to prevent defendant from
removing his assets from court's jurisdiction).
353 See Johansson, supra note 43, at 1107 (suggesting courts balance plaintiffs and
defendant's interests prior to issuing Mareva order); Alexander, supra note 343, at 505
(arguing Mareva injunction persuades many opposing parties to settle claim for damages);
But see O'Driscoll, supra note 345, at 408 (stating by definition, Mareva injunctions
contemplate litigation within jurisdiction of court granting order).
354 See O'Driscoll, supra note 345, at 400 (stating Mareva injunctions are common
tool of English civil procedure); Johansson, supra note 43, at 1096 (discussing Mareva
injunction use within English courts); Alexander, supra note 316, at 493 (discussing
source of power for English courts to issue Mareva orders).
355 See Alexander, supra note 316, at 496 (claiming Mareva injunctions are only
effective against defendant within court's jurisdiction); see also Johansson, supra note 43,
at 1095 (discussing court's ability to reach worldwide assets when injunction based on in
personam jurisdiction); O'Driscoll, supra note 345, at 402 (stating Mareva injunctions
issued on defendant when his funds are within bank or possessed by third party within
court's jurisdiction).
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to a due process argument in a court in his country. 356 In fact, an
English judge might even point to the precedent of American law,
were he so inclined to even entertain the rhetorical exercise,
which allows for prejudgment attachment, ex parte temporary
restraining orders, and preliminary injunctions in aid of
equitable claims.357 These could be seen, when taken together,
as evidence of the due process argument having already been
decided - and not in the defendant's favor.358
The next and last opportunity for a defendant to raise due
process arguments would be in the context of an enforcement
action in his own country. 359 Once a plaintiff has reduced his
claims to judgment in England, securing the assets in another
country will require him to sue in that country to force their sale
or transfer. 360 Apart from the fact that raising the due process
issue in an English court might entirely foreclose a defendant's
ability to later raise it in an American court on procedural
grounds, discussed below in PART IV.D., American courts are
notoriously deferential to recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments. 361 Courts in those states which have adopted some
356 See Alexander, supra note 316, at 490-91 (discussing popularity of English law in
resolving international commercial disputes); Johansson, supra note 43, at 1107 (arguing
defendants may potentially be forced to litigate in foreign forum under Mareva orders);
O'Driscoll, supra note 345, at 408 (arguing Mareva orders contemplate litigation within
jurisdiction of court that issued order).
357 See Alexander, supra note 343, at 511-12 (comparing Mareva injunction and
United States law); Johansson, supra note 43, at 1098-1100 (discussing prejudgment
attachment laws and preliminary injunctions); Zicherman, supra note 297, at 677 (stating
American courts use temporary injunctions and pre-judgment attachment to prevent
removal of assets from jurisdiction).
358 See supra, PART III (discussing availability, where certain requirements met, of
preliminary injunctions in American federal courts). But see Connecticut v. Doehr, 501
U.S. 1, 2 (1991) (noting that state statute authorizing prejudgment attachment without
notice or hearing - and without requiring a showing of exigent circumstances - violates
due process); United States v. Noriega, 746 F.Supp. 1541, 1544 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (rejecting
efforts by U.S. government to secure voluntary freezing of Manuel Noriega's assets in
foreign countries without affording him adversarial hearing to disprove link between
assets and drug trafficking).
359 See Johansson, supra note 43, at 1096 (explaining plaintiffs can attach assets
located in foreign jurisdictions and seek enforcement of judgment in those jurisdictions);
Alexander, supra note 343, at 506 (stating plaintiffs can later attach judgment to assets
protected by Mareva injunction).
360 See Alexander, supra note 343, at 506 (noting Mareva orders allow plaintiffs to
preserve financial assets and property to which they can attach judgments at later time);
Johansson, supra note 43, at 1096 (stating plaintiffs can seek enforcement of judgment on
assets in foreign jurisdictions)
361 See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION, 387-89
West Group (2d Ed. 2002) (stating, "Tihe United States, with a long (and constitutionally
mandated) tradition of enforcing sister-state judgments, appears to be the most receptive
of any major country to recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments..."); Jennifer
2005 MAREVA ORDERS
form of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgment Recognition Act 362
are restrained statutorily from even hearing such arguments
when presented with a judgment from a nation whose system
provides for due process protections, though those protections
may differ from or even violate American ones.363
D. Enforcement Actions & Procedural Ambiguity
Another troublesome area involves the peculiar intersection of
the Mareva procedure and the enforcement action in American
courts. Recall that the Mareva order operates as an interlocutory
judgment, not merely as an injunction. 364 Because they are faced
with a judgment, much of the language used in these cases by
American courts comes from recognition and enforcement
actions, which have a more concrete framework when compared
to the hairier dialect of provisional remedies, comity, and
M. Anglim, Crossroads in the great Race: Moving Beyond the International Race to
Judgment in Disputes over Artwork and other Chattels, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 239, 248
(2004) (stating that New York is generous forum in recognizing and enforcing foreign
judgments, in part because of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act -
UFMJRA); Chao, supra note 362, at 150 (stating that UFMJRA codifies common law of
majority of states); Michael Gruson, Rethinking Legal Opinion Letters: Legal Opinions of
New York Counsel in International Transactions, 1989 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 365, 398
(1989) (stating that New York's statutory requirements for enforcement of foreign
judgment makes such enforcement simple).
362 Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act (1962). See CIBC Mellon
Trust Co. v. Mora Hotel, 100 N.Y. 2d at 221 (N.Y. 2003) (noting majority of states have
adopted UFMJRA at this writing - 29 states plus District of Columbia). See generally
Cedric C. Chao & Christine S. Neuhoff, Enforcement and Recognition of Foreign
Judgments in United States Courts: A Practical Perspective, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 147, 165
(2001) (listing states and their year of adoption of UFMJRA).
363 See John Fellas, Lessons on Enforcing Foreign Judgments in the United States,
N.Y.L.J., Vol. 228, No. 61 (Sept. 27, 2002), suggesting that to enforce an action based on a
Mareva injunction in New York, a plaintiff must - or at least should - demonstrate to the
English court that the procedure would satisfy American notions of due process. This
proposition, based on the enforcement action decision by the New York Court of Appeals
in CIBC v. Mora Hotel, is probably erroneous. An English court is not in any way
constrained by American due process rights of American defendants. In an exceedingly
generous forum such as New York (a UFMJRA state) with regard to enforcement actions,
and even in the CIBC decision itself, there was no such explicit requirement that a
plaintiff have made a showing that the judgment comports with American notions of due
process. In fact, the court explicitly rejected any suggestion that an English judgment
could even be considered to have been rendered without adequate due process protections.
While the decision of the Court of Appeals in CIBC is problematic to this author, a fair
reading of CIBC cannot support the commentator's proposition that a plaintiff might have
to demonstrate to an English court in order to enforce an action based in a Mareva
injunction that the procedure would satisfy American notions of due process. Though, in
fact, this author wishes it did support such a requirement.
364 See supra, note 8 for discussion re: interlocutory judgments. Note, too, that in
cases like CIBC where the defendants default, the "interlocutory" adjective is dropped and
replaced with "final," fitting even better into existing case law and statutory frameworks.
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reciprocity. 365 As has been noted, simply securing a judgment in
England only gets the plaintiff half-way home.366 To get their
hands physically on defendant's assets, they must initiate a
recognition and enforcement 367 action in the country where those
assets are located.368 A recent enforcement action in the New
York Court of Appeals, 369 CIBC Mellon Trust Co. v. Mora Hotel
Corp.,3 70 illustrated how increased use of the Mareva injunction,
if simply treated as another foreign court procedure, should
worry and induce nightmares for American defendants who have
any - even tenuous or associative - contact with potential
plaintiffs in English courts. 371
365 See generally Guinness v. PLC Ward, 955 F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1992); CIBC, 100
N.Y.2d at 221 (concerning enforcement of Mareva order); Kingsland Holdings Inc. v.
Fulvio Bracco, Civ. Act. No. 14817 (Court of Chancery of Del., New Castle March 6, 1997)
(concerning Mareva order).
366 See Fabano, supra note 293, at 141 (writing that Mareva order "does not give
plaintiff a security interest in the defendant's assets prior to a final judgment"); Alon
Seveg, When Countries Go Bust: Proposals for Debtor and Creditor Resolution, 3 ASPER
REV. INT'L Bus. & TRADE L. 25, 59 (2003) (declaring that "[t]he purpose of the [Mareva]
injunction is to prevent the defendant from committing a fraud on the court... the
injunction does not remove any of defendant's rights in the assets"); Ronald J. Silverman,
Mareva Orders: Fact or Fiction in the United States?, 21-9 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 24, 24
(2002) (stating that Mareva injunction does not deny party of his property "but merely
curtails defendant's ability to arbitrarily dispose" of it).
367 In the arena of international litigation, these are two separate concepts which
must be considered, though in actuality, they are often either confused or dealt with
together. "Recognition" involves one country agreeing to hold as conclusive the legal
judgment and procedures of another country's courts. It is a prerequisite for
"enforcement," which, in legal effect, turns the foreign country's "recognized" judgment
into a judgment of the enforcing forum. For example, a plaintiff who has secured an
English judgment may sue a defendant in the state of New York to force the sale of assets
maintained by the defendant in Syracuse. In the enforcement action, often disposed of by
summary judgment, the New York courts "transform" the English judgment into an
identical New York judgment, thereafter affording the plaintiff the relief they seek.
368 Mary J. Davis, Summary Adjudication Methods in United States Civil Procedure,
46 AM. J. COMP. L. 229, 244 (1998) (stating that jurisdiction over either person or the
property is necessary for freezing or obtaining assets); H. Patrick Glenn, The Morris
Lecture: Conflicting Laws in a Common Experiment? The NAFTA Experiment, 76 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1789, 1804 (stating that Mareva injunction may only enjoin movement of
assets outside issuing jurisdiction); Michael Polonsky, Making Use of the English
"Freezing Order," 1 INT'L Bus. LIT.& ARB. 443, 474 (2001) (stating that Mareva injunction
does not affect persons outside issuing country until enforced in relevant jurisdiction,
though this proposition is debatable, to say the least).
369 For those readers not familiar with the confusingly titled court system of the
Empire State, the New York Court of Appeals is the highest court in the New York state
court system, akin to most states' Supreme Court. More frustrating, maybe, is that the
trial-level court in New York is the New York Supreme Court.
370 100 N.Y.2d 215 (2003).
371 George A. Bermann, Provisional Relief in Transnational Litigation, 35 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 553, 576 (1997) (positing that Mareva orders have potentially severe
consequences especially since they are issued without finding of liability); Bruce Kercher,
Remedy Discussion Forum: Legal History and the Study of Remedies, 39 BRANDEIS L.J.
619, 628 (2001) (stating that Mareva orders are dangerous for alleged debtors); Ronald J.
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1. The "Generous Forum"
The second part of Judge Read's opinion in CIBC begins, "New
York has traditionally been a generous forum in which to enforce
judgments for money damages rendered by foreign courts." 372 He
went on to explain that New York has adopted the Uniform
Foreign Money-Judgment Recognition Act ("UFMJRA") as
C.P.L.R., article 53,373 part of New York's civil practice rules. 374
The rationale behind adopting the UFMJRA was to "codify and
clarify existing case law"375 and, alternatively, to promote the
efficient enforcement of New York judgments abroad "by assuring
foreign jurisdictions that their judgments would received
streamlined enforcement here."376 In fact, Judge Read explained,
a plaintiff who has secured a final, conclusive foreign money
judgment proceeds to the New York courts and "merely asks the
court to perform its ministerial function of recognizing the
foreign country money judgment and [convert] it into a New York
judgment."377
Judge Read's opinion in CIBC is squarely in line with the
general thinking around the country with regard to enforcement
of foreign judgments. 378 It also points out the two assumption-
Silverman, Mareva Orders: Fact or Fiction in the United States?, 21-9 AM. BANKR. INST. J.
24, 24 (2002) (stating that Mareva injunctions inhere "great risk" and potential to violate
due process).
372 CIBC, 100 N.Y.2d at 221.
373 See id. at 220, 221 (citing 1 NY Civil Practice: C.P.L.R. §53 (2004)).
374 See id. at 221 (noting New York adopted the UFMJRA in 1970); see also N.Y.
C.P.L.R. §53.
375 CIBC, 100 N.Y.2d at 221.
376 Id.
377 Id. at 221-22. One risk that is run in performing this "ministerial" function is that
of transforming it into merely a "rubberstamp." A recent opinion in New York City
explained,
New York certainly has a self-interest in being a 'generous forum in which to enforce
judgments for money damages rendered by foreign courts.' New York courts would
like the courts of foreign nations to be receptive to our money judgments. However,
even generosity has limits. If this Court were to grant the present motion/action,
without demanding more, essential facts regarding the personal service of Gorman in
Canada, this Court's 'ministerial function' would be further reduced to a mere
rubberstamp.
Attorney General of Canada v. Gorman, 769 N.Y.S.2d 369, 370 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2003)
(emphasis added, internal citations omitted).
378 See Jennifer M. Anglim, Crossroads in the great Race: Moving Beyond the
International Race to Judgment in Disputes over Artwork and other Chattels, 45 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 239, 248 (2004) (stating that New York is generous forum in recognizing and
enforcing foreign judgments, in part because of the UFMJRA); Chao, supra note 362, at
150 (stating that UFMJRA codifies common law of majority of states); Michael Gruson,
Rethinking Legal Opinion Letters: Legal Opinions of New York Counsel in International
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riddled pillars upon which enforcement and recognition actions -
and indeed the UFMJRA - rest.379 First, American courts
provide generous forums so that, by appearing to be respectful
international citizens, foreign courts will in turn enforce
American judgments abroad.3S0 This concept is known as
reciprocity. 381 And, in theory, it's logic is undeniable. The
presumed benefits of ease and convenience, avoidance of
duplicative actions, maximization of limited court resources, and
mutual respect between legal professionals all suggest that, in
the international arena especially, a little cooperation will go a
long way. 382 Unfortunately, lots of things which work in theory
falter in practice. Reciprocity is one of them. By all objective
standards, American courts enforce almost every foreign
Transactions, 1989 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 365, 398 (1989) (stating that New York's
statutory requirements for enforcement of foreign judgment makes such enforcement
simple).
379 See CIBC, 100 N.Y.2d at 221; see also Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in
the American Courts in 2003: Seventeenth Annual Survey, 52 AM. J. CoMP. L. 9, 70-73
(Winter, 2004) (summarizing CIBC opinion); Linda J. Silberman, The Impact of
Jurisdictional Rules and Recognition Practice on International Business Transactions:
The U.S. Regime, 26 Hous. J. INT'L L. 327 (2004) (eliciting salient points of CIBC opinion).
380 See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202-03 (1895) (finding comity to be reciprocal
principle); In re Akiebolaget Kreuger & Toll, 20 F. Supp 964, 969 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ('The
principle of comity is extended by the courts of this country to the judgments of the courts
of a foreign country to the same extent that courts in the foreign country extend the
principle to judgments of the courts of this country."); Jennifer M. Anglim, Crossroads in
the great Race: Moving Beyond the International Race to Judgment in Disputes over
Artwork and other Chattels, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 239, 249-50 (2004) (stating that in
deciding whether to enforce a foreign judgment, U.S courts often consider reciprocity).
381 See J. Noelle Hicks, Andrew P. Vance Memorial Writing Competition Winner:
Facilitating International Trade: The U.S. Needs Federal Legislation Governing the
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 28 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 155, 163-65 (2002)
(analyzing importance of UFMJRA in relation to international reciprocity requirements);
Michael Traynor, An Introductory Framework for Analyzing the Proposed Hague
Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters:
U.S. And European Perspectives, 6 ANN. SURV, INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 4-5 (2000) (explicating
United States' and European current formulations of reciprocity); Michael Traynor,
Conflict of Laws, Comparative Law, and The American Law Institute, 49 AM. J. COMP. L.
391, 394 (2001) (discussing effects of and issues raised by United States' recognition of
reciprocity) (hereinafter Conflict of Laws).
382 See Michael David Schimek, Anti-Suit and Anti-Anti-Suit Injunctions: A Proposed
Texas Approach, 45 BAYLOR L. REV. 499, 520-21 (1993) (explaining effects on
international reciprocity caused by United States' recognition of foreign judgments); Julie
E. Dowler, Note, Forging Finality: Searching for a Solution to the International Double-
Suit Dilema, 4 DUKEJCIL 363, 363-65 (1994) (expressing growing need for international
reciprocity given globalization of markets). See generally Matthew H. Adler, If We Build
It, Will They Come? The Need For A Multilateral Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Civil Monetary Judgments, 26 LPIB 79, 110 (1994) (concluding an
international judgment recognition treaty is answer to problems arising from lack of
"clarity and simplification" in area of judgment recognition).
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judgment that passes in front of their benches. 383 Abroad, foreign
courts enforce almost none of the American judgments that come
before theirs.38 4
In over two hundred years of jurisprudence, the Supreme
Court of the United States has rendered exactly two decisions on
the issue of enforcement of foreign judgments, both on the same
day, over a century ago, only one of which is ever cited, and
neither of which is followed by the vast majority of state
courts. 38 5 The main decision, Hilton v. Guyot,386 stresses the
importance of true reciprocity in enforcement actions, and, as it
has not been overruled, technically remains binding precedent. 387
While American courts should afford great deference to the
judgments of foreign courts, the court held, true reciprocity
demands that American courts not be too generous in enforcing
383 See Edward C.Y. Lau, Update on the Hague Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 6 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 13, 14 (2000) (stating
"[W]hile the U.S. has been generous about recognition of foreign judgments, the U.S. has
not enjoyed reciprocity with most countries on U.S. judgments."); Andreas F. Lowenfeld,
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION, 387-89 West Group (2d Ed. 2002) (stating,
"[The United States, with a long (and constitutionally mandated) tradition of enforcing
sister-state judgments, appears to be the most receptive of any major country to
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments..."); Traynor, supra note 381, at 393
(stating "[R]ecognition and enforcement of foreign country judgments has been governed
by a relatively stable principle of finality accompanied by comity, particularly as applied
to money judgments.").
384 See The Committee on Foreign and Comparative Law of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York, Survey on Foreign Recognition of U.S. Money Judgments, THE
RECORD, Vol. 56, No. 3, pp. 380-411 (2001), reviewing enforcement of American
judgments abroad. See also Georges R. Delaume, Economic Development and Sovereign
Immunity, 79 A.J.I.L. 319, 342 (1985), noting foreign judgments are more likely of being
recognized by the United States judicial system than United States judgments are in
foreign judicial systems. There are any number of theories and explanations for why -
and significant commentary on the subject - but, at the base, foreign courts don't like how
things are done in the United States. They dislike American discovery (too broad),
American theories of jurisdiction (especially general or "doing business" jurisdiction), and
for some civilian countries, the common law system itself (places too much discretion in
judges). But, mostly, they think American judges and American juries simply give away
way too much money in damages, especially punitive damages. When a foreign court
refuses to enforce an American money judgment, it often does so on "public policy"
grounds, i.e., that punitive damages are against that nation's public policy.
385 See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 217-28 (1895) (summarizing reciprocity as
foreign judgment recognition requirement for various countries); Ritchie v. McMullen, 159
U.S. 235, 242 (1895) (upholding Canadian judgment as conclusive on merits); see also
Ramon E. Reyes, Jr., Article, The Enforcement of Foreign Court Judgments in the People's
Republic of China: What the American Lawyer Needs to Know, 23 BROOKLYN J. INTL L.
241, 246-47 (1997) (citing Supreme Court's historical cases and noting lack of present day
support for approach).
386 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
387 See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 227-28 (concluding United States' foreign policy, as
elucidated by Supreme Court, for judgment recognition requires reciprocity from foreign
judgment-issuing jurisdiction).
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judgments from countries that do not enforce American
judgments. 388 Led by New York, the Hilton decision was soon
discarded and thoroughly distinguished in state courts and the
existing rule became the norm, relying on the dicta of Hilton
rather than the decision.389
The second pillar involves what is known as comity.390 A New
York judge recently stated, "In international law, the principle of
comity is best exemplified by the recognition of the courts of one
nation to a judgment rendered by the courts of another country.
Such comity promotes international cooperation and ensures that
388 The reasonable, if not the necessary, conclusion appears to us to be that
judgments rendered in France, or in any other foreign country, by the laws of which
our own judgments are reviewable upon the merits, are not entitled to full credit and
conclusive effect when sued upon in this country, but are prima facie evidence only of
the justice of the plaintiffs' claim.
In holding such a judgment, for want of reciprocity, not to be conclusive evidence of
the merits of the claim, we do not proceed upon any theory of retaliation upon one
person by reason of injustice done to another; but upon the broad ground that
international law is founded upon mutuality and reciprocity, and that by the
principles of international law recognized in most civilized nations, and by the comity
of our own country, which it is our judicial duty to know and to declare, the judgment
is not entitled to be considered conclusive.
159 U.S. at 227-28; see also Susan L. Stevens, Note, Commanding International Judicial
Respect: Reciprocity and the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 26
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 115, 125-26 (2002) (articulating Supreme Court's
requirement of reciprocity and stating other reasons not to recognize foreign judgments);
Lindsay Loudon Vest, Comment, Cross-Border Judgments and the Public Policy
Exception: Solving the Foreign Judgment Quandary by Way of Tribal Courts, 153 U. PA.
L. REV. 797, 800 (2004) (expounding on international effects of loss in bargaining power
U.S. caused itself through ignorance of Hilton reciprocity requirement toward foreign
judgments).
389 See Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 868 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (discussing current
United States case law and procedure limiting applicability of Supreme Court reciprocity
mandates); Royal Bank of Canada v. Trentham Corp., 491 F. Supp. 404, 414 (S.D. Tex.
1980) ("[T~he courts and commentators have almost universally rejected or ignored the
doctrine that reciprocity should be required as a precondition to the recognition and
enforcement of a foreign country's judgment."), vacated by 665 F.2d 515 (5th Cir.1981)
(vacated due to change in state law); Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,
242 N.Y. 381, 387 (1926) (Pound, J.) ("[A] right acquired under a foreign judgment may be
established in this State without reference to the rules of evidence laid down by the courts
of the United States. Comity is not a rule of law, but it is a rule of "practice, convenience
and expediency."). Like the eminent reputation of Lord Denning and the subsequent
emboldening effect his Mareva decision had on later English judges, one could certainly
argue that the Johnston decision may maintain lasting effect primarily because of the
weight of the reputation of the members of the New York Court of Appeals at the time,
names including Pound, Cardozo, McLaughlin, Crane, Andrews, and Lehman.
390 See Baker v. John, 982 P.2d 738, 762-63 (Sup. Ct. Alaska 1999) (outlining
characteristics of 'comity'); Shoichi Tagashira, Article, Intraterritorial Effects of Foreign
Insolvency Proceedings: An Analysis of "Ancillary" Proceedings in the United States and
Japan, 29 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 14 (1994) (stating Supreme Court's definition of 'comity');
Douglas I. Wood, Note, Conflicts - Insurance - Environmental Law - Limited Renvoi
Exception Will be Utilized When Lex Coci Contractus Indicated that Foreign Jurisdiction
Would Apply Maryland Law to Substantive Issue, 26 U. BALT. L. REV. 247, 260 n.94 (1996)
(discussing doctrine of comity).
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disputes are tried only once."3 9 1 Comity is not per se a rule of law
and is not technically dependent upon reciprocity. 392 Like
reciprocity, comity is wonderful in theory and thorny in practice.
It too rests on an assumption that, without it, the whole of
international law will come toppling down like a house of
cards. 393 But, such is not the case. Comity, like all other
considerations in the international arena, demands assent. 394 A
court cannot legally assent to enforcing another's laws in
violation of its own, nor can another court ask that it do so. 395
391 Attorney General of Canada v. Gorman, 769 N.Y.S.2d 369, 370 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
2003).
392 See Johnston, 242 N.Y. at 387 (explaining New York's position on international
comity); Shoichi Tagashira, Intraterritorial Effects of Foreign Insolvency Proceedings: An
Analysis of 'Ancillary" Proceedings in the United States and Japan, 29 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1,
13-14 (1994) (providing example where United States court recognized it had
international 'duty' of comity, inferring 'duty' to be independent of reciprocity); Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, Comment, Conflict, Balancing of Interests, and the Exercise of Jurisdiction to
Prescribe: Reflections on the Insurance Antitrust Case, 89 A.J.I.L. 42, 45 n.21 (1995)
(noting Supreme Court's prior decision holding reciprocity as requirement to comity to be
outlived).
393 See Somportex, Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3rd
Cir. 1971) (stating "[Comity] is not a rule of law, but one of practice, convenience, and
expediency. ... Comity should be withheld only when its acceptance would be contrary or
prejudicial to the interest of the nation called upon to give it effect."); Harold G. Maier,
Symposium, "Could a Treaty Trump Supreme Court Jurisdictional Doctrine?"- A Hague
Conference Judgments Convention and United States Courts: A Problem and a Possibility,
61 ALB. L. REV. 1207, 1223-24 (1998) (explaining international concerns specific
jurisdiction must contemplate before determining whether to extend comity); Harold G.
Maier, Article, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between
Public and Private International Law, 76 A.J.I.L. 280, 282-83 (1982) (noting "[T]he laws
of one country can have no direct force in another country, yet nothing could be more
inconvenient to the commerce and general intercourse of nations than . . . transactions
valid by the law of one place ... rendered of no effect elsewhere owing to a difference in
law.").
394 See Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court for
the S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 554-55 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing for
generalized across-the-board assent to international comity by United States rather than
assent on case-by-case basis); Maier, supra note 393, at 1223-24 (positing "[E]nforcement
of a foreign country judgment results from the forum's unilateral choice of... either to
give effect to the local law of the foreign sovereign.., or to dismiss the case. There is
no... legal requirement that a forum give effect to the judgment of a foreign... [court].");
Ronald J. Silverman & Mark W. Deveno, Distressed Sovereign Debt: A Creditor's
Perspective, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 179, 189 (2003) (providing example of country's
ability to set its own standards under principle of comity for rejection of foreign
judgments as contrary to public policy).
395 See Finanz AG Zurich v. Banco Economico S.A., 192 F.3d 240, 246-50 (2nd Cir.
1999) (stating United States policy not to recognize foreign judgments that violate "the
laws or public policy of the United States" or lack "fundamental standards of procedural
fairness" and observing a foreign bankruptcy proceeding violates those principles);
Cunard S.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Services AB, 773 F.2d 452, 457 (2nd Cir. 1985) (stressing
comity will not be granted if foreign issuing court lacked proper jurisdiction or violated
principles of due process); Lauretta Drake, Stop the Madness! Procedural and Practical
Defenses to Avoid Inconsistent Cross-Border Judgments Between Texas and Mexico, 9 J.
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But, where there is no direct conflict, only a difference of
approach or opinion, comity will still have persuasive and
powerful effect in the enforcement of foreign judgments.396 As it
stands now, international litigation is quickly being reduced to a
multinational "game of chicken."397 Where one court enters a
judgment in direct opposition to or despite that of a foreign court,
comity suggests that one will back down; the who, when, and
why are matters of speculation at best.398 Add to that mix an ill-
conceived theory of reciprocity and you have one complicated
litigation environment.
Add to that environment the Mareva injunction and you have a
potentially combustible situation. Bowing to the twin gods of
reciprocity and comity, American courts run the risk of placing
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 209, 231-32 (1999) (discussing in depth United States' standards
for extending comity).
396 See Somportex, Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3rd
Cir. 1971) (affirming Supreme Court precedent that comity should be extended unless it
would be "contrary or prejudicial to the interest of the nation"); Christine Duh, III.
Cyberlaw: A. Internet Juridiction: 2. International: Yahoo! Inc. v. LICRA, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 359, 367-68 (2002) (asserting United States will extend comity so long as doing
so would not create direct conflict with constitutional, procedural or public policy
considerations); Stephen Karotkin & Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP, 19-5 ABIJ 24 (2000)
("[C]omity is a doctrine that encourages deference to foreign laws and judgments if macro
systemic concepts, such as due process and impartiality, are present in the foreign
proceedings.") (quoting In re lonica PLC, 241 B.R. 829, 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)).
397 See Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, [2003] EWCA Civ. 752 (2003). In that case, the
English court was made aware that application of an extraterritorial Mareva order over
assets in the United States was contrary to the public policy of the U.S., because no
American court had the power to issue such orders. Nevertheless, the English court left
the Mareva order in place with regard to American assets.
The same was not the case where the assets were in Turkey. The Turkish defendants had
secured an anti-suit injunction in Turkey, enjoining plaintiffs from enforcing the Mareva
order. The English Court of Appeal, considering the inability to enforce the High Court's
order abroad, deemed the Mareva order "inexpedient" over the Turkish defendants and
discharged the order against them! American defendants might heed this anti-suit
injunction approach should they feel the sting of a Mareva order in the future.
One other contextual point of Motorola is its use of the English remedy "in aid of foreign
proceedings." Motorola only resorted to English jurisdiction after being refused similar
relief in the United States. The English court recognized that this could potentially put
England in the role of "international policeman" yet did not shy away from such a role.
See generally Charles Hewetson & Simon Hart, Jurisdictional Disharmony and
Confusion: The Court of Appeal Looks at Worldwide Freezing Orders, Assets, and
Jurisdiction, J. OF INT'L BANKING L. AND REG., 18(11), 463-66 (2003).
398 See Spencer Weber Waller, A Unified Theory of Transnational Procedure, 26
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 101, 126 n.133 (1993) (outlining statutory approach intended to
ensure most applicable forum hears issue and receives full authority on its judgment
regarding that issue). See generally Robert C. Casad, Symposium, Issue Preclusion and
Foreign Country Judgments: Whose Law?, 70 IOWA L. REV. 53, 76-77 (1984) (explaining
problems of issue preclusion that arise when court recognizes foreign judgment); Jack L.
Goldsmith, Article, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617,
1634-36 (1997) (noting increase in civil lawsuits in United States courts involving foreign
parties and uncertainty of law surrounding such cases).
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their own citizens (and their assets) at risk, endorsing the
extraterritorial, exorbitant exercise of jurisdiction the Mareva
order represents. 399 What's worse is that they place their citizens
at risk in exchange for an enforcement of American judgments
abroad which is simply not happening and a measure of judicial
deference for the judgments of the American legal system which
foreign courts regularly refuse.400 Rather than reduce these pipe
dreams to statutory reality in frameworks like the UFMJRA,
especially where the Mareva procedure is involved, American
courts should dramatically reassess their approaches to
reciprocity and comity (and re-read Hilton).
2. The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgment Recognition Act
Framework
The CIBC decision explained the general UFMJRA approach in
place in at least 29 states.40 1 Where a foreign judgment is "final,
conclusive, and enforceable where rendered"402 an American
court will consider it "conclusive between the parties to the
extent that it grants or denies recovery of a sum of money."403
There are two mandatory exceptions. 404 First, where "the
399 See Mary A. Nation, Comment, Granting a Preliminary Injunction Freezing Assets
Not Part of the Pending Litigation: Abuse of Discretion Or an Important Advance in
Creditors' Rights?, 7 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 367, 401-04 (1999) (discussing three major
cases where Mareva order was applied and extent to which order froze money around
world); Theuer, supra note 293, at 426-38 (recognizing extraterritorial reach of Mareva
order and minimal showing required for its issuance). See generally Bermann, supra note
287, at 588-89 (analyzing jurisdictional questions stemming from United Kingdom case
that imposed Mareva order on highly tenuous jurisdictional grounds).
400 See Violeta I. Balan, Comment, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in the United States: The Need for Federal Legislation, 37 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 229, 236 (2003) (noting that most foreign countries still require reciprocity before
recognizing American judgments). See generally Dennis Campbell & Dharmendra Popat,
Enforcing Amercian Money Judgments in the United Kingdom and Germany, 18 S. ILL. U.
L. J. 517, 543 (1994) (noting that some German commentators argue that American
judgments should not be recognized)
401 See CIBC Mellon Trust Co. v. Mora Hotel Corp. 100 N.Y.2d 215, 221 n. 2 (2003)
(noting that District of Columbia has also adopted variation of the UFMJRA); Balan,
supra note 400, at 238 (citing table of jurisdictions where Act has been adopted); see also
Brian Richard Paige, Comment, Foreign Judgments in American and English Courts: A
Comparative Analysis, 26 SEATTLE UNIV. L. R. 591, 598 (2003) (explaining that UFMJRA
is majority approach to foreign judgment enforcement in US).
402 CIBC, 100 N.Y.2d at 221.
403 Id.
404 See Balan, supra note 400, at 239 (noting that section four of UFMJRA states
basis for non-recognition); Paige, supra note 401, at 602-03 (comparing grounds for non-
recognition under UFMJRA and Restatement [Third] of Foreign Relations Law); see also
Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement of Foreign Money-Judgments in the United States: In
Search of Uniformity and International Acceptance, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 266
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judgment was rendered under a system which does not provide
impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the
requirements of due process of law."405 Second, where the
"foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the
defendant."406 There are also seven discretionary exceptions 407
which the court did not discuss in its opinion in CIBC but a few
of which were raised by defendants 408 and are discussed further
below.
For all practical purposes, the UFMJRA approach ties the
court's hands when it comes to enforcing a judgment that
involves a Mareva injunction. 409 CIBC is an excellent example.
The courts of New York, a state with significant international
presence, has addressed cases involving Mareva injunctions
several times. Indeed, the Supreme Court's Grupo Mexicano
decision overruled a decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit,410 in which New York sits. New
York's Court of Appeals endorsed the Grupo Mexicano decision in
(1991) (explaining that if judgment is not recognized, matter litigated elsewhere will need
to be re-litigated in United States action).
405 CIBC, 100 N.Y.2d at 221-22 (emphasis added).
406 Id. at 222.
407 See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R., §5304(b) (2004). New York, when adopting the UFMJRA,
moved that basis for non-enforcement into its list of "discretionary" bases. New York's
discretionary bases, then, are as follows: 1) the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over
the subject matter; 2) the defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court did not receive
notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend; 3) the judgment was
obtained by fraud; 4) the cause of action on which the judgment is based is repugnant to
the policy of New York; 5) the judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive
judgment; 6) the judgment in the foreign country was contrary to an agreement between
the parties under which the dispute in question was to be settled otherwise than by
proceedings in that court; and 7) in the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service,
the foreign court was a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action. See
generally Chao & Neuhoff, supra note 362, at 151-52. Some of the "uniformity" of the
UFMJRA is lost with successive adoption by the various states, but remains fairly
consistent around the country).
408 See CIBC Mellon Trust Co. v. Mora Hotel Corp., N.V., 2002 WL 32173789, at *1,
*6-7 (Brief for Defendants-Appellants) (2002) (arguing that recognizing foreign award is
repugnant to public policy since facts are extreme and Appellants' punishment is
disproportionate to conduct in question).
409 See Jennifer M. Anglim, Crossroads in the Great Race: Moving Beyond the
International Race to Judgment in Disputes over Artwork and Other Chattels, 45 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 239, 254-5 (2004) (noting that mandatory exceptions to UFMJRA are rarely
invoked successfully); Chao & Neuhoff, supra note 362, at 150-51 (stating that under
UFMJRA, foreign judgments are presumptively enforceable unless reason for non-
enforcement is found); see also CIBC, 100 N.Y.2d at 222 (stating that defendant sued on
English judgment will rarely be in position to defeat it).
410 See Grupo Mexicano De Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund., 527 U.S. 308, 333
(1999) (finding that grant of injunction exceeded trial court's jurisdiction); Grupo
Mexicano De Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, 143 F.3d 688 (2d Cir. 1998).
MAREVA ORDERS
Credit Agricole Indosuez v. Rossiyskiy Kredit Bank,411 foreclosing
the ability of New York state courts from issuing preliminary
injunctions in aid of money claims.412 In doing so, they had a few
harsh words for the Mareva procedure:
The widespread use of [the worldwide Mareva injunction]
would drastically unbalance existing creditors' and debtors'
rights under the present Federal and State statutory and
decisional schemes, and substantially interfere with the
sovereignty and debtor/creditor! bankruptcy laws of, and the
rights of interested domiciliaries in, foreign countries. At the
very least, the availability of such a powerful, discretionary
provisional remedy, even when that discretion is exercised
by courts with caution and restraint, would introduce
uncertainty in results which the present [common law]
bright-line rule - more readily permitting investors
accurately to assess likely risks, and to adjust interest rates
accordingly - avoids. 413
In CIBC, the Court of Appeals, despite their concern over
Mareva orders, nonetheless enforced an English judgment
granted as a contempt sanction against two defendants who
refused to comply with the requirements of a Mareva order.414 By
converting the $330 million contempt judgment into a New York
judgment, the Court of Appeals created the largest ever award
for contempt of court in the history of American law - over $300
million more than the next highest one. 415
411 94 N.Y.2d 541 (2000).
412 See Credit Agricole, 94 N.Y.2d at 548-51 (noting that court will refuse injunctions
if convinced that money judgment is true object of action); Paul H. Aloe, Survey of New
York Law: Civil Practice, 51 SYRACUSE L. REv. 247, 268 (2001) (stating that "it has long
been the law that a preliminary injunction is not available where the claimant seeks only
money damages"); see also Traffix, Inc. v. Talk.com Holding Corp., No. 00 Civ. 9802
(AKH), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1200, at *6 (S.D.N.Y Feb. 13, 2001) (asserting that court
cannot grant preliminary injunction where underlying proceeding is simply action for
money damages pursuant to contract).
413 Credit Agricole, 94 N.Y.2d at 551.
414 See CIBC, 100 N.Y.2d at 222-26 (noting that use of such an order, standing alone,
does not render entire English system incompatible with due process).
415 See CIBC Mellon Trust Co. v. Mora Hotel Corp., N.V., 2002 WL 32173789, at *1,
*69 (Brief for Defendants-Appellants) (2002) (stating research indicated next largest
contempt sanction in United States was $18 million in Meissner v. Wal-Mart, Case No.
A159,432 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Jefferson Co.) (Mehaffy, J.)). But cf. CIBC Mellon Trust Co. v.
Mora Hotel Corp., N.V., 2003 WL 22299457, at *1, *67-68 (Brief for Plaintiffs-
Respondents) (2003) (arguing that judgments entered against appellants were not
contempt sanctions, but instead default judgments on plaintiffs' substantive claim). See
generally CIBC, 100 N.Y.2d at 222 (commenting that "New York has traditionally been a
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Given their hesitation with the Mareva procedure, what
explains this shocking result? The UFMJRA. Neither
mandatory exception allowed the New York court to refuse
enforcement or countenanced the peculiar situation presented by
the CIBC defendants and the Mareva injunction. 416 The first
exception - the system compatible with due process exception -
cannot even be seriously argued without rebuke by a reviewing
court.417 England, after all, does have a system which provides
for due process, a system on which the American one is based.418
Note, too, that due process must simply be available, not
necessarily available as it exists in the United States.419 One
Court of Appeals judge described it as follows: "Any suggestion
that [England's] system of courts 'does not provide impartial
tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due
process of law' borders on the risible."420 Judge Read, in CIBC,
added, "the relevant inquiry under [the UFMJRA] is the overall
fairness of England's legal 'system,' which is beyond dispute."421
generous forum in which to enforce judgments for money damages rendered by foreign
courts").
416 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §5304 (2004), which statutorily mandates certain exceptions..
See CIBC, 100 N.Y.2d at 221-26, which rejected the defendants' arguments that New
York's mandatory exceptions should apply to the case at bar. It is not at all surprising
that the UFMJRA did not anticipate the need to address such a remedy as the Mareva
injunction. After all, the Mareva injunction did not even exist - and had been consistently
refused for centuries - when the UFMJRA was adopted in 1970. See generally PART V.C.
for further discussion.
417 See CIBC, 100 N.Y 2d at 222 (asserting that N.Y. C.P.L.R. §5304 (a)(1) does not
demand that foreign tribunal's procedures exactly match those of New York as long as the
foreign court's procedures are "compatible with the requirements of due process of law");
Anglim, supra note 409, at 254 (stating that "most foreign fora satisfy minimum due
process standards, so challenges to foreign judgments based on differences in foreign
courts' procedures usually fail"); see also Brand, supra note 404, at 271 (suggesting that
most United States courts considering foreign judgments have found foreign procedures
in compliance with United States due process requirements).
418 See CIBC, 100 N.Y.2d at 222 (noting that American jurisprudence is based on
England's); see also Society of Lloyd's v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 476 (7th Cir. 2000)
(stating that England's courts are fair and neutral and provide procedures compatible
with requirements of due process of law). See generally Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S.
114, 123 (1889) (explaining that American due process originates in English law).
419 See Guinness PLC v. Thomas Joseph Ward, 955 F.2d 875, 900 (4th Cir. 1992)
(summarizing that foreign procedures need not be identical to due process procedures in
American courts); see also Ingersoll Milling Machine Co. v. John P. Granger, 833 F.2d
680, 687-88 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that similarity of foreign procedures is irrelevant, and
only 'basic fairness' of procedures is at issue); see also Society of Lloyd's v. Ashenden, 233
F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that UFMJRA requires only "fundamentally fair"
foreign procedures akin to "international concept of due process").
420 Society of Lloyd's, 233 F.3d at 476 (positing that English system of courts are just
and impartial).
421 CIBC, 100 N.Y.2d at 222 (acknowledging that English High Court gave ample
opportunity to present defense).
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More importantly, the use of a questionable procedure - like the
Mareva injunction - "does not render the English system as a
whole incompatible with our notions of due process."422 In
dismissing the applicability of this exception, he concluded that a
defendant would rarely be in a position to defeat an English
judgment under this exception. 423
The second possible exception - lack of personal jurisdiction -
is also implicated by the procedural history of CIBC, the facts of
which are not unusual, but provide a worthwhile cautionary tale.
In CIBC, two defendants with assets in the United States were
made subject to a Mareva order in a conspiracy to defraud
case.424 They were notified by the plaintiffs of the order over nine
months after the initial ex parte grant of the Mareva order.425 In
England, the defendants challenged the personal jurisdiction of
the English court over them - and its power to issue such an
injunction.426 They were denied, and eventually exhausted their
appeals through the House of Lords without success. 427 While
they pursued their appeals through the English system, they
elected to refuse compliance with the Mareva order, apparently
on the advice of English counsel. 428 After a few stern warnings
and subsequent "unless" orders,429 the English High Court found
the defendants in contempt of court and issued judgment for
plaintiffs as a sanction in the amount requested for the entire
422 Id. at 222 (noting validity of English law despite "potential commercial
disruption" of Mareva orders).
423 UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENT RECOGNITION ACT § 4 comment, 13 U.L.A. 59
(1986) ("A mere difference in the procedural system is not a sufficient basis for non-
recognition. A case of serious injustice must be involved."); see also Guinness, 955 F.2d at
900 (noting that foreign tribunal's procedures need not be identical to those used in
United States); CIBC, 100 N.Y.2d at 222 (noting that statute is satisfied so long as
England's procedures were congruent with U.S. notion of due process).
424 See CIBC, 100 N.Y.2d at 218-19 (suggesting that plaintiffs were "duped" into
making fraudulent investments.)
425 See id. at 218-19 (noting that legal proceedings were commenced in May 1996 and
defendants were notified of Mareva order in March 1997).
426 Id. at 219 (arguing that necessary defendant was not domiciled in England at
critical time).
427 Id. at 219 (noting that three separate courts rejected defendants' arguments).
428 See id. at 219-20 (specifying that Mareva order related to tracing claim).
429 See id. at 220 (noting that defendants ignored several warnings). The New York
court called them "unless" orders. They might better be described as ultimatums. In
essence, the English court issued these to the defendant warning them that failure to
comply would result in their being debarred from defending the suit on the merits in
England. Such a sanction is obviously a harsh one and it is at least refreshing to see that
the English court took the step of issuing the "unless" orders before finding the
defendants in contempt, a step it is not required to take.
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case, not merely the two defendants at issue.430 Plaintiffs then
commenced an enforcement action in New York's Supreme
Court431 which granted plaintiffs summary judgment and
appointed a receiver to sell the defendants' assets,432 a decision
the defendants appealed unsuccessfully to New York's Appellate
Division.433 Next they appealed to the New York Court of
Appeals, the decision discussed here.434 Defendants further
countered by moving to set aside the judgment of the High Court
in England,435 at which point plaintiffs moved to have the
defendants' appeal dismissed in New York pursuant to the
UFMJRA. Specifically, they relied on the inapplicability of the
second exception.436
Plaintiffs contended, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that
defendants' attempts to set aside the English High Court's
decision constituted an "appearance" in the English court, which
went beyond merely challenging personal jurisdiction. 437 The
wording of the personal jurisdiction exception is particularly
important. It states that foreign country judgment will be
refused for lack of personal jurisdiction if "the defendant
voluntarily appeared in the proceedings, other than for the
purpose of protecting property seized or threatened with seizure
in the proceedings or of contesting the jurisdiction of the court
over him."438 Recall that a Mareva order acts in personam4 39 and
so technically does not qualify as a procedure that "seizes" any
assets.
430 See id. at 220 (stating that Feb. 1999 default judgment of $600,000 was increased
to $330 million after Dec. 1999 default judgment).
431 See supra, note 369 (regarding New York's peculiarly named courts).
432 See CIBC, 100 N.Y.2d at 220 (noting that Gorham Hotel was attached and sold in
satisfaction of judgment).
433 Id. at 220 (noting judgment on May 28th, 2002).
434 Id. at 220 (reiterating issues on appeal regarding defendants' due process rights).
435 Id. at 221 (noting Court's dismissal of defendants' application).
436 See id. at 221 (explaining plaintiffs' argument that defendants' applications to
High Court "mooted" their constitutional claim).
437 See id. at 223-25 (concluding that defendants 'voluntarily appeared' in English
proceeding by doing more than necessary to contest jurisdiction).
438 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5305(a)(2) (1997) (necessitating finding that defendant who
appears and contests merits has submitted to jurisdiction of court).
439 See supra, PART IV.A (noting absurdities of application of in personam jurisdiction
in these cases); see also Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 838 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting
proper standard to apply when evaluating whether country had obtained in personam
jurisdiction); CIBC, 100 N.Y.2d at 223 (noting that Mareva order acts in personam);.
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The underlying theory is that a defendant who seeks to make
arguments in a foreign jurisdiction beyond those relating solely
to contesting personal jurisdiction is, in fact, submitting to that
jurisdiction's authority and will waive any right thereafter to
claim the foreign court lacked jurisdiction in an enforcement
action.440 Judge Read summarized the law as follows: "If the
judgment debtor did any more than she had to do, however, to
preserve her jurisdictional objection in the foreign court, she
would thereby have submitted voluntarily to its jurisdiction and
forfeited the right to claim an exception under [the UFMJRA]."441
When the CIBC defendants made the motion to set aside the
default judgment, they raised a "question as to the merits" 442
and, in doing so, did more than they "had to do" - a tricky
standard at best.
Given the existing English precedent, 443 the CIBC defendants'
decision to refuse to comply with the Mareva order - while
entirely consistent with their lack of personal jurisdiction
argument 444 - was not wise. Given the statutory requirements of
440 See CIBC, 100 N.Y.2d at 225 (noting voluminous materials defendants brought
before judge while contesting merits and attempting to set aside judgment of English
court); see also S.C. Chimexim S.A. v. Velco Enters. Ltd., 36 F. Supp. 2d 206, 215
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding that since defendants appeared to contest merits, even though
they raised jurisdictional issues as well, jurisdictional issues were waived because
defendants voluntarily appeared); Nippon Emo-Trans Co., Ltd. v. Emo-Trans, Inc., 744 F.
Supp. 1215, 1222-26 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding that defendant's appearance to contest on
merits after losing jurisdictional challenge was voluntary appearance, and thus
jurisdictional issues were waived).
441 See CIBC, 100 N.Y.2d at 223 (quoting Siegel, David D., Practice Commentaries,
N.Y. C.P.L.R. §C5305:1 (1997)) (noting that voluntary appearance constitutes anything
above and beyond an appearance solely to contest jurisdiction).
442 See id. at 224-26 (quoting Nippon, 744 F. Supp. at 1222-26) (noting that in
applying to contest on merits and set aside judgment defendants did more than raise
mere jurisdictional challenge).
443 See Grupo Torras SA v. Sheikh Fahad Mohammed Al-Sabah, Court of Appeal
(Civil Div.), Hearing Transcript, Feb. 16, 1994 (noting defendant, while under Mareva
order, must disclose his assets while jurisdictional arguments were pending as opposed to
after); see also Society of Lords v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 2000) (according
almost absolute deference to English decisions such that court practically declares any
argument about due process concerns in English justice system to be absurd); CIBC, 100
N.Y.2d at 222 (noting strong deference that United States courts accord to English
judgments).
444 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §5304 (1997) (noting that basis for non-recognition of foreign
money judgment is lack of personal jurisdiction); CIBC, 100 N.Y.2d at 219-20 (noting that
defendant refused to comply with Mareva order while it was contesting court's
jurisdiction); see also Credit Corp. v. Uzan, [2003] EWCA Civ. 752 (2003) (providing
example of similarly situated defendants that similarly refused to comply with Mareva
order in light of their position that court had failed to establish personal jurisdiction over
them).
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UFMJRA in the United States, that miscalculation was
compounded greatly.445
But consider a hypothetical American defendant who is issued
a Mareva order, freezing his assets. While contesting personal
jurisdiction, the defendant attempts to apply for a discharge or
variation of the Mareva order to allow him to avoid some of the
oppressive nature of the device. Would this be considered doing
"more than he had to do" for the purposes of a later enforcement
action under UFMJRA? Aren't discharge applications, after all,
highly fact-sensitive, and don't they include the distinct
possibility of reaching something approaching the merits of the
case? Does not the defendant's argument rest primarily on
defeating the ex parte evidence of the plaintiff which, in turn,
usually requires him to produce evidence of his business
practices, reputation, and credit-worthiness to attack the "risk of
default" ground for issuing the Mareva injunction? Or, say, he
places at the court's disposal security sufficient to indemnify
plaintiffs claim and discharge the Mareva order. Would this act
itself frustrate any future personal jurisdiction argument in a
subsequent action? Under the existing UFMJRA framework, the
answer to all of these questions is probably "yes"
As mentioned above, there are seven bases on which an
argument for non-enforcement might be raised, i.e., grounds on
which a reviewing court "need not" enforce the foreign
judgment.446 Given the pervasiveness of New York's "generous
forum" philosophy, the likelihood of success with resort to these
discretionary exceptions is slim. 447 More problematic is that, in a
standard Mareva situation, five of the seven are largely
445 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §5305(a)(2) (1997) (stating that defendant who voluntarily
appears in proceeding may not challenge jurisdiction); CIBC, 100 N.Y.2d at 221 n.2
(noting that as of 2003, 29 states and District of Columbia had also adopted UFMJRA).
See generally N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 5401-5409 (1997) (codifying UFMJRA into New York law).
446 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §5304 (1997) (listing non-exclusive grounds on which foreign
judgments might not be enforced); see also CIBC, 100 N.Y.2d at 221-22 (noting that
despite these bases New York has traditionally been generous in enforcing foreign
judgments); Greschler v. Greschler, 51 N.Y.2d 368, 376 (1980) (explaining doctrine of
comity and New York's general willingness to enforce foreign judgments).
447 See CIBC, 100 N.Y.2d at 221 (noting that New York has historically been
generous in recognizing foreign money judgments); see also Greschler, 51 N.Y.2d at 376
(1980) (explaining doctrine of comity and New York's general willingness to enforce
foreign judgments); Lazier v. Westcott, 26 N.Y. 146, 148 (1862) (providing early example
of New York's willingness to accept foreign country judgments as conclusive evidence).
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inapplicable44 8 and the remaining two are tenuous at best.449 The
CIBC defendants attempted to raise the "repugnant to the public
policy of this state" exception in their brief to the Court of
Appeals in New York. 450 Without comment, the Court of Appeals
refused to entertain that argument in its decision.451 Like the
personal jurisdiction exception, the public policy exception's
specific wording makes it particularly slippery. It states that it
must be the "cause of action"452 on which the foreign judgment is
based that violates state public policy.453 The underlying causes
of action in CIBC were for fraud and conspiracy to defraud,
certainly commonplace in the courts of New York. 454 Most
448 The first one, subject matter jurisdiction, is probably not satisfied by the mere
exercise of jurisdiction by the English court which will have made an affirmative
determination as to this basis as a matter of course. The second one, adequate notice -
while intriguing in the Mareva context - discusses notice which allows for a defendant to
defend the proceeding. While that notice may be delayed following application of a
Mareva order, the defendant does have the right to both challenge the Mareva order itself
and the case on the merits. The fraud exception will be based on the facts of particular
cases. The two others, similarly - conflict with another final judgment and forum
selection - are fact-sensitive and meant to effectuate the will of the parties and to avoid
duplicative litigation, concepts not direcly implicated in the standard Mareva context. See
also N.Y. C.P.L.R. §5304 (1997).
449 See Piper Aircraft v. Reno, 454 U.S. 235, 257-61 (1981) (noting that for court to
find a foreign country inconvenient forum, several factors must be balanced; there is no
clear bright line test); Ackermann, 788 F.3d at 841 (positing that defendants that seek a
finding that judgment is unenforceable because it is repugnant to state public policy must
meet high standard); N.Y. C.P.L.R. §5304 (1997).
450 See CIBC Mellon Trust Co. v. Mora Hotel Corp., N.V., 2002 WL 32173789, at *1,
*56 (Brief for Defendants-Appellants) (2002) (noting N.Y. C.P.L.R. §5304(b)(4) gives New
York courts discretion to refuse recognition of foreign judgment where underlying cause of
action is repugnant to significant public policy in New York); see also Hilton, 159 U.S. at
193 (reinforcing notion that doctrine of comity forbids recognition of judgments which are
violative of public policy of state). But see Ackermann, 788 F.2d at 841 (finding that
standard to hold judgment unenforceable as repugnant to New York's public policy is high
standard that will not be frequently met).
451 See CIBC, 100 N.Y.2d at 223 (mentioning public policy exception argument only in
summary of appellants' and respondents' arguments, but not commenting on it); CIBC
Mellon Trust Co. v. Mora Hotel Corp., N.V., 2002 WL 32173789, at *1, *57 (Brief for
Defendants-Appellants) (2002) (stating that Appellate Division effectively held in opinion
below that public policy argument was not properly preserved for appeal because it was
not raised at trial). See generally Ackermann, 788 F.3d at 841 (positing that judgment of
English court is practically beyond reproach from argument based on public policy).
452 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §5304(b) (outlining bases to refuse recognition of foreign
judgment).
453 See CIBC Mellon Trust Co. v. Mora Hotel Corp., N.V., 2002 WL 32173789, at *1,
*56 (Brief for Defendants-Appellants) (2002) (noting N.Y. C.P.L.R. §5304(b)(4) gives New
York courts discretion to refuse recognition of foreign judgment if underlying cause of
action is repugnant to New York's public policy); Hilton, 159 U.S. at 193 (stating that
doctrine of comity forbids recognition of judgments that are violative of state's public
policy). But see Ackermann, 788 F.2d at 841 (positing high standard to meet to obtain
finding that judgment is unenforceable as repugnant to New York's public policy).
454 See Grupo Mexicano de Sarrollo S.A. v. Alliance, 527 U.S. 308, 310-42 (1999)
(explaining applicability of Mareva orders); CIBC, 100 N.Y.2d at 218-19 (noting
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Mareva orders are utilized in a commercial setting, in causes of
action which are familiar to New York courts and courts around
the world.455 That the Mareva order itself may implicate the
public policy of New York is immaterial under this exception.
The only other discretionary exception which might apply is
the "inconvenient forum" exception.456 Under the UFMJRA (and
New York's C.P.L.R., §5304),457 a court need not enforce a foreign
judgment where "in the case of jurisdiction based only on
personal service, the foreign court was a seriously inconvenient
forum for the trial of the action."458 Such a forum non conveniens
argument may have some effect where the defendants are
relatively unsophisticated parties with little or no contact in
England.459 Forum non conveniens analysis, however, is far from
uniform, is subject to significant balancing of interests (including
those of the plaintiff in England)460 and, as such, represents a
underlying cause of action and facts); Credit Agricole Indosuez Rossiyskiy Kredit Bank,
94 N.Y.2d 541 (2000) (noting that Mareva orders are most utilized in cases involving
crimes in commercial settings).
455 See Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 331-32 (explicating arguments against use of
Mareva injunctions because of effect it would have on debtor - creditor law); CIBC, 100
N.Y.2d at 222 (noting court's concern for potential of Mareva orders to disrupt commercial
activity due to order's power); Credit Agricole Indosuez v. Rossiyskiy Kredit Bank, 94
N.Y.2d 541, 544 (2000) (noting that widespread use of Mareva injunctions would have
subsequent profound effect on international commerce).
456 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §5304 (b)(7) (1997) (providing for forum non conveniens
argument); see also CIBC, 100 N.Y.2d at 221 (noting that defendant seeking to set aside
English judgment bears high burden). See generally, Piper Aircraft v. Reno, 454 U.S. 235,
257-61 (enunciating ever-changing balancing test necessary to decide whether forum is
inconvenient).
457 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §5304 (2004) (codifying grounds under which foreign judgments
may be rejected by New York courts).
458 See id. (also encompassing due process and personal jurisdiction concerns).
459 See XR Co. v. Block & Balestri, P.C., 44 F.Supp.2d 1296, 1300 (S.D. Fla.'1999)
(illustrating sophistication of person requesting change in forum is just one consideration
in forum non conveniens decision, noting that moving defendant was not so
unsophisticated as to not understand contractual forum clause); see also Citibank v.
Collins, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4919, *4 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). See generally Friedrich K.
Juenger, The Internalization of Law and Legal Practice: Forum Shopping, Domestic and
International, 63 TUL. L. REV. 553, 565 (1989) (alluding to plaintiffs who find Mareva
injunctions particularly appealing because they are useful in disputes between people of
different nations. Thus, they have been used as method of preying on an opponent's lack
of sophistication).
460 See Jeffrey M. Eilender, Forum Non Conueniens and Comprehensive Hazardous
Waste Coverage Suits, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1066, 1080 (1990) (stating that some courts will
consider, "as a public factor, a concern for the convenience of other courts across the
country in not expending resources on a case that one court could have heard
comprehensively"); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Standing to Allege Violations of the Doctrine of
Specialty: An Examination of the Relationship between the Individual and the Sovereign,
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1187, 1211 (1995) (noting that deciding inconvenience involves
examining characteristics of foreign governments). See generally Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S.
at 257-61 (analyzing public and private interest factors when considering grant of forum
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somewhat risky approach. First, the exception is a discretionary
one. Even were the judge to determine the English forum to be
seriously inconvenient, it is within her discretion to nevertheless
enforce the judgment.461
Second, the comity "game of chicken" problem comes into play.
The English court has exercised jurisdiction under what it
considered to be proper grounds. England recognizes the
principle of forum non conveniens and its decision to assume
jurisdiction over the defendant implies that it has made a
decision that the forum is an appropriate one, or at least not an
unreasonably inconvenient one.462 A reviewing court that refuses
to enforce the English judgment on forum non conveniens
grounds stands as a direct obstacle to what the English court
considers its pursuit of justice between the parties.463 At that
point, international comity and respect for the judicial
proceedings of other nations is implicated. 464
non conveniens dismissal, noting foreign plaintiffs have "local interest in having localized
controversies decided at home").
461 See Douglas W. Dunham & Eric F. Gladbach, Forum Non Conveniens and Foreign
Plaintiffs in the 1990's, 24 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 665, 667 (1999) (noting that discretionary
features of forum non conveniens doctrine make uniformity "impossible"); see also Helen
E. Mardirosian, Recent Development, Federal Jurisdiction and Forum Selection: Forum
Non Conveniens, 37 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1643, 1663 (2004) (positing that dismissal under
forum non conveniens is catastrophic); Spencer Weber Waller, A Unified Theory of
Transnational Procedure, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 101, 112 (1993) (stating that forum non
conveniens decisions are reviewable for abuse of discretion only).
462 See Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd. (The Spiliada), [1986] 3 W.L.R. 972,
985 (H.L.) (holding that "appropriate" forums promote parties' interests in justice); see
also Richard G. Fentiman, Jurisdiction, Discretion and the Brussels Convention, 26
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 59, 72 (1993) (noting that "appropriate forum" can also mean "natural
forum"); Alexander Reus, Judicial Discretion: A Comparative View of the Doctrine of
Forum Non Conveniens in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany, 16 LOY.
L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 455, 478 (1994) (stating that England has been moving toward
"most suitable forum" approach to forum non conveniens matters).
463 See Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230, 237 (Md. 1997) (holding that certain
foreign judgments can be refused enforcement in United States if they are incompatible
with United States public policy); Falcon Mfg. v. Ames, 278 N.Y.S.2d 684, 687-88 (N.Y.
County Civ. Ct. 1967) (holding that foreign judgments cannot "contravene" public policy);
see e.g., Michael Traynor, Conflict of Laws, Comparative Law, and the American Law
Institute, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 391, 396 (2001) (noting that some United States courts have
refused to enforce foreign defamation judgments, sometimes on First Amendment
grounds).
464 In this author's view, that is rightly so. Comity should not be used as a sword to
push through judgments based on exorbitant jurisdiction. That a foreign court might rely
on the "generous" nature of enforcing American courts, even where it exercises authority
beyond its jurisdiction, has already implicated the principle of comity. When a reviewing
court uses comity as a shield, it is within its purview to do so, to fend off such outrageous
exercises of jurisdiction. This thinking was used in Somportex, Ltd. v. Philadelphia
Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3rd Cir. 1971), which held that "[a]lthough more
than mere courtesy and accommodation, comity does not achieve the force of an
imperative or obligation." Comity can have dangerous consequences, such as denying
762 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 19:3
Finally, and where the CIBC defendants likely lost all chance
with this exception, any resort to the English courts indicates
that the English forum may not be "seriously inconvenient" at
all.4 65  Whether a discharge application to unshackle the
defendant from the Mareva order will nullify this exception is an
issue that has not been addressed in the courts.466 Likely, the
securing of English counsel and the production of evidence to
negate the plaintiffs showing in a discharge proceeding may
demonstrate enough contact to make this exception functionally
impossible to rely on. 467
In this light, then, the defendant is faced with a Hobson's
Choice:468 defend on the merits in England or challenge the
litigants' interests in favor of national ones. See Mladen Don Kresic, Note, The
Inconvenient Forum and International Comity in Private Antitrust Actions, 52 FORDHAM
L. REV. 399, 418 (1983). Thus, some courts decide the comity question only after they have
decided the subject matter jurisdiction question. E.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v.
Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1291-92 (3rd Cir. 1979).
465 The CIBC defendants had secured assistance of English counsel (who proved to be
of questionable "assistance") and instituted a number of appeals in the English courts
prior to raising the "inconvenient forum" argument in New York. In all likelihood, the
New York court was not impressed with the CIBC defendants' ability to litigate in
England everything but the merits of their case. The New York Court of Appeals quoted
Society of Lloyd's v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 476 (7th Cir. 2000) when it stated that to
charge that English courts do not "provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible
with the requirements of due process of law borders on the risible." CIBC Mellon Trust v.
Mora Hotel Corp. N.V., 100 N.Y.2d, 215, 222 (2003). The court also cited Guinness PLC v.
Ward, 955 F.2d 875, 900 (4th Cir. 1992) when it noted that the enforcement of a Mareva
injunction does not deny the defendant his due process rights. CIBC, 100 N.Y.2d, at 222.
466 See John F. Carella, Of Foreign Plaintiffs and Proper Fora: Forum Non
Conveniens and ATCA Class Actions, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 717, 730 (2003) (pointing out
courts have said that doctrine of forum non conveniens is not implicated when foreign
matter at hand is not United States interest, specifically under Alien Tort Statute.); cf.
Mardirosian, supra note 461, at 1683 (noting forum non conveniens argument can still be
used if defendant "fully satisfies her burden by showing that both an adequate alternative
forum is available and the convenience factors strongly favor dismissal." ). But see Aric K.
Short, Is the Alien Tort Statute Sacrosanct? Retaining Forum Non Conveniens in Human
Rights Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1001, 1046 (2001) (pointing to only few
cases brought under Alien Tort Statute that have been dismissed on forum non
conveniens grounds).
467 See N.Y. C.P.L.R §5305(a)(2) (2004) (stating foreign judgments will most likely not
be nullified if defendants voluntary appear in foreign courts); CIBC, 100 N.Y.2d at 222
(noting that personal jurisdiction objections are foreclosed when defendants do anything
beyond appearing to contest personal jurisdiction); see also S.C. Chimexim S.A. v. Velco
Enters. Ltd., 36 F.Supp.2d 206, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that defendant appeared
voluntarily when he argued merits after judgment had been handed down).
468 A Hobson's Choice is "an apparently free choice where there is no real
alternative." Merriam Webster Online Dictionary, at http://www.merriamwebster.com/cgi-
bin/dictionary?va=Hobson's. "Tobias Hobson was a carrier and innkeeper at
Cambridge.... He kept a stable of forty good cattle, always ready and fit for traveling;
but when a man came for a horse he was led into the stable, where there was great choice,
but was obliged to take the horse which stood nearest to the stable-door; so that every
customer was alike well served, according to his chance, and every horse ridden with the
same justice." See Historical and Genealogical Notes, at http://ftp.rootsweb.comlpubl
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judgment nowhere. That a potential defendant may not have the
means to defend in England exacerbates the problem. 469
Likewise, when taken together, the UFMJRA, CIBC, and Credit
Agricole stand for the precarious proposition that New York can
prevent its own courts from issuing Mareva-type remedies
against New York defendants but is powerless to stop English
courts from doing the same with Mareva orders.470 This is a
dangerous position to occupy given the expanding use of the
procedure, the risk that plaintiffs could use this procedure
strategically to stifle American competition, 471 and the likely
usgenweb/valschools/wmmary/notesOO07.txt (last visited Apr. 6, 2005). A Hobson's Choice
is similar to a Morton's Fork, where one has two choices, but each one is equally bad.
Hobson's Choice, at http://c2.comlcgi/wiki?HobsonsChoice (last visited Apr. 6, 2005).
469 See Jennifer M. Anglim, Crossroads in the Great Race: Moving Beyond the
International Race to Judgment in Disputes over Artwork and Other Chattels, 45 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 239, 270-71 (2004) (stating that main purpose of forum non conveniens doctrine
is that forum be convenient, which includes ready availability of witnesses and
documentation); see also Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255-56 (1981) (arguing
that when foreign persons are involved, their forum choices are less reasonable); Friedrich
K. Juenger, The Internationalization of Law and Legal Practice: Forum Shopping,
Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L. REV. 553, 565 (1989) (arguing that foreign
plaintiffs should not receive great deference in regards to forum non conveniens
arguments).
470 See Credit Agricole Indosuez v. Rossiyskiy Kredit Bank, 729 N.E.2d 683, 688 (N.Y.
2000) (implying that Mareva-type relief should be left to legislatures), CIBC, 100 N.Y.2d
at 161 (holding that standards used to determine whether jurisdiction is preserved can
adjust in Mareva situations, but Mareva orders are still not permitted in New York). But
see Paul H. Aloe, 2002-2003 Survey of New York Law: Civil Practice, 54 SYR L. REV. 825,
850 (2004) (noting that Mareva orders, though not recognized by New York, are not
"repugnant to New York public policy").
471 One underhanded tactic is for plaintiffs to secure Mareva orders, not for the
assistance in seeking a claim, but for the shackling effects they have on defendants'
ability to conduct business. This is done by pursuing the claim slowly or not at all without
informing the court of their intention to later abandon the suit. See Maurice Sheridan,
Procedure: Abuse of Process of the Mareva Injunction, J. OF INT'L BANKING L., 1989, at
N237.
An egregious case of such use of the Mareva injunction occurred in the case of Daisystar,
Ltd. v. Town and Country Bldg. Soc., TIMES, Oct. 16, 1989 (CA). In Daisystar, a
defendant was able to convince the Court of Appeal to discharge a Mareva order and, in
the process, declare the granting judge's choice to maintain the order over the vigorous
protests of the defendant as "plainly wrong." Judge Dillon, in Daisystar, was particularly
concerned with the possibility that a party could secure a Mareva order, then sit back and
rest on the protections it afforded without diligently prosecuting the case. In effect, the
party was using the Mareva as an "end," rather than merely a "means." Calling any
Mareva order "essentially oppressive," he stated, "where a party has obtained a Mareva
injunction, that party is bound to get on with the trial of the action - not to rest content
with the injunction. The injunction is merely ancillary to the trial of the action to hold the
position until the action comes on for trial." Id. at 3. This sentiment was echoed by Judge
Farquarson in his opinion. Id. at 7. Judge Dillon, (quoting Lloyds Bowmaker Ltd. v.
Britannia Arrow Holdings, [1988] 3 All E.R. 178 (CA (Civ. Div.)), stated,
In other words, a plaintiff who succeeds in obtaining a Mareva injunction is in my
view under an obligation to press on with his action as rapidly as he can so that if he
should fail to establish liability in the defendant the disadvantage which the
injunction imposes upon the defendant will be lessened so far as possible.
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further expansion of the Mareva procedure into areas of public
law, such as antitrust, patent, and securities regulation. 472 PART
V suggests some possible solutions.
V. SOLVING THE MAREVA PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES
4 7 3
A. Attempting Diplomacy
One logical approach, it seems, would be to mobilize the
diplomatic corps of Great Britain and the United States to
hammer out some sort of agreement with regard to the Mareva
procedure. The nations are close allies and share a "special
relationship"474 which one would assume could be brought to
bear in this type of situation. Two potential stumbling blocks to
effecting such a bilateral convention, however, make this solution
unlikely. One involves the lack of precedent; the other a lack of
incentive. 47 5
Id. at 3. In Lloyd's Bowmaker, Judge Dillon states that there should be full disclosure "to
the court on the part of the applicant." Lloyd's Bowmaker, [1988] 3 All E.R. at 186.
472 In Pantell (No. 1) Mareva Injunctions: Isolated Incursions into the Field of Public
Law or Part of a Strategic Plan, J. OF Bus. L., Jan. 1994, at 18-27, Dennis Crighton
outlines the implications of Lord Browne-Wilkinson's decision in Securities and
Investments Bd. v. Pantell (No. 1), [1989] 2 All E.R. 673 (Ch.D), which allowed for the use
of the Mareva injunction in aid of a cause of action created by a securities statute - a
statute which, incidentally also carries criminal provisions and penalties). In Pantell (No.
1), Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated,
Parliament, by giving the Secretary of State (that is to say the SIB) a statutory cause
of action, has invested the Secretary of State and the SIB with the necessary locus
standi to apply for relief. In my judgment the court has the incidental powers,
including the power to grant Mareva relief, necessary to prevent such statutory right
of action being rendered abortive by the dissipation of assets.
Id. at 677 n.9. In addition, Germany has begun to use Mareva-like injunctions "to prevent
the movement of assets out of the jurisdiction" in patent infringement cases. See Larry
Coury, C'est What? Saisie! A Comparison of Patent Infringement Remedies Among the G7
Economic Nations, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1101, 1135 (2003).
473 Attempting to find solutions to the problems of the Mareva procedure is, by no
means, limited to the foreign jurisdictions subject to it. See generally Taylor, supra note 2
(discussing potential reforms of procedure in England to alleviate some of harshness of
Mareva "relief").
474 Use of the phrase "special relationship" dates back to at least World War II and
the alliance between President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston
Churchill. See Warren Hoge, The Struggle for Iraq: The Ally - Of Blair and Bush, and the
Ties that Bind, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2003, at Al. More recently, President Bush and
Prime Minister Blair have made numerous references to the "special relationship" in
recent speeches to describe the "affairs of the two countries." Dana Milbank & Steven
Mufson, Blair Reassures Bush on Europe Defense Force, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 2001, at Al.
475 For example, a uniform system of temporary relief in arbitration situations is
especially difficult because precedent even within the United States is fairly varied and
inconsistent. See William Wang, Note, International Arbitration: The Need For Uniform
2005] MAREVA ORDERS
First, the United States and Great Britain have never
managed to come to any general agreement as to the enforcement
of judgments, either as part of a bilateral or multilateral
treaty. 476 Any such effort would be breaking new ground rather
than treading on well-worn terrain.477 In fact, the United States
as a general matter is party to very few mutual cooperation
agreements with other countries, and where it is, the agreement
is usually limited and subject-specific.4 78 The U.S. legal system
itself - especially its liberal discovery and more liberal damages -
presents difficulties of assent, to say the least, in other
countries.479 Such a treaty only about Mareva injunctions is
Interim Measures of Relief, 28 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 1059, 1081 (2003). In addition, the
Supreme Court has issued rulings that add difficulty to jurisdictional issues, such as
accepting jurisdiction in foreign nations for lawsuits only if other continuous business has
been performed in that nation. See Russell J. Weintraub, How Substantial is Our Need for
a Judgments Recognition Convention and What Should We Bargain Away to Get It?, 24
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 167, 187 (1998). However, certain instances do demonstrate that the
United States can accept foreign judgments even if foreign procedures are inconsistent
from our own, such as differing notice requirements. See Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862,
867-68 (D.C. Cir 1981); Alan Reed, A New Model of Jurisdictional Property for Anglo-
American Foreign Judgment Recognition and Enforcement: Something Old, Something
Borrowed, Something New?, 25 LOY. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 243, 284 (2003).
476 See Bermann, supra note 287, at 609 (noting that U.S. has not ratified "any
general convention on recognition of final foreign country judgments"); Brian Richard
Paige, Foreign Judgments in American and English Courts. 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 591,
622 (2003) (mentioning failure of United States and United Kingdom to form treaty,
specifically because of breakdown in negotiations at "Convention on the Reciprocal
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Matters" in 1981); see also Dennis
Campbell & Dharmendra Popat, Enforcing American Money Judgments in the United
Kingdom and Germany. 18 S. ILL. U. L. J. 517, 526 (1994) (acknowledging lack of any
resurrection of negotiations between United States and United Kingdom since breakdown
in 1980s).
477 See Paige, supra note 476, at 591 (calling attention to fact that United States is
not party to any treaty that agrees to recognize foreign judgments); Survey on Foreign
Recognition of U.S. Money Judgments, supra note 384 at 383 (noting absence of U.S. in
treaties recognizing foreign judgments); see also Campbell & Dharmendra, supra note
476, at 520 (explaining that diverse procedural and substantive rules in United States
have thwarted any attempt at forming treaty to recognize foreign judgments).
478 See Bermann, supra note 276, at 566-67, 609 (discussing agreements to which
United States is party); see, e.g., Agreement Concerning the Investigation of Drug
Trafficking Offences and the Seizure and Forfeiture of Proceeds and Instrumentalities of
Drug Trafficking, Feb. 9, 1988, U.S.-U.K., art. 10, T.I.A.S. No. 11,649 (requiring state
parties to enact enabling legislation to identify, trace, and freeze property derived from or
related to drug trafficking); Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between
the United States and Switzerland, May 25, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 2019 (1976) (permitting
United States Securities and Exchange Commission to obtain freezes on assets in
Switzerland involved in securities violations).
479 See Campbell & Dharmendra, supra note 476, at 520 (discussing aspects of U.S.
law that have prevented formation of treaties with foreign countries); Susan L. Stevens,
Commanding International Judicial Respect: Reciprocity and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments. 26 HASTINGS, INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 115 (2002)
(arguing that liberal damages awards to United States citizens has deterred foreign
countries from enforcing American judgments); see also Survey on Foreign Recognition of
766 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 19:3
almost surely to devolve into debate about other procedures
which, as has always happened,480 will likely culminate in
fundamental failure of agreement, or at best, agreement to
disagree.
Second, England has no incentive to limit the Mareva
procedure's reach. As it has been structured, the English courts
do not consider it an exorbitant use of jurisdiction because it is
classified as an in personam remedy.481 Besides, American courts
are enforcing judgments based on its utilization without any
treaty.482 The United States, in reality, has nothing to bargain
with and Great Britain has nothing further to gain, only
something to lose. So long as American courts adhere to the
UFMJRA framework, the Mareva injunction's devastating effect
on American defendants will continue relatively or completely
unmolested in the absence of a bilateral treaty. 483
U.S. Money Judgments, supra note 384, at 383 (discussing issue of treaties between civil
law and common law countries).
480 See Bermann, supra note 287, at 561 (contrasting United Kingdom's inclination
for world-wide Mareva injunctions with United States Supreme Court's due process
concern in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 210 (1977) that "at most... a State in
which property is located should have jurisdiction to attach that property... as security
for a judgment being sought in a forum where the litigation can be maintained"); see also
Campbell & Dharmendra, supra note 476, at 520 (stating United States procedural rules
make it difficult to reach agreements recognizing judgments); Stevens, supra note 479, at
115 (recognizing foreign court's hesitation to enforce U.S. judgments because of its
differing procedural rules).
481 See Bermann, supra note 287, at 564 (explaining that Mareva injunctions are
aimed people not property, obviating concern for territorial reach); see also Johansson,
supra note 43, at 1095 (describing ability of court to reach defendant's assets wherever
they are when Mareva order operates in personam as opposed to in rem). Cf. Shaffer, 433
at 210 (explicating due process limits on property attachment).
482 See Johansson, supra note 43, at 1098 (noting that Mareva injunctions are not
available to plaintiffs in U.S., where courts are hesitant to grant pre-judgment relief);
Samuel K. Alexander, III, Book Review of The Mareva Injunction and Related Orders, by
Dr. Mark S. W. Hoyle. 39 VA. INT'L L. 503, 526-27 (1999) (stating that there is no United
States counterpart to Mareva injunction because it might violate defendant's right to due
process); see also Theuer, supra note 293, at 479 (describing how although some United
States courts have welcomed an approach similar to that of England, there are still due
process concerns).
483 See generally Bermann, supra note 287, at 564 (describing world-wide reach of
English Mareva orders); Johansson, supra note 43, at 1095 (noting court's ability to
control defendant's assets outside of England due to in personam nature of order); Russell
J. Weintraub, How Substantial Is Our Need for a Judgments-Recognition Convention and
What Should We Bargain Away To Get It? 24 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 167, 170 (1998)
(describing U.S.'s inclination to recognize foreign judgments in general although
reciprocity is not always acknowledged).
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B. Re-Thinking the Common Law
While the diplomats engage in what could be decades of hand-
wringing, American courts can certainly address the Mareva
problem under their own authority.484 One conceivable approach
would be to recognize the Mareva injunction as an affront to the
sovereignty of the state or country and create a bright-line rule
refusing enforcement of any foreign judgment utilizing the
procedure. Within the UFMJRA framework, under the CIBC
facts, a court could consider such a contempt judgment as not
final, not conclusive - and therefore outside of the UFMJRA
entirely.48 5 This approach, given the sway concerns of comity
have in the minds of American judges4 86 (and perhaps leery of
retribution in the form of refusal of enforcement of what few
judgments do get enforced abroad), is not likely.
A second, more tenable approach, however, could effect serious
change on the application and deleterious ramifications on
American defendants of the Mareva procedure. That approach
would simply follow the Supreme Court's reasoning in Hilton
when it said,
[The foreign] judgment is prima facie evidence, at least, of
the truth of the matter adjudged; and it should be held
conclusive upon the merits tried in the foreign court, unless
some special ground is shown for impeaching the judgment,
as by showing that it was affected by fraud or prejudice, or
that, by the principles of international law, and by the
484 See Theuer, supra note 293, at 450 (stating that some United States courts have
adopted "Mareva-type" injunctions); see, e.g.,Guinness PLC v. Ward, 955 F.2d 875 (4th
Cir.,1991) (finding no violation of due process in upholding district court's decision to
enforce Mareva injunction); United States v. All Funds on Deposit in any Accounts
Maintained in the Names of Meza or Castro, 856 F. Supp. 759 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)
(supporting Mareva order against drug trafficking organization).
485 See Paige, supra note 476, at 599-601 (describing judgments falling within
parameters of the UFMJRA); see also Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 228 (listing "lack of
jurisdiction, partiality, fraud, or lack of notice or due process" as reasons to not enforce
foreign judgment). See generally Eric P. Enson, A Roadblock on the Detour Around the
First Amendment: Is the Enforcement of English Libel Judgments in the United States
Unconstitutional? 21 LOY. L.A. INT'L COMP. L. J. 159, 168 (1999) (describing implications
of Court's opinion in Hilton).
486 See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 228 (defining comity as procedural, reciprocity and public
policy restrictions on American enforcement of foreign judgments); see also Enson, supra
note 485, at 166-70 (describing comity as one of doctrines limiting enforcement of foreign
judgments); Jennifer M. Anglim, Crossroads in the Great Race: Moving Beyond the
International Race to Judgment in Disputes over Artwork and Other Chattels. 45 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 239, 250 (2004) (noting example of American judge giving due consideration to
comity in lawsuit to continue without final foreign judgment).
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comity of our own country, it should not be given full credit
and effect.4s 7
Both the current Supreme Court488 and the New York Court of
Appeals 489  have expressed serious reservations on the
extraterritorial application of the Mareva procedure by English
courts. Those concerns might readily rise to the level of a
"special ground" for impeaching a foreign judgment. 490
The question remains as to who should bear the burden of
demonstrating either the existence of the "special ground" or the
absence of such an impeaching factor. Under the current
UFMJRA framework and the ex parte nature of the procedure
itself, logic suggests that the plaintiff should bear this burden.491
According to the Second Circuit, in an enforcement action,
currently the "plaintiff has the 'prima facie' burden of
establishing (1) a final judgment, (2) subject matter jurisdiction,
(3) jurisdiction over the parties or res, and (4) regular
proceedings conducted under an impartial system of justice."492
487 Hilton, 159 U.S. at 206 (emphasis added).
488 See Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 308, 330
(1999).
489 See Credit Agricole Indosuez Rossiyskiy Kredit Bank, 94 N.Y.2d 541, 551 (2000).
490 See Theuer, supra note 482, at 450 (labeling Grupo Mexicano "most profound
present embrace of the use of a Mareva-type injunction by a U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals" despite being overruled by Supreme Court); Gregory T. Walters, Bachchan v.
India Abroad Publications Inc.: The Clash Between Protection of Free Speech in the United
States and Great Britain. 16 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 895 n.7 (1993) (citing Hilton, explaining
U.S. court must recognize foreign judgment as conclusive unless special grounds are
shown); see also Jerome A. Hoffman, Recognition by Courts in the Eleventh Circuit of
Judgments Rendered by Courts of Other Countries. 29 COMB. L. REV. 65, 79 (1998/1999)
(noting that United States courts have followed Hilton, although they are not bound by
it).
491 See Paige, supra note 476, at 601(noting burden plaintiffs must meet for court to
issue Mareva order); Zicherman, supra note 297, at 675 (explaining ex parte nature of
Mareva orders). See generally Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 308.
492 The court in Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 842 (2d Cir. 1986) noted that
plaintiff has this burden in international cases and enforcement actions from courts of
other U.S. states (also considered "foreign" judgments). Similarly, in Dominican Sisters of
Ontario, Inc.. v. Dunn, 272 A.D.2d 367, 707 N.Y.S.2d 215 (App. Div. 2000) the court held
that plaintiff had to make a proper prima facie showing that jurisdiction in the
underlying Oregon State Court action had been properly obtained. See, e.g. Desilets v.
Desilets, 262 A.D.2d 482, 483, 691 N.Y.S.2d 318 (App. Div. 1999), for a similar holding. In
New York state court, the burden is similar. One court stated, "As the proponent, plaintiff
bears the burden of making a prima facie showing that the mandatory grounds for non-
recognition [under UFMJRA and, in NY, CPLR article 53] - i.e., due process and personal
jurisdiction - do not exist." Wimmer Canada, Inc. v. Abele Tractor & Equip. Co., Inc., 299
A.D.2d 47, 750 N.Y.S.2d 331 (3rd Dept. 2002). Another stated, "Every defendant
judgment-debtor has a right to have the vital issue of personal jurisdiction proven to the
court's satisfaction, even where the motion is made on default, and proof of personal
jurisdiction in the foreign jurisdiction should be readily apparent." Attorney General of
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To require the plaintiff to establish a fifth element, the absence
of a special ground for impeaching the English judgment by use
of an ex parte Mareva order, would not overly (or at least
unreasonably) burdensome - and consistent with Hilton.493 In
effect, this approach would create a rebuttable presumption of
invalidity where a foreign judgment makes use of a Mareva-type
procedure. 494
This approach would offer at least three beneficial checks to
the procedure that currently do not exist. First, it would afford a
natural forum for defendants to make a due process argument,
unshackled from the UFMJRA's restrictive mandatory
exceptions, re-injecting some adversarial balance into the
proceedings. 495 Second, it might tend to chill the plaintiff in
advance from seeking the Mareva injunction in the first place, or
at least limit those requests to meritorious scenarios where an
increased evidentiary burden could easily be satisfied, i.e., where
there is demonstrable risk of dissipation of assets.496 Third, it
would give a moment of pause to English judges who might
restrict their Mareva orders to non-American assets or require
assistance from an American court in administering them. 497
Canada v. Gorman, 769 N.Y.S.2d 369, 2003 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1609 (N.Y. Civ. Ct., Queens
County 2003).
493 See CIBC Mellon Trust Co. v. Mora Hotel Corp. N.V., 296 A.D.2d 81, 101 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2002) (concurring with Court's analysis in Hilton). See generally Paige, supra
note 476, at 601-07 (listing and describing grounds for non-recognition); Zicherman,
supra note 297, at 675 (explaining plaintiffs burden with respect to ex parte Mareva
orders).
494 Similar procedures have been available in civil law countries prior to the Mareva
case, referred to variously as "ring-fencing", "arrest", and "interim anticipatory
protection." In Italy, for example, a similar device called "protective attachment" is
utilized. See supra, note 278. For an article discussing the expansion of the Mareva
procedure in Canada for use in aid of foreign proceedings, see Paul Michell, The Mareva
Injunction in Aid of Foreign Proceedings, 34 OSGOODE HALL L.J., 741 (1996). See
generally Paige, supra note 476, at 601-07, which addresses grounds for non-recognition.
495 See Chao, supra note 362, at 151(necessitating tribunals to exercise due process
and proper jurisdictional requirements over defendants); see also CIBC Mellon Trust Co.
v. Mora Hotel Corp. N.V., 100 N.Y.2d 215, 225 (2003) (ensuring if there is voluntary
appearance, other jurisdictional requirements are waived so that case can be heard). See
generally supra, PARTS IV.C & D.
496 See CIBC, 100 N.Y.2d at 221(explaining that New York courts are always
generous in enforcing money judgments from foreign courts); Wasserman, supra note 326,
at 332 (commenting on how American courts routinely use injunctions to freeze assets);
see also Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 328
(1999) (commenting that Mareva remedies have been confirmed in federal statute).
497 See CIBC, 100 N.Y.2d at 221 (encouraging England and other foreign nations to
be as open as New York in approving foreign judgments); see also Grupo Mexicano 527
U.S. at 329 (stating that Mareva order is powerful tool in England).
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Importantly, American courts could continue to provide
"generous forums" for enforcement of foreign judgments. Those
judgments sought to be enforced that do not utilize the Mareva
procedure would be unaffected by this higher evidentiary
showing.498 If English courts take such considerations into
account and issue fewer of these orders extraterritorially, all the
better. As the procedure becomes more commonplace in the
United States (which it is likely to do given the broad exceptions
already in place to side-step Grupo Mexicano), such an approach
could also assuage some federalism and sovereignty concerns
between the states themselves.499
C. Addressing the Statutory Loophole
Another potential solution lies in the modification of the
UFMJRA itself. It is the solution with the greatest ease of
implementation, though not without its difficulties. A change in
the statute would force enforcement courts to address the Mareva
procedure square on, rather than confining their concerns with
the procedure to persuasive, but non-precedential dicta. 500
One method of modification would be to address the language
of the mandatory "lack of personal jurisdiction" exception. Resort
to an English court to attempt to discharge a Mareva injunction
should be explicitly disclaimed as a basis which would constitute
a voluntary submission to English jurisdiction. A defendant who
seeks to stave of "seizure" of assets is, as the statute stands
currently, still within his rights to raise the personal jurisdiction
exception. A defendant who seeks to do the same to avoid
"freezing" of his assets is not similarly protected. As there is no
practical difference to a defendant, the statutory language should
encompass both.
498 See CIBC, 100 N.Y.2d at 221 (explaining generous nature of American courts in
enforcing foreign judgments).
499 See Credit Agricole, 94 N.Y.2d at 551 (noting difficulties Mareva-type procedures
present to state decisional and statutory schemes); see also CIBC, 100 N.Y.2d at 221-22
(concluding ease of New York court's function in converting foreign money judgment). See
generally Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 308.
500 See Grupo Mexicano 527 U.S. at 331 (relying on English case law and precedent to
reach holding); Bermann, supra note 287, at 560 (finding authority for Mareva injunction
in English case law and English statute); Wasserman, supra note 326, at 332-33
(discussing English precedent of Mareva injunction).
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Another modification might involve adding another mandatory
or discretionary basis for non-enforcement. This author would
argue for mandatory non-enforcement where the Mareva order is
granted ex parte without timely notice to the defendant.
Requiring plaintiffs to have demonstrated compliance with
American notions of due process when suing American
defendants with little or no connection to England does not seem
too strenuous a requirement. 501 A discretionary ground is more
in line with the "equitable" nature of the device and might grant
the reviewing court a measure of flexibility in recognition and
enforcement actions, though it might be frustrated by the
ubiquitous "generous forum" philosophy.5 02
These changes, however, would have to be made on a state-by-
state basis. 503 The UFMJRA is not a federal statute, but rather
a codification of legal principles and suggested statutory
framework which states are at liberty to accept en toto or modify
as they deem appropriate. 504 Change in a few key states with
international presence, however, would go a long way to negating
the Mareva order's impermissible reach.
D. "International Judicial Warfare"50 6
One of the dirty little secrets of international law is that much,
if not most, of it depends on one nation simply capitulating to the
legal processes of another.507 This "comity" is, really, entirely
501 See Goldring, supra note 254, at 54 (discussing United States' due process simply
as requiring minimal contacts with jurisdiction); see also Wasserman, supra note 254, at
319-20 (explaining importance of due process concerns in American law). But see CIBC,
100 N.Y.2d at 223 (arguing that New York law allows foreign judgment even with lack of
personal jurisdiction if there was voluntary appearance).
502 See Wasserman, supra note 254, at 261 (noting relief of such action is equitable);
see also Grupo Mexicano 527 U.S. at 318-19 (explaining that this issue must be one of
equity to be decided by courts); CIBC, 100 N.Y.2d at 221 (discussing New York State's
generous forum philosophy).
503 See Goldring, supra note 254, at 54 (explaining that each state has varying forum
and jurisdictional statutes); see also CIBC, 100 N.Y.2d at 223 (ruling based on New York's
legal position on this matter); Wasserman, supra note 254, at 276-77 (discussing varying
state statutes regarding judgments, writs of attachments, and remedies).
504 See Grupo Mexicano 527 U.S. at 328 (explaining that Mareva relief has been
confirmed by certain federal statutes). See Generally Wasserman, supra note 254, at 332-
33 (summarizing various legal principles regarding use of injunctions to secure money
judgments).
506 Bermann, supra note 287, at 615.
507 See Quaak v. KPMG Bedrijsrevisoren, 361 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 2004) (discussing
difficulty in international law of balancing different nation's laws while maintaining
sovereignty); Goldring, supra note 254, at 8 (clarifying that nature of international law
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voluntary in the absence of treaties and conventions. 508 The
European Union has taken the lead in establishing such
conventions for its member states, but beyond the borders of
Europe, enforcing foreign judgments - let alone preliminary
provisional remedies like the Mareva order - is more akin to the
Wild West.509 What happens when a suit in Country X threatens
the banking system of Country Y or a prominent industry in
Country Z? Are the courts of Country Y or Country Z required or
even obliged to enforce those judgments? Absolutely not. Some
states do not even wait for the final judgment shoe to drop before
acting to frustrate Country X's legal processes, becoming
proactive rather than reactive. 510
The anti-suit injunction is the most powerful tool for these
"frustrating" courts. This type of injunction, which also operates
in personam, can be issued by a court over parties subject to its
jurisdiction to prevent them from proceeding with litigation in
other forums, including other nations' courts. 511 Though it
technically operates over the parties, there is no doubt that it can
frustrate another nation's legal processes and be considered
violative of the notion of international comity.512 While anti-suit
injunctions are effective, other methods such as declarations of
requires national laws to give it effect); see also Bermann, supra note 287, at 570
(explaining that orders regarding foreign assets must comply with principles of
international law, whatever those may be).
508 See Goldring, supra note 254, at 8 (explaining that international agreement must
be approved by nation's government). See generally Bermann, supra note 287 (discussing
implications of international law on such agreements).
509 See Goldring, supra note 254, at 34-35 (describing European Union and powers
afforded to member countries regarding agreements); see also Grupo Mexicano 527 U.S. at
331(denying Mareva relief).
510 See Bermann, supra note 287, at 579 (categorizing United States and other
nations as taking proactive stance towards such remedies, though this remains to be
proven as far as the U.S. is concerned). See generally Goldring, supra note 254
(delineating different nation-states' remedies).
511 See Bermann, supra note 287, at 555 (suggesting anti-suit injunction as alternate
remedy to prevent litigant from bringing suit in another country); George A. Bermann,
The Use of Anti-Suit Injunctions in International Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
589, 589 (1990) (defining anti-suit and its effects on international litigation) [hereinafter
Bermann Anti-Suit].
512 See Quaak v. KPMG Bedrijsrevisoren, 361 F.3d 11, 16-19 (1st Cir. 2004)
(discussing ramifications and decisional calculus involved in issuing international anti-
suit injunctions); Bermann, supra note 511, at 607 (mentioning that considerations of
international comity in regards to anti-suits should be evaluated). See generally Goldring,
supra note 254 (exploring difficulties of different countries interacting with various laws
and agreements).
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non-liability and even simple non-enforcement will do.513 The
overriding point is that by throwing up obstacles into the path of
another country's attempt to enforce its legal system beyond its
own borders a state can force the issuing court to re-think its
tack or back down entirely.514
This legal "game of chicken," however, is not limited to the
enforcement of final judgments. 515 With the rise of prejudgment
provisional remedies like the Mareva orders and Anton Piller
orders comes an increasing use of these frustrating devices. 516 At
the tip of the spear of frustration is England itself, accompanied
by its commonwealth nations. In an ironic twist that would
make Socrates blush, England would flatly refuse to enforce any
Mareva-type order were it to be asked to do s0.5 17 A few examples
513 See Bermann, supra note 287, at 555 (stating that amidst controversy, anti-suit is
still effective form of intervention); see also Bermann, supra note 511, at 602 (comparing
anti-suits to declarations of non-liability).
514 See Derby & Co., Ltd. v. Weldon (No. 2), [1989] E.C.C. 322, 339 (Eng. C.A. 1988)
(stating that court "should not appoint Receivers over non-residents in relation to assets
which are not within the jurisdiction of this Court, unless satisfied that the local Court
either of residence or of the situation of the assets will act in aid of the English Court in
enforcing it"); Bermann, supra note 287, at 566 (stating that "litigants have urged that
courts refrain from issuing orders restraining the use of property located abroad in the
absence of available sanctions in the event such orders are disregarded"); Bermann, supra
note 287, at n.54 (quoting Rosseel N.V. v. Oriental Commercial Shipping (U.K.) Ltd.,
[1990] 1 W.L.R. 1387, 1388-89 (Eng. C.A.)) (stating that except for exceptional case,
English courts should refrain from asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction).
515 See Alexander, supra note 316, at 501 (stating that "once the plaintiff obtains the
English Mareva, it must then apply to the foreign court to have the Mareva recognized
and enforced against the foreign defendant"); Bermann, supra note 287, at 557 (stating as
example, that courts of country X may see fit to issue protective orders affecting persons
or property in country Y, they may not be able to ensure that those orders are obeyed or
that the relief sought to be achieved will otherwise be effective); see also Fabano, supra
note 293, at 144 (stating that in application for a world wide Mareva order, plaintiff may
be required to make further application in foreign jurisdiction where he believes
defendant's assets are located).
516 See Alexander, supra note 515, at 490 (stating that effectiveness of Mareva and
Anton Piller have led to their increasing use); Samuel K. Alexander, III, The Mareva
Injunction and Related Orders, by Dr. Mark S. W. Hoyle, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 503, 506 (1999)
(book review) (stating that effectiveness of Mareva injunctions has led to their increased
use and popularity); Theuer, supra note 293, at 421 (stating that English courts have
aggressively expanded applicability of prejudgment interlocutory relief, such as Mareva
orders and Anton Piller injunctions).
517 See Securities and Exchange Commission v. Wang, 699 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y.
1988); Silverman & Kirshner, supra note 254, at 24 (noting that Mareva-type orders are
becoming the norm in common law jurisdictions); Zicherman, supra note 297, at 676
(noting that most common law jurisdictions in which English case law is followed now
grant Mareva injunctions). But see Mark S.W. Hoyle, The Mareva Injunction and Overseas
Assets, J. INT'L BANKING L. 4(1), 15 (1989) (noting that there seems no reason why the
English courts will not enforce a similar Mareva-type order from any of the other Brussels
Convention countries).
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will help illustrate the rising tide of this "international judicial
warfare."51 8
Example 1: The British Government Weighs In.519 The U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission secured a court order to
freeze the bank accounts of two foreign defendants allegedly
involved in insider trading activities. 520 The defendants promptly
instructed the New York branch of their bank to move the
accounts to the Hong Kong branch and thereafter failed to
appear at the proceedings. 521 A default judgment was entered.5 22
The defendant then sued the bank in Hong Kong to release the
funds which the bank had been holding pursuant to the
American court order. 523 The U.S. court then issued an anti-suit
injunction, staying the Hong Kong proceedings, demanding the
accounts be transferred to the American court. 524 The Hong Kong
court, in response, issued an order denying effect to the U.S.
orders, including the anti-suit injunction (an "anti-anti-suit
injunction"), claiming the freezing of the assets was an
extraterritorial exercise of U.S. sovereignty.525 The British
government came to the aid of the Hong Kong court via
diplomatic channels, complaining that the U.S. court had acted
extraterritorially, in violation of international law, by "seeking to
regulate.., relations between a banking company, not of United
States nationality..., and a customer of that Bank in respect of
a sum of money held in accounts in a branch of that Bank in
Hong Kong." 526 Before the respective high courts of the countries
involved could engage in an extended "pot calling the kettle
black" debate, the parties settled.527
518 See Bermann, supra note 287, at 615 (stating that transnational provisional relief
and anti-suit injunctions are similar in that both can precipitate "international judicial
warfare").
519 See Securities and Exchange Commission v. Wang, 699 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y.
1988); Bermann, supra note 287, at 614 (stating that British government strongly
supported bank because U.S court had acted extraterritorially); Michael R. Sesit,
International Furor Arises over Order from U.S. Court on U.K Bank's Funds, WALL ST. J.,
May 30, 1989 (noting that British government has joined appeal of United States federal
court order).
520 See Wang, 699 F. Supp at 45.
521 Id.
522 Id..
523 Id..
524 Id..
525 Id..
526 See Bermann, supra note 287, at 614.
527 See id., at 615.
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Example 2: Reigning in the Worldwide Mareva?528 Plaintiffs
secured a worldwide Mareva order from an English court,
freezing defendant's assets wherever situated.529 The plaintiffs
contacted a third party Swiss bank (with a branch in England) to
trace defendants' assets.530 The Swiss bank protested to the
English court that compliance with its order would force it to
violate Switzerland's bank secrecy laws.531 The English court
agreed to vary the terms of the Mareva order, and the plaintiffs
appealed. 532 The English Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal
and issued instructions for future grants of worldwide Mareva
orders. 533 These instructions included a proviso 534 that third
parties subject to a Mareva order cannot be forced to comply
where it would subject them to inconsistent obligations in the
country where the assets are located.535 The Court of Appeal
considered it "inexpedient" for an English court to issue an order
it could not enforce. 536 Of course, only a few nations have such
strict bank secrecy laws and so the effect of this case is yet to be
seen.537 It should be noted, too, that where the plaintiff names
528 See Bank of China v. NBM, L.L.C., [2002] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 506 (Eng. C.A. 2001);
Alexander Fox, Global Warming to Comity? The Worldwide Freezing Order Begins its
Thaw, J. INT'L FIN. MARKETS 4(3), 108 (2002) (characterizing decision of the Court of
Appeal judgment as "restrictive"). See generally Case Comment, Jurisdiction Freezing
Order, J. INT'L BANKING L. 17(4), N29-30 (2002) (calling decision relief for banks).
529 Bank of China, 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 506.
530 Id.
531 Id.
532 Id.
533 Bank of China v. NBM, LLC (2002) 1 ALL E.R. 717 (CA) at [22] (holding that
"Baltic proviso" should be in standard freezing [Mareva] order for third parties unless
court considers it inappropriate).
534 See Baltic Shipping co. v. Translink Shipping Ltd, (1995) LLOYD'S REP. 673
(commonly allowing third party to "comply with what it reasonably believes to be its
obligations under the law of the State in which those assets are situated."); Bank of
China, 1 ALL E.R. 717 (CA) at [11] (stating that Baltic was first case in which English
court permitted addition of this provision); see also Great Future International Ltd. v.
Sealand Housing Corp. (2004) EWHC 124 (CH) at [36] (noting, although court adopted
Baltic proviso as standard, it did not address consequences of third party breaching
Mareva order once it was made).
535 Bank of China v. NBM, LLC (2002) 1 ALL E.R. 717 (CA) at [19] (defining
inconsistent obligations as those that are contractual as well as those that are penal in
nature).
536 Id. at 18 (stating that it is "exceptional" for an order of English court to require
"third party to do or refrain from doing something abroad" because of inherent territorial
limits of court's jurisdiction).
537 See Jennifer A. Mencken, Note, Supervising Secrecy: Preventing Abuses Within
Bank Secrecy amd Financial Privacy Systems, 21 B.C. INT'L AND COMP. L. REV. 461, 469
n.68 (1998) (stating there are relatively small number of nations with strict banking
secrecy laws, most of which are small nations or nations from Pacific Rim); see also
Michael Evans, Why Switzerland Will Not Give Up Bank Secrecy, INT'L FIN. L. REV. (2002)
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the bank as a party to the case, the proviso does not need to be
issued and the banks remain -subject to the worldwide Mareva
order.538 Whether the enforcement in these cases is any more
"expedient" or even possible is a matter of conjecture.
Example 3: Defeat of a Worldwide Mareva Order. 539 Plaintiffs
instituted an action for fraud in the United States and sought a
Mareva-type remedy to enjoin defendants from absconding with
their assets. 540 The U.S. court could not grant them the relief
they sought.541 Plaintiffs thereafter filed suit in England and
secured a worldwide Mareva order over all of defendants' assets
while the American proceedings were pending. 542 Defendants,
citizens of Turkey and with no connection to England, objected to
the granting of the Mareva order on "expediency" grounds, i.e.,
the English court could not enforce the order against them.543
After refusing to comply with the Mareva order, the defendants
were held in contempt of court and given lengthy prison
sentences in absentia. 544
While the defendants appealed the ruling to the English Court
of Appeal, they secured an anti-suit injunction in Turkey, staying
(pointing out even though Swiss banking laws are still legendarily strong, they no longer
apply to criminal matters); Private Banking: A new Swiss role, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 20,
1999, at 68 (noting in addition, over time, banking laws in Switzerland itself have
gradually eroded).
538 See Societe Eram Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Compagnie Internationale de Navigation,
[2003] 2 All E.R. (Comm.) 65, para. 23 (2003) (stating that English Court of Appeals have
accepted that there is nothing that precludes English court from granting Mareva orders
against a defendant); see also Great Future International Ltd. v. Sealand Housing Corp.
(2004) EWHC 124 (CH) at [36] (noting that Court was considering rights of third parties to
litigation rather than rights of parties to litigation when approving Baltic proviso), Baltic
Shipping Co. v. Translink shipping Ltd. and Translink Pacific Shipping Ltd., (1995) 1
LLOYD'S REP 673 (stating that need for proviso arises from need to protect third parties to
litigation in regard to overseas actions, and describing importance of drawing distinction
between rights of third parties and rights of litigants).
539 Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, (2003) E.W.C.A. CIV. 752 (2003) at [126].
540 Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 388 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir, 2004) (stating that
plaintiffs, Motorola and Nokia, urged court impose constructive trust over some of assets
of defendants, as well as attachment of certain properties and shares in corporate
defendants as collateral).
541 Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan (2003) E.W.C.A. Civ. 752 at [71 (noting that United
States court does not have jurisdiction to grant worldwide relief through freezing order).
542 See id. at 17 (noting that on May 30, British court granted freezing orders for all
four defendants with maximum of 200 million dollars (American)).
543 Id. at 18-23 (stating that second and third defendants appealed Mareva order on
ground that English court had no jurisdiction over them because they had no association
with England, and owned no assets in England).
544 Id. at 31, 33 (noting that lower court held four defendants in contempt for failure
to comply with court ordered cross-examinations, and sentenced them to fifteen months in
prison in absentia, with exception of fourth defendant who was sentenced to six months).
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the proceedings in both the United States and England.545 The
plaintiff then obtained an order from the American court
requiring the defendants to withdraw from the proceedings in
Turkey.546 Rather than do so, the defendants obtained a second
injunction from the Turkish court, again staying the English and
American proceedings. 547 The English Court of Appeal, despite
the contempt shown by the defendants for the English
proceedings, determined it would be "inexpedient" to attempt to
enforce a Mareva order over the Turkish defendants and
dissolved the Mareva order. 548 The defendants lost the case in
the United States and are currently appealing the $4.26 billion
judgment against them. 549 They have been informed that if they
ever enter the United States, they will face immediate arrest for
contempt.550
These examples demonstrate the extraterritorial problem
areas presented by Mareva orders, especially when the
diplomatic and judicial arms of separate countries become
entangled.551 They also point out the underlying fragility of the
545 Id. at 29 (stating that defendants successfully filed an injunction in Turkey on
November 27, 2002, which stayed United States action and all other related proceedings).
546 Id. at 37 (stating that plaintiff filed in U.S. District Court to compel defendants to
withdraw from Turkish court, and filed in Turkish court to have judge who gave previous
order removed for bias. The District Court granted order, and Turkish judge voluntarily
withdrew from proceedings, pending resolution of plaintiffs claim).
547 Id. at 39 (stating that employees of corporate defendant obtained second
injunction in Turkey, preventing proceedings in all of jurisdictions in which plaintiff filed
suit (England, United States, Germany, France, Bermuda, The Channel Islands)).
548 Id. at 125-26 (holding that freezing orders as they applied to second and third
defendant must be dismissed because Turkish injunction in connection with lack of assets
in English jurisdiction and defendants' lack of cooperation indicated that defendants
would disobey freezing order. If that did happen, an English court had no ability to
sanction defendants. However, court sustained freezing order against first and fourth
defendants).
549 The Court of Appeals ordered a reconsideration of punitive damages awards
granted by the lower court in the amount of 2.1 million dollars on the grounds that it was
inconsistent with the due process requirements of the U.S. Constitution, and Illinois law.
Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 388 F.3d 39, 65-66 (2d Cir., 2004).
550 Id. at 47 (stating that district court ordered defendants arrested if they entered
United States because of their contempt of prior court orders); see also Motorola Credit
Corp. v. Uzan, 274 F. Supp. 2d 481, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that unless defendants
purge their contempt of prior orders, they will be confined until they comply with
directives of court). But see Motorola Credit Corp v. Uzan, 2004 U.S. APP. LEXIS 22057 at
*1-3 (2d Cir. 2004) (denying plaintiffs motion to dismiss defendants' appeals on ground
that defendants were not "fugitives" who abandoned jurisdiction after an adverse
judgment).
551 See Guy Wilkes, Current Developments - Private International Law, 53.2 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 512 (2004) (illustrating difficulties of enforcing freezing injunctions against
sovereign state that has entered into commercial contract with company from another
state); Collingwood Thompson, Offshore: Double Standards, THE LAWYER March 29, 2004,
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procedure when faced with any obstacle to its enforcement. 552
One potential consequence of failing to erect such obstacles to
enforcement of Mareva orders is that "non-frustrating" states
may see a run on the assets of their country.553 Between freezing
the assets in a country, like the United States, who does not
impede the enforcement of a Mareva order and the assets in
another country, like Turkey or Switzerland, which does, the
choice is easy. Failure to act, in this arena, is consequently not a
preferable option.554
at 29 (noting that G7 Summit of Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering
suggested that percentage or share of funds be given to foreign jurisdiction in return for
cooperation in freezing order process, which would then reduce any potential inconsistent
judgments by different countries); see also Bank of China v. NBM LLC (2002) 1 ALL E.R.
717 at [18] (noting that English Mareva order doesn't require third party to violate law of
other jurisdiction, or disobey court orders from that jurisdiction).
552 See Johansson, supra note 43, at 1096 (finding "courts are less willing to grant the
Mareva injunction if the consequences of the orders suggest that in-rem jurisdiction would
be required"); John Rothchild, Protecting the Digital Consumer: The Limits of Cyberspace
Utopianism, 74 IND. L.J. 893, 923 (Summer, 1999) (listing difficulties of enforcing Mareva
orders such as "hiring foreign counsel to bring the Mareva action may be very expensive;
the jurisdiction where the Mareva injunction is instituted may have bank secrecy laws
that make it all but impossible to ascertain the extent of frozen funds; in cases where the
Mareva action is unsuccessful, the plaintiff may be liable for substantial damages; and
even where successful, this type of action does not prevent the defendant from resuming
her violative behavior after arriving at a monetary settlement"); see also Alon Seveg,
Investment: When Countries Go Bust: Proposals For Debtor and Creditor Resolution, 3
ASPER REv. INTL Bus. & TRADE L. 25, 60 (2003) (arguing "a creditor's best strategy to
attach sovereign assets would be to pursue a post-judgment order of constraint (as
opposed to a pre-judgment order.")).
553 See Catherine Kessedjian, First Impressions of the Transnational Rules of Civil
Procedure From Paris and the Hague, 33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 477, 483 (1998) (noting "Mareva
injunctions may be useful in international litigation, it is not evident that judges in
countries where such injunctions do not exist will readily make the adjustment and adopt
such a procedural remedy"); Johansson, supra note 43, at 1107 (illustrating criticism that
"while the Mareva injunction's disclosure order adds to the injunction's effectiveness, it
might subject defendants to oppressive multiple lawsuits worldwide"); see also Fabano,
supra note 293, at 146 (discussing multiple reasons for United States to not adapt Mareva
injunction such as not wanting to "go against a strong precedent, or because the principles
of due process would be offended by its adoption").
554 See Alexander, supra note 316, at 515 (positing that "the international scope of
such orders will become more pronounced in the future as more and more international
transactions involve debtors seeking to transfer their property and assets to different
jurisdictions to avoid creditor claims"); Vaughan Black, Commodifying Justice for Global
Free Trade: The Proposed Hague Judgments Convention, 38 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 237, 265
(2000) (noting that country's decision to recognize foreign money judgments is similar to
accepting foreign goods within its borders and "this problem is not in any respect a
principled one, but rather a bargaining process wherein states are rational self-
maximizers"); cf.Silverman & Kirshner, supra note 242, at *24 (arguing that "U.S. courts
and lawmakers should more frequently adopt what has become the norm in other
common-law jurisdictions").
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VI. CONCLUSION
The final chapter of the story of the Mareva injunction is not
yet written. For defendants, English or American, all indications
are that it will not end well. Two overriding factors suggest that
the Mareva procedure has only begun to defile and oppress
defendants.555
First, the very efficient lethality of the procedure itself
suggests that English judges are unlikely to abandon this
powerful weapon in their attempts to effectuate international
frontier justice.5 56 The Mareva injunction is an effective tool, to
be sure. Draconian measures usually are effective tools of those
who wield them.557 But, at what price are we allowing the
discretion of a few to override the protections of the many? While
some judges may caution restraint, few deny the Mareva
injunction's effectiveness or counsel for its abandonment. 558
Second, there is no demonstrable pattern of judicial restraint
so necessary for this procedure to avoid becoming an abuse of the
highest order.559 Nearly every self-imposed limitation placed
555 See Doak R. Bishop et. al., Strategic Options Available When Catastrophe Strikes
the Major International Energy Project, 36 TEX. INT'L L.J. 635, 647 (Summer, 2001)
(finding "ex parte nature, and the fact that defendants are rarely able to "discharge a
Mareva order," the orders can be powerful tools in prompting defendants to settle"); Sally
Lloyd-Bostock, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Civil Justice Reform: Is ADR Being
Used to Paper Over Cracks? Reactions to Judge Jack Weinstein's Article, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 397, 402 (1996) (explaining Mareva orders "can have very harsh
consequences for the defendant"); Theuer, supra note 293, at 438 (arguing "the only
restraint on the courts' ability to indulge a plaintiff is the requirement that it have
personal jurisdiction over the defendant").
556 The developer of another "nuclear weapon," Edward Teller, once said, "The more
decisive a weapon is, the more surely it will be used..." While he was speaking of atomic
arsenals, the point is well-taken and appropriate in this context, too.
557 See Alexander, supra note 316, at 488 (commenting Mareva injunctions are
extraordinary remedy and "often have a decisive effect on a case"); Bermann, supra note
287, at 568 (proposing "an order restraining a defendant from dealing with any of his
assets overseas, and requiring him to disclose details of all his assets wherever located, is
a draconian order"); Theuer, supra note 293, at 484 (arguing "the expansive use of
equitable relief to secure future damages remedies through judicial imperialism is an
infringement of a defendant's substantive rights and an affront to American principles of
equity and fair-play").
558 Ironically, the only true restraint on the procedure may be the English court
system itself and its ability to handle the swarm of requests that come before it. 'The
attraction of London could, however, soon fade if the infrastructure of our courts is not
properly equipped to handle the phenomenon which they have created." Taylor, supra
note 3.
559 Commentators who counsel for the acceptance of the Mareva procedure in the
United States generally do so on condition that the self-imposed limitations of the English
courts remain as they existed when the commentary was written. George Bermann's 1997
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upon the courts' discretion has been abandoned or ignored. 560 It
has been applied to English citizens, to defendants with no assets
in England, to third parties, to assets outside of England, and in
aid of foreign proceedings - all once thought impermissible.561
Even judges, such as Lord Browne-Wilkinson, who have publicly
expressed hesitation with the procedure have used and, in some
cases, greatly extended the device. 562 Indeed, the Mareva
article, supra note 287, at 572-73, is an excellent example of an endorsement of the
procedure, recognizing this inherent problem:
Given its close consideration of the proper international scope of Mareva injunctions,
U.K. case law may be a useful source of guidance for American courts as they venture
into the realm of provisional restraints on foreign assets. Although, like most
exercises of discretion, the determination of how far to reach in quest of assets to
secure satisfaction of a future judgment depends on the totality of the circumstances,
at least some guidelines seem to have emerged from U.K. practice.
For one thing, the British courts claim to regard provisional restraints on overseas
assets more favorably when the applicant asserts an actual property interest in those
assets than when it merely treats them as a convenient way of securing satisfaction
of a judgment. In the same vein, they seem to find the extraterritorial Mareva
injunction less unattractive when the purpose of the U.K. action is to adjudicate the
merits of a claim, rather than merely to enforce a judgment rendered by a foreign
court or international arbitral tribunal.
However sensible these (and other) guidelines may be, it is nevertheless unlikely that
they will ever serve as more than rules of thumb for the exercise of judicial discretion.
Bermann, supra note 287, at 572-73.
Subsequent cases, as shown above, have demonstrated that Professor Bermann's
suspicions in the last sentence were not unfounded. Professor Wasserman's 1992 article,
supra note 254, 336 suffers still more from overly optimistic assumptions about judicial
self-restraint.
560 See Fabano, supra note 293, at 139 (arguing "it is safe to say that as long as the
basis for granting the injunction is reasonable, it will be granted and applied to all types
of property regardless of the cause of action or debt owed to the plaintiff'); William, Q.C.
Tetley, Arrest, Attachment, and Related Maritime Law Procedures, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1895,
1956 (1999) (noting "an action in rem plaintiff petitioner has been held entitled to an
arrest warrant as of right, whereas the Mareva injunction petitioner must depend on
judicial discretion"); Theuer, supra note 293, at 432 (recalling "the Mareva injunction had
been initially confined to cases in which the defendant was not resident in the jurisdiction
but had property in the jurisdiction, and the injunction only restrained removal of
property from the jurisdiction, these limitations had been systematically relaxed by
subsequent cases").
561 See Johansson, supra note 43, at 1095 (noting "initially, the Mareva injunction
reached assets only within the courts' jurisdiction and applied only to foreign defendants
engaged in transnational business. However, the Mareva injunction has evolved and now
reaches assets located worldwide"); Theuer, supra note 293, at 437 (concluding "despite
the admonitions of the courts that a Mareva injunction is an extraordinary remedy,
practice belies the rarity of such relief'); Zicherman, supra note 297, at 675 (noting "the
Mareva injunction does not merely regulate the actions of the defendant-owner; it also
controls the behavior of third parties and prevents them from dissipating the defendant's
enjoined assets").
562 See Bundock, supra note 25, at 496 (predicting that "given the safeguards now
incorporated in the order it could well be argued that it is consonant with this approach to
the exercise of the court's discretion that such orders should more readily be granted in
future"); Peter Hutchesson, Derby & Co Ltd. and Others vs. Weldon and Others, 138 NEW
L.J. 6385, 339 (December, 1988) (quoting Lord Browne-Wilkinson as finding it proper to
grant "Mareva injunction pending trial over assets worldwide even where the relief
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injunction's entire development demonstrates an astonishing
failure to heed the warning of Montesquieu who said in 1742,
"There is no crueler tyranny than that which is perpetrated
under the shield of law and in the name of justice."563
Erecting obstacles to frustrate the oppressive effects of the
Mareva injunction in the United States may bruise a few
national egos and may require a comprehensive re-thinking of
America's approach toward international law and the judgments
of foreign nations. 564 Failing to do so, however, is not an
acceptable alternative solution, and any extended delay in the
face of the ever-quickening pace of Mareva-type remedies places
American assets and businesses at severe risk.565 It would be the
height of immodesty to compare this Note with Paul Revere's ride
in the Massachusetts countryside to warn the colonists. But,
warnings need only one voice; revolutions require many.
sought is against a non-resident company which has no assets within the jurisdiction of
the English court"); Lenon, supra note 137, at 1234 (positing expansion of court's power to
grant Mareva injunctions in foreign proceedings, among other examples, are "latest in the
series of incremental extensions which have characterized the history of the Mareva
injunction since its emergence in 1975").
563 CHARLES-LOUIS DE SECONDAT, BARON OF MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS
(1748). One American take on this theory is that of President John Adams, who said, "The
moment the idea is admitted into society that property is not as sacred as the law of God,
and that there is not a force of law and public justice to protect it, anarchy and tyranny
commence."
564 See Alexander, supra note 482 (finding "Hoyle's discussion of the Worldwide
Mareva is particularly important for international law practitioners who must consider
the merits and the costs of such applications in foreign jurisdictions"); Fabano, supra note
293, at 147 (arguing "a plaintiff dealing with a defendant in the international business
arena needs to feel that there is a sure and effective remedy for him in the event that he
has to initiate a lawsuit. As we have seen from the analysis of the American legal system,
the plaintiff will face more uncertainty than peace of mind"); Theuer, supra note 293, at
421 (noting "American legal commentators have generally approved this development and
urged the adoption of similar measures by American courts. Furthermore, at least one
U.S. circuit court has expressed admiration for the English courts' success in this field").
565 See Alexander, supra note 554, at 493 (noting "the use of the Mareva injunction
and other ex parte orders had become quite common, as hundreds of orders were being
made each year with few applications being rejected"); Johansson, supra note 43, at 1096
(suggesting "without expanding the courts' jurisdiction per se, the injunction effectively
extends the courts' geographic reach. In short, court orders apply to defendants wherever
they are"); Theuer, supra note 293, at 484 (predicting "hydraulic pressure of those
claiming a source of funds against those seeking to retain that source will doubtless seek
release elsewhere, either through Congress or a new "nuclear weapon of law").

